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This research examines the operational and financial shortcomings of South African State-Owned 
Companies (‘SOCs’) which is shown to primarily stem from a lack of enforceable accountability.  
The resolution of this accountability issue begins with the identification of SOCs. An analysis is 
undertaken of the predominant statutes with which SOCs are required to comply: the Public 
Finance Management Act and the Companies Act. An examination of these statutes, together with 
relevant case law and secondary sources, reveals contradictory, convoluted and confusing 
provisions relating to the definition and categorization of various State-Owned Enterprises 
(‘SOEs’) and SOCs. A complete overhaul of these statutory definitions and categorisations is 
required through the enactment of an overarching legislation to govern all aspects relating to all 
SOEs, under which SOCs will be subsumed, as was previously proposed by the Presidential 
Review Committee on State-Owned Entities in 2012.  
The various accountability mechanisms, which should currently be implemented by SOCs, are 
analysed in terms of primary and secondary sources of law. This analysis divides the mechanisms 
into two distinct categories: internal and external mechanisms. Internal accountability mechanisms 
include: the directors, the board and its committees, the role of the company secretary and internal 
audit and the state, as the sole shareholder of the SOC. The external accountability mechanisms 
include: the external audit, the role of the Auditor-General and Public Protector, the legislature, 
the judiciary and the public, as the ultimate stakeholder of the SOC. Notwithstanding the 
availability of these accountability mechanisms, SOCs still fail to actually account for their 
continued underperformance.  
Research conducted through a direct analysis and interpretation of the annual, integrated reports 
of South African Airways SOC Limited (‘SAA’), from 2012 to 2017, will illustrate the inability 
of an SOC to effectively account for its performance. It is shown that one of the significant 
challenges which contributes to the accountability issue facing an SOC stems from the fact that 
the state is its sole shareholder. Evidence from this case study, together with that garnered from 
the investigation of the Zondo Commission of Inquiry into State Capture, will conclusively unveil 
the significant accountability issues experienced by many SOCs in South Africa. There is limited 
case law on the corporate governance and accountability of SOCs, however, an examination of 





corporate governance structures to achieve accountability. However, it is submitted that corporate 
governance, whilst popular, may not be the best method for achieving the accountability of SOCs.  
A structured framework entailing the enforceable accountability of SOCs is proposed as a solution 
to the accountability issue through the implementation of a reward-based system which 
incentivizes the board of an SOC, and the state, to achieve real and significant accountability. This 
system requires the establishment of an independent rating agency which will rate the 
accountability of an SOC. The rating of the SOC will be linked to the provision of state funding, 
with maximum thresholds based on specific rating levels. The board of an SOC will retain the 
discretion of deciding which mechanism is to be instigated to attain actual accountability, of which 
corporate governance is just one method. The board of an SOC, and the state, will be incentivized 
to achieve a high rating level in order to secure preferential state funding.  
This reward-based enforcement mechanism for the accountability of SOCs will require legislative 
reform through the enactment of overarching SOE legislation to govern all aspects relating to 
SOEs. In addition, legislation will be enacted to establish an independent rating agency, akin to 
the state institutions established under chapter nine of the Constitution. The implementation of an 
effective enforcement mechanism will result in the achievement of actual and significant 
accountability for SOCs which will ultimately improve their performance and reduce their reliance 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
1. Introduction  
This research will focus on answering the legal issue of whether the accountability and 
performance of SOCs may be improved through the implementation of a legal, statutory and 
corporate governance reform. The definition and categorisation of SOEs and SOCs in South Africa 
will be fully set out in chapter two of this thesis. The current accountability mechanisms of SOCs, 
which is outlined in chapter three, may not be fully utilised or properly implemented which leads 
to an accountability issue. An examination into SAA under chapter four, as a case study, will 
provide a practical analysis of the possible accountability and financial performance challenges 
facing an SOC. A solution for the improved performance of SOCs, in the form of enforceable 
accountability, is then proposed. The concept of enforceable accountability for SOCs proposes a 
legal reform involving the enactment of certain statutes coupled with a reformed approach to 




The South African economy has experienced sluggish progress over the last couple of years. The 
real Gross Domestic Product (‘GDP’) growth rate was recorded at 0.3 per cent for 2019 and was 
expected to increase to 0.9 per cent for 2020, however largely due to the impact of the global 
pandemic caused by the coronavirus, known as COVID19, the GDP growth rate plummeted to 
negative 7.2 per cent in 2020.1  
South Africa is home to over 700 SOEs, ranging from constitutional organizations to SOEs and 
SOCS of which the state is the partial or sole shareholder.2 South Africa’s economy is under 
enormous pressure to secure state funding and guarantees for numerous SOEs, including SOCs, 
 
1  National Treasury, Republic of South Africa ‘Budget Review 2020’ (2020) available at: 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2020/review/FullBR.pdf, accessed on 12 August 2020 at 
7; National Treasury, Republic of South Africa ‘Budget Review 2021’ (2021) available at: 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2021/review/FullBR.pdf accessed on 27 February 2021. 
2 Pamela Mondliwa & Genna Robb ‘SOEs and Competition: Reflections on South Africa’s Experiences in the 





which are not capable of financial independence.3 The national budget for 2020 projected the 
borrowing requirement for SOCs at approximately 1.3% per cent of overall GDP and in 2021 this 
has been reduced to 1%, however, this seems to be an unrealistic target given the current poor 
financial performance of SOCs. 4  
SOCs, such as Eskom SOC Limited (‘Eskom’) and SAA, have dual mandates comprised of both 
commercial and non-commercial objectives and are capable of being financially self-sustaining.5 
However, with liabilities far outstripping their assets, resulting in a return on equity for the 2020 
financial year of negative 7.9 per cent, SOCs have become more reliant on state funding which 
causes further strain on our limited resources.6  
These SOCs have become huge borrowers of state funding, largely in the form of a provision of 
guarantees over the last decade with a total debt of R692.9 billion and in the next three years 
R182.2 billion is due to be repaid.7 These SOCs shift state funds away from other SOEs which do 
not have commercial mandates and are unable to be financially self-reliant.8 The improvement of 
the financial performance of SOCs is, therefore, of paramount consideration in order to alleviate 
the constrained national budget. 9 
It is submitted that a lack of accountability may contribute to the continued underperformance of 
many SOCs, with a specific focus on their financial performance.10 Despite many internal and 
 
3Ibid at 2; Presidential Review Committee on State-Owned Entities (PRC) ‘Growing the Economy – Bridging the 
Gap’ (PRC) (2013) Available at http://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/presreview.pdf, accessed 
on 13 August 2020 at 67 & 185.  
4 National Treasury (2021) op cit note 1 at 38.  
5  Lynn McGregor ‘Can South African State-Owned Companies Succeed?’ (2015) available at 
http://portal.regenesys.net/course/discussions/editors/kcfinder/upload/files/McGregor%2C%20L.%202015.%20Can
%20State%20Owned%20Companies%20succeed.%20USB..pdf, accessed on 13 August 2020 At 1; PRC Protocol op 
cit note 3 at 3; National Treasury op cit note 1 at 89; Victoria Bronstein & Morne Olivier ‘An Evaluation of the 
Regulatory Framework Governing State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in the Republic of South Africa’ (Unpublished 
research paper, HSRC SOEs Research Project 43, 2011) at 2. 
6 National Treasury (2021) op cit note 1 at 92.   
7 Ibid at 92.  
8 Ibid at 27.  
9 Adele Thomas ‘Governance at South African State-Owned Enterprises: What do Annual Reports and the Print Media 
Tell Us? (2012) 8 Social Responsibility Journal 448 at 452; Thabane & Snyman Van-Deventer, Elizabeth 
‘Pathological Corporate Governance Deficiencies in South Africa’s State-Owned Companies: A Critical Reflection’ 
(2018) 21 PER/PELJ 1-32 at 13.  
10  McGregor op cit note 5 at 1; Modimowabarwa Kanyane & Kombi Sausi ‘Reviewing State-Owned Entities’ 
Governance landscape in South Africa’ (2015) 9 African Journal of Business Ethics 28-41 at 29; Thomas op cit note 
9 at 458; Thabane op cit note 9 at 7; Olga Constantatos & Tarryn Sankar ‘Futuregrowth Asset Management SOE 
Governance Unmasked, A Learning Journey’ (2018) available at http://www.Futuregrowth op cit note 





external measures, with which SOCs are required to comply, accountability remains a significant 
issue. The internal and external accountability measures available to SOCs will be fully described 
under chapter three of this thesis. The predominant statutes which govern SOCs are the Public 
Finance Management Act 1 of 1999 (‘PFMA’) and the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (‘Companies 
Act’), the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (‘Constitution’) as well as its own 
founding legislation.11 The internal accountability measures include: the directors, the board and 
its committees, the state (as shareholder), the internal audit and the company secretary.12 External 
accountability measures include: the external audit and Auditor-General, the Public Protector, the 
legislature, the judiciary and the public. 
This lack of accountability of SOCs has received notable media attention and, following the 
modern concept of stakeholder inclusivity (which will be more fully defined in Chapter Three), 
the stakeholders of SOCs, specifically the public as taxpayers and not just the state as the sole 
shareholder, play an important supervisory role by overseeing the performance of SOCs. 13. In 
response to this attention, the state established the judicial commission of enquiry into allegations 
of state capture, corruption and fraud in the public sector, headed by Deputy Chief Justice 
Raymond Zondo (‘Zondo Commission’).14 The Zondo Commission is mandated to investigate 
SOCs, with a focus on directors who have allegedly committed breaches of their legislated duties 
and the state who is meant to supervise the SOC, as its sole shareholder.15 Together with a report 
from the Public Protector (‘State Capture Report’), the Zondo Commission has uncovered huge 
accountability failures by numerous SOCs.16  
 
11 The Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999; The Companies Act 71 of 2008; The Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa Act 8 of 1996. 
12 The Bronstein & Oliver op cit note 5.  
13 Thomas op cit note 9 at 450; Patricia Makoni ‘The Challenges of ‘Acting’ CEOS in State-Owned Enterprises: the 
Case of South African Airways’ (2015) 11 Corporate Board: Role, Duties & Composition 16 at 16.  
14 Terms of Reference of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry to Inquire into Allegations of State Capture, Corruption 
and Fraud in the Public Sector including Organs of State, Proclamation No. 3 of 2018 by the President of the Republic 
of South Africa in GG 41403 of 25 January 2018. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Commission of Inquiry into State Capture ‘Hearings, recent’ available at 
http://www.statecapture.org.za/site/hearings, accessed on 14 August 2020; Thulisile Madonsela ‘State of Capture’ 
Public Protector South Africa (2016) report No. 6 of 2016/2017 available at http://www.saflii.org/images/329756472-





Under the investigation proceedings, SAA has been highlighted as an SOC with many 
accountability issues.17 Notwithstanding numerous legislated measures, with which the directors 
of SAA are meant to comply, continued and consistent accountability failures, over the last decade, 
have contributed to airline’s voluntary institution of business rescue proceedings in December 
2019.18  
In addition to the legislated measures, voluntary corporate governance recommendations have 
been suggested which SOCs should apply, in order to achieve accountability. In South Africa, the 
corporate governance of SOCs is dominated through the application of the recommended practices 
encompassed under the King Reports and Codes on Corporate Governance for South Africa (‘King 
Codes’), the most recent of which code is the King IV Report on Corporate Governance for South 
Africa (‘King IV’).19  
However, despite the alleged application of the recommended practices under King IV by SOCs, 
such as SAA, their accountability remains an issue. From an analysis and interpretation of SAA’s 
annual integrated reports, for the financial year-ends from 2013 to 2017 (‘SAA Reports’), it 
becomes apparent that one of the main issues facing this SOC is the lack of an appropriate 
enforcement mechanism to ensure its accountability which may have contributed to its poor 
financial performance.20   
 
17 Ibid; Ngatane, N ‘Zondo Commission hears testimony from PWC auditor on SAA finances’ (2020) available at 
http://ewn.co.za/2020/07/16/zondo-commission-hears-testimony-from-pwc-auditor-on-saa-finances, accessed on 14 
August 2020.  
18  South African Airways SOC Limited ‘SAA to enter into Business Rescue’ 5 December 2019 available at 
http://www.flysaa.com/about-us/leading-carrier/media-center/media-releases/newsroom, accessed on 14 August 
2020; Thembekile Kimi Makwethu ‘PFMA Consolidated General Report on National and Provincial Audit Outcomes 
2018-2019’ (2019) Auditor-General South Africa available at 
http://www.agsa.co.za/Portals/0/Reports/PFMA/201819/GR/2018-19%20PFMA%20Consol%20GR.PDF, accessed 
on 12 August 2020; Makoni op cit note 13 at 16.  
19  Institute of Directors Southern Africa (IODSA) The King Report on Governance for South Africa.  (2016) 
Johannesburg: IODSA (King IV) at ch 6.  
20  South African Airways SOC Limited ‘Annual Integrated Report 2013’ (2014) available at: 
http://www.flysaa.com/documents/51855150/51859528/SAA+Annual+Report+2013.pdf/557e81fd-f531-4596-9853-
e079d2d937c4, accessed on 14 August 2020; South African Airways SOC Limited ‘Annual Integrated Report 2014’ 
(2015) available at: 
http://www.flysaa.com/documents/51855150/51859528/SAA+Annual+report+2014.pdf/89fba6a8-5fe8-412d-8ee0-
f659f92f5471, accessed on 14 August 2020; South African Airways SOC Limited ‘Integrated Annual Report 2015’ 
(2016) available at http://www.flysaa.com/documents/51855150/51859528/SAA+IAR+2015.pdf/a2f72b91-0dde-
4c5f-b3aa-6ed7dc6f4726, accessed on 14 August 2020; South African Airways SOC Limited ‘Annual Integrated 
Report for year-ended 2016’ (2017) available at 
http://www.flysaa.com/documents/51855150/51859528/SAA+IAR+2016.pdf/0276a1d0-2848-41bc-a62c-
2a5a624605c5, accessed on 14 August 2020; South African Airways SOC Limited ‘Annual Integrated Report for 





Currently, in order to enforce the accountability of SOCs, a combination of retributive and reward-
based systems have been implemented but with little success.21 Reform of the accountability of 
SOCs seems inevitable and the focus on enforceability is central to improving their accountability 
which may lead to better future performance. The legal reform of SOCs though statutory 
enactments and a different approach to accountability, in comparison to the predominant current 
approach of corporate governance, is proposed in this research. The premise of this legal reform 
is that the implementation of a framework for the enforceable accountability of an SOC will serve 
to improve their future performance. 22  
1.2 Primary Research Question and Secondary Research Objectives 
As a result of the accountability and performance issues facing SOCs, the following primary 
research question is addressed in this thesis: 
• Whether the accountability and performance of SOCs may be improved through the 
implementation of a legal statutory and corporate governance reform. 
From this primary research question, the following secondary research objectives arise, which are 
addressed sequentially in the chapters of this thesis: 
• To understand how SOCs are defined and categorised through South African legislation; 
• To evaluate the current accountability measures which are available for utilisation by SOCs;  
• To ascertain the accountability and performance issues facing an SOC where SAA is utilised 
as the case study; 
• To examine how accountability is achieved through the current corporate governance regime 
in South Africa, with reference to SOCs and to identify any shortcomings in this regime; and 
 
http://www.flysaa.com/documents/51855150/0/SAA_IAR+2017.pdf/22db54be-b1f5-404a-99fd-d12f3fe9e56b, 
accessed on 14 August 2020 (“SAA Reports”).  
21 Thabane op cit note 9 at 23.  
22  Pricewaterhousecoopers South Africa ‘State-Owned Enterprises: Catalysts for Public Value Creation’ (2015) 
available at http://www.pwc.com/gr/en/publications/assets/state-owned-enterprises-catalysts-for-public-value-
creation.pdf, accessed on 13 August 2020; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development ‘South Africa 
Policy Brief: Corporate Governance State-Owned Enterprise Reform’ (2015) Available at 
http://www.oecd.org/policy-briefs/south-africa-state-owned-enterprise-reform.pdf, accessed on 13 August 2020; 





• In light of the accountability and performance issues facing SOCs, to propose a legal statutory 
and corporate governance reform of SOCs to implement enforceable accountability which may 
serve to improve future performance.  
1.3 Methodology 
The methodology of this research is comprised mainly of a desktop study involving an 
interpretation and analysis of primary and secondary sources of law. The following table will 
identify the methodology adopted in this research using the relevant chapters for reference: 
Chapter Methodology 
Chapter One Introductory chapter which sets out a 
background to the research issue, the primary 
and secondary research questions, assumptions 
made and the justifications for the research.  
Chapter Two An examination of South African statutes to 
determine the legal definition of SOCs and 
SOEs in South Africa. 
Chapter Three A description of the accountability 
mechanisms for SOCs based on an 
examination of primary and secondary sources 
of law.  
Chapter Four A case study of SAA to illustrate 
accountability and performance issues facing 
an SOC based on an analysis and interpretation 
of the SAA Reports.  
Chapter Five A description and analysis of the corporate 
governance regime of SOCs using primarily 
secondary source of law.  
Chapter Six A proposed legal framework for the 
enforceable accountability of SOCs by 
describing a legal and corporate governance 






Chapter Seven Provides a conclusion to the thesis by 




There are various assumptions made in this research in order to answer the primary research 
question and address the secondary research objectives. First, there is a specific focus on SOCs as 
opposed to all SOEs in South Africa. The focus on SOCs as opposed to all SOEs is to narrow the 
scope of the research to identifying the accountability and performance issues facing SOCs which 
cause a significant drain on state resources due to their increased reliance on state funding as a 
result of their poof financial performance. Many SOEs are reliant on state funding due to their 
solely non-commercial mandates and there is little possibility to reform these SOEs to become 
financially self-reliant and ease the burden on state funds. 23 Such SOEs will always be state funded 
and therefore the focus of this research is on SOCs which, if reformed, are capable of being 
financially independent from the state. 24 
The SOCs which form the focus of this research are ones which discharge dual commercial and 
non-commercial mandates. The commercial mandates of SOCs will form the specific focus of this 
research as opposed to a focus on the achievement of their non-commercial mandates. SOCs with 
commercial mandates are highlighted in this research as an improvement of the financial 
performance of these SOCs may alleviate their reliance on state funding, which is a scarce 
resource. 25 
In order to avoid confusion, any reference in this thesis to an SOE indicates a ‘state-owned entity’ 
which is a broad definition encompassing all entities which are partially or wholly owned by the 
state, including enterprises, organisations, departments and companies. Any reference to an SOC 
indicates only those ‘state-owned companies’ which are defined as such, in accordance with the 
provisions of the Companies Act and the PFMA.26 Furthermore, although SOCs fall under the 
 
23 Robb op cit note 2.  
24 Bronstein & Oliver op cit note 5 at 11.  
25 National Treasury (2020) op cit note 1; Sunita Menon ‘SAA Continues to Stretch the National Purse’ Business Live 
19 April 2018  available at http://www.businesslive.co.za/fm/features/2018-04-19-saa-fiasco-continues/, accessed on 
14 August 2020.  





portfolio of different ministers, the Minister of Public Enterprises will be referred to as the Minister 
throughout this thesis, to avoid confusion, and the SOCs, in reference such Minster, are the ones 
falling under the purview of the Department of Public Enterprises and the Minister.  
Secondly, SAA will be utilized as the case study to illustrate the accountability failures plaguing 
SOCs which may be a predominant contributing factor to their poor financial performance. The 
rationale for the use of SAA is due to its recent initiation of business rescue proceedings and its 
historic ability to be financially independent from the state. SAA has recently entered into business 
rescue - as the first South African SOC to have done so, it is important to examine the possible 
causes for this initiation into business rescue.27 
 SAA was financially independent from the state until 2012 when it became reliant on state funding 
to continue its operations.28 Therefore, SAA has the ability to discharge its commercial mandate 
which may take precedence over its non-commercial mandate and allow the SOC to be financially 
independent from the state, as was arguably the case prior to 2012.29 Other SOCs, such as Eskom, 
are required to discharge a burdensome non-commercial mandate, on behalf of the state which 
may be prioritised over their commercial mandate. 30 This would mean that their financial reform 
will prove a much more difficult and complicated task. 
The third assumption of this research relates to the use of accountability throughout this thesis. 
The definition and concept of accountability will be fully explained in chapter three. This research 
refers to accountability on a broad spectrum as a principle which may be achieved through various 
mechanisms. The most popular method of achieving this principle for SOCs in South Africa is the 
adoption of corporate governance structures. Therefore, accountability is discussed with specific 
reference to corporate governance in chapter five. However, accountability is referred to in general 
terms as a principle which may achieved by an SOC on a standalone basis or under the umbrella 
of its corporate governance regime, depending on the requirements of the specific SOC. Unless 
specifically referred to in this research, accountability remains a broadly defined principle and not 
as specifically referred to in corporate governance.   
 
27 SAA op cit note 18.  
28 SAA Reports op cit note 20. Kanyane op cit note 10 at 30; Thabane op cit note 9 at 4; Thomas op cit note 9 at 453.  
29 Kanyane op cit note 10 at 30.  
30 Department of Minerals and Energy ‘Electricity Basic Services Support Tariff (Free Basic Electricity)’ in GN 1693 





The fourth assumption relates to the performance of an SOC. In this research the performance of 
an SOC is referred to on numerous occasions. The performance of an SOC is couched in general 
terms to refer to a holistic view of performance including: managerial, operational, corporate, 
financial, and structural performance. 31  However, due to the case study on SAA where the 
financial performance of the SOC is examined, there is an emphasis on the financial performance 
of SOCs in reference to the discharging of their commercial mandates in order to maximize 
shareholder wealth. Where specifically referred to, financial performance will be stated, otherwise, 
the performance of an SOC refers to its general performance from a holistic perspective as 
described in this paragraph.  
Lastly, throughout this thesis one of the internal accountability measures of an SOC is 
differentiated into the directors, the board and its committees. While this differentiation may seem 
redundant, it is made due to the separate duties which the PFMA and the Companies Act place on 
the board, as a collective body, and the directors, on an individual basis. Therefore, in order to 
better analyse the different duties and accountability mechanisms of an SOC, the differentiation is 
made.  
1.5 Relevance of the Research 
The justifications for this research are from an academic and socio-economic standpoint. From 
an academic perspective, the implementation of a novel enforceable accountability framework 
for SOCs provides a knowledge contribution. From a socio-economic standpoint, the 
implementation of enforceable accountability may improve the accountability and performance 
of SOCs which will positively impact the economy.  
1.5.1  Academic Justifications 
A valuable knowledge contribution to the field of commercial law is central to the examination of, 
and proposed solution to, the poor performance of South African SOCs. The primary knowledge 
contribution is the proposed concept of enforceable accountability, as a potential solution for the 
accountability and performance of SOCs. Enforceable accountability is implemented through the 
creation of an independent rating agency which creates an incentive for SOCs to perform as the 
provision of state funding is linked to the rating score achieved by the SOC. The rating agency 
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rates the SOC based on an accountability scorecard which is more fully detailed and set out in 
chapter six of this thesis.  
While the use of an independent rating agency to assess the performance of SOCs has been 
attempted in international jurisdictions, the creation of such an agency in the context of South 
African SOCs is, arguably, a novel concept. Furthermore, linking the outcome of the rating to the 
provision of state funding is innovative in establishing a reward-based mechanism for South 
African SOCs.  
In an examination of the primary knowledge contribution to the field of commercial law, three 
secondary academic justifications for this research are also contributed: 
Firstly, the statutory duties with which directors of SOCs must comply are complex and 
contradictory and lack a duty to account. An overarching SOE Legislation will address this issue 
by amalgamating and codifying the duties, thereby removing unnecessary duplications and 
contradictions and providing the insertion of an enforceable duty to account. The SOE Legislation 
will also contain certain mandatory provisions with which SOCs must comply which have been 
proposed in chapter six.  
Secondly, a case study of SAA is used to showcase the possible accountability issues and financial 
performance of an SOC through an interpretation and analysis of the SAA Reports. This analysis 
is conducted through a direct examination of the SAA Reports and is not based on any other 
secondary source of law, such as an article or opinion, which provides a similar summary or 
analysis.   
Thirdly, despite comprehensive corporate governance recommendations, set out in King IV and 
the Protocol on Corporate Governance in the Public Sector (‘Protocol’), SOCs still exhibit a lack 
of accountability.32  The proposed scorecard to be implemented by the rating agency is largely 
based on criteria specifically designed to achieve the principle of accountability which may be 
achieved on a standalone basis or under the popular approach of utilising corporate governance 
methods. 33  The enforceable accountability of SOCs, through the accountability scorecard, is 
 
32 Kanyane op cit note 10 at 32; Thabane op cit note 9 at 9; Thomas op cit note 9 at 450; PRC Protocol op cit note 3 
at 139; King IV op cit note 19 at ch 6.   
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proposed to transcend the ‘tick box’ approach to the application of the numerous recommended 
practices suggested in King IV and the Protocol.34  
1.5.2 Socio-Economic Justifications 
There are primarily three significant socio-economic justifications for implementing the concept 
of enforceable accountability for SOCs. 
The first primary justification focuses on the state’s limited resources in a developing country. 
With a deteriorating economic outlook, the state can ill afford any unnecessary expenditure.35 In 
light of the state’s constrained resources, state funding should be provided on an exceptional basis 
to SOCs and supervision of the expenditure of those funds is essential.36  
The implementation of a rating agency, which links the rating score of an SOC to the provision of 
state funding, will provide an incentive-based enforcement mechanism for the accountability of 
SOCs. This causal link will focus on the provision of state funding to SOCs exhibiting good 
accountability and, arguably, assist in decreasing the unnecessary expenditure of the state’s limited 
resources to financially underperforming SOCs. This implementation will also assist in the state’s 
supervisory role over any state funding which is provided to SOCs as it will be linked to the 
accountability scorecard. In addition, the state will have more available resources to assist SOEs 
which are not capable of being financially self-sufficient.37  
The second justification for this research stems from the significant effect which underperforming 
SOCs have on the economy. The status of the South African economy has deteriorated 
significantly, with all of the prominent credit rating agencies recently downgrading its 
creditworthiness to sub-investment status. 38  One of the predominant factors leading to the 
inevitable downgrade was the numerous allegations of corruption coupled with the state of SOCs 
 
34 Jess Schulschenk ‘Interview Summary Report’ Corporate Governance Research Programme Albert Luthuli Center 
for Responsible Leadership (2012) available at 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download;jsessionid=68F22977B4B9767319AEC519D9869F1E?doi=10.1.1.39
3.5505&rep=rep1&type=pdf, accessed on 13 August 2020. 
35 Futuregrowth op cit note 10 at 3. 
36 Thomas op cit note 9 at 451; Kanyane op cit note 10 at 34.  
37 McGregor op cit note 5 at 9; Thomas op cit note 9 at 449; Thabane op cit note 9 at 5.  
38 Feddersen, M ‘Rating Agencies to Focus on Three Priorities in October’s budget statement’ Pricewaterhousecoopers 
(2019) available at http://www.pwc.co.za/en/press-room/rating-agencies.html, accessed on 14 August 2020; Paul 
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resulting from their underwhelming performance over the last decade. 39  Improving the 
accountability of SOCs may assist in the fight against corruption and circumvent the squandering 
of limited state resources which may ultimately improve the performance of SOCs and South 
Africa’s creditworthiness rating.  
The third justification relates to the detrimental impact which state funding to a financially 
underperforming SOC may have on competitive neutrality.40 State subsidization for SOCs which 
are capable of performing financially may perpetuate their monopolistic positions which 
negatively impacts competitive neutrality in the industry in which that SOC operates.41 Private 
counterparts, in the same industry sectors as these SOCs, are not afforded the same opportunity 
when they become financially and commercially insolvent.42 Utilizing state funds for SOCs which 
would otherwise be insolvent, is, arguably, tantamount to an unfair, uncompetitive practice.43 An 
economy which fosters competitive neutrality is a key concern for foreign investors who may be 
deterred from making investments in South Africa.44 
1.6 Chapter Overview and Conclusion  
1.6.1    Chapter One: Introduction 
Chapter One comprises an introduction for the topic of thesis. The introductory aspects include: a 
background to the topic, setting out primary and secondary legal questions, assumptions made, the 
methodology utilized, the justifications and relevance of the research and a chapter overview.  
1.6.2 Chapter Two: The Definition of SOCs 
Chapter Two provides an examination into the identification and categorization of SOCs in South 
Africa, in accordance with predominant legislation.45 A distinction is drawn between the differing 
classifications of SOEs and SOCs as a result of compliance with respective legislative instruments. 
All SOEs, of which SOCs comprise a distinct category, are governed primarily by the PFMA, the 
 
39 Ibid.  
40 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development ‘Competitive Neutrality and State-Owned Enterprises 
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Constitution and their own founding legislation.46  However, SOCs, as a defined and distinct 
category of SOEs, are also subject to the Companies Act.47  
There are numerous discrepancies between the various statutes which results in confusing and 
contradictory definitions of SOEs and SOCs. The promulgation of an overarching SOE Legislation 
to govern all aspects relating to SOEs, as previously suggested by the Presidential Review 
Committee on State-Owned Entities in 2012, is a priority which must now be actioned.48 The SOE 
Legislation will amalgamate provisions of the existing legislation to avoid unnecessary 
duplications and remove any contradictions.49 The identification and categorization of SOEs and 
SOCs will be updated, clear and simple which will improve compliance costs.  
1.6.3   Chapter Three: The Accountability of SOCs 
Chapter three will set out an analysis of the current theoretical accountability mechanisms 
available to SOCs. In this chapter the accountability mechanisms are categorized into various 
internal and external measures. An overview of the internal accountability measures includes: the 
directors, the board and its committees, the roles of the internal audit and company secretary and 
the state, as shareholder. The primary external accountability measures include: the external audit, 
the offices of the Auditor-General and Public Protector, the roles of the judiciary and legislature 
and the public.  
1.6.4  Chapter Four: A Lack of Accountability for SOCs  
Chapter four provides a detailed analysis of the current accountability and performance issues 
facing SAA, as a case study of an SOC. The conclusions from this chapter, in respect of the 
accountability failures and poor financial performance of SAA, are drawn from an interpretation 
and analysis of the SAA Reports.50 
1.6.5  Chapter Five: Corporate Governance of SOCs. 
Chapter five comprises an examination of the corporate governance measures adopted by SOCs 
as the current, primary method utilised by SOCs to achieve the principle of accountability. An 
 
46 PFMA op cit note 11; The Constitution op cit note 11. 
47 Companies Act op cit note 11. 
48 Kanyane op cit note 10 at 32, PRC op cit note 3 at 9.   
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analysis of the current enforcement mechanisms utilized by SOCs to achieve accountability is 
undertaken. The effectiveness of the enforcement mechanisms employed by SOCs, encompassing 
elements of both reward and retribution-based systems, are also examined. The outcome of this 
examination begets reform based on the implementation of the concept of the enforceable 
accountability of SOCs.  
1.6.6  Chapter Six: Enforceable Accountability  
Chapter six proposes a solution to the accountability issues facing SOCs, in the form of legal and 
corporate governance reform to implement an innovative enforcement mechanism. The 
enforcement mechanism provides for the annual rating of the accountability of SOCs by an 
independent institution. The accountability of SOCs will be measured in accordance with uniform 
categories which are stipulated on a proposed scorecard to be utilized by the rating agency. The 
provision of state funding to the SOC will be based on its rating and maximum thresholds and 
terms and conditions will be set.  
The statutory reform which is required for SOCs is threefold. First, an amendment to the 
Constitution to include the rating agency as an independent state institution, akin to the office of 
the Public Protector or Auditor-General.51 Secondly, the enactment of a proposed Rating Agency 
Act (‘Rating Agency Act’) to govern all aspects relating to the powers and duties of the rating 
agency. Thirdly, the re-iteration of the proposal made by the Presidential Review Committee on 
State-Owned Entities in 2012 that an overarching SOE Legislation must be enacted to govern all 
aspects relating to SOEs, which will include SOCs. 52  The inclusion of certain proposed statutory 
provisions of the SOE Legislation are set out in this chapter. The reform to the governance of 
SOCs is proposed in the form of a specific focus on the achievement of accountability, as a broader, 
standalone principle and not necessarily defined and implemented through corporate governance 
structures. 53 This SOC reform will address many of the accountability issues facing SOCs, such 
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1.6.7 Chapter Seven: Conclusion  
Chapter seven provides possible recommendations to the accountability issues currently faced by 
SOCs with the implementation of a rating agency as an enforcement mechanism and the inclusion 
of proposed statutory provisions for the SOE Legislation. SOCs with good ratings will be given 
preferential funding by the state which incentivizes the board of an SOC to ensure the 
implementation of effective accountability measures. The improved accountability of SOCs, due 
to the implementation of enforceable accountability, may lead to their better future financial 
performance which will alleviate their significant drain on state resources and help improve the 
economy.  Any possible issues with the implementation of these recommendations will also be 






CHAPTER TWO: THE DEFINITION OF SOCS 
2 Introduction  
South African SOEs comprise a range of organisations, entities, enterprises, boards, tribunals, 
companies and commissions which are either partially or wholly owned by the state, on a 
municipal, provincial or national level.54 The scope of this research is focused on the category of 
SOEs which are defined as SOCs in terms of the Companies Act read together with the PFMA.55 
These SOCs, such as SAA, discharge commercial mandates and are categorized as ‘major public 
entities’ under schedule 2 of the PFMA. The predominant pieces of legislation with which these 
SOCs must comply are the PFMA, the Companies Act and their own founding legislation. 
Compliance with multiple pieces of legislation makes the identification and categorization of 
SOEs and SOCs overly complicated. This is remedied by the reiterated proposal of an overarching 
SOE Legislation which governs all aspects related to SOEs and SOCs.56   
2.1 The Background Logistics of SOCs 
The exact identification of an SOC is important as it will determine the legislation with which its 
board of directors must comply. All SOCs are subject to the provisions of the Companies Act and 
the PFMA.57 All SOEs, which are not defined as SOCs, are subject to the provisions of the PFMA 
but not the Companies Act. Both SOEs and SOCs are subject to the provisions contained in their 
own founding legislation and the Constitution.58 
Given the legal minefield to which SOEs and SOCs are subject, their definition and classification 
has never been a settled issue.59 At the advent of the constitutional democracy, after the 1994 
general elections, it was found that many public policy functions were discharged by SOEs on 
behalf of the state.60 SOEs were not definitively identified in legislation and their direction and 
control by the government varied on a case by case basis and was also largely determined by the 
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56 PRC op cit note 3 at 9.  
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58 Kanyane op cit note 10 at 32; PWC op cit note 22 at 6; Bronstein & Oliver op cit note 5 at 11; Constitution op cit 
note 11 at section 2.  
59 PRC Protocol op cit note 3 at 3.  





specific  mandates with which they were required to discharge.61 The need for reform and the 
specific identification of SOEs was required, as the by-then outdated Companies Act 61 of 1973 
(‘1973 Companies Act’) remained the only mechanism through which to incorporate companies 
in South Africa.62 
 
Although the 1973 Companies Act made no specific reference to the categorization of a ‘State-
Owned Company’, it did allow for the formation of companies and, therefore, by inference, for 
the possibility of an SOC.63 Under the 1973 Companies Act, two types of companies could be 
formed: ‘a company having share capital or a company not having a share capital and having the 
liability of its members limited by the memorandum of association.’64 A company having a share 
capital could be a public or a private company having par value or no par value shares. A public 
company, whose majority or sole shareholder was the state could be referred to as what is now 
known as an SOC.65 However, no provision for the specific definition of a ‘state-owned company’ 
was contained in South African legislation.66  
 
The lack of legislative requirements for the identification and formation of SOEs, given their 
relative importance in the economy, gave way to implementation of the PFMA.67 The PFMA was 
promulgated in 1999 and came into effect on 1 April 2000.68 One of the main reasons for the 
enactment of the PFMA was to give effect to certain provisions encapsulated in the Constitution 
which came into effect in 1996.69 The provisions in the PFMA are intended to complement and 
support the principles enshrined in the Constitution, with respect to the provincial and national 
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spheres of government.70 All SOEs, regardless of their nature, are subject to the provisions of the 
Constitution as the overarching and supreme law of the Republic.71  
 
The PFMA is the overarching piece of legislation which pertains to all provincial and national 
SOEs and its main object is to provide guidance and enforce compliance, primarily in relation to 
the financial management of the institutions to which it applies.72 Municipal systems are governed 
by the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 and the Local Government 
Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003 (‘MFMA’). 73  The provisions in the Local 
Government Municipal Finance Act largely mirror those of the PFMA in respect of the financial 
management of municipal SOEs.74 
 
The Companies Act came into effect in May 2011 and provided a welcomed statutory definition 
of a ‘State-Owned Company’.75   The Companies Act was considered a progressive piece of 
legislation and sought to align South African corporate law with that of international trends.76  All 
companies which are incorporated and registered in South Africa, including SOCs, are subject to 
the provisions of the Companies Act.77 All SOCs are subject to the enhanced accountability and 
transparency requirements, embedded in chapter three of the Companies Act, unless an exemption 
has been granted by the Minister of Public Enterprises (‘Minister’).78  
 
2.1.1 The PFMA 
Due to their utilization of public funds, the state saw fit to hold SOEs to much higher level of 
scrutiny, hence the enactment of the PFMA for provincial and national public entities and the 
MFMA for municipal entities.79 The focus of this research is on SOCs which are defined as 
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‘national public entities’ under the PFMA and therefore, further discussion on the MFMA is not 
germane to this research. 
 
The object of the PFMA has been highlighted as a mechanism ‘to secure transparency, 
accountability and sound management of the revenue, expenditure, assets and liabilities of the 
institutions to which it [the PFMA] applies’.80 The overarching principles of transparency and 
accountability are paramount and serve to uplift the values enshrined in the Constitution, 
specifically with respect to the financial management of national government institutions.81 Not 
merely underlying notions, accountability and transparency are the cornerstones to achieving a 
true constitutional dispensation.82 The PFMA enjoys legislative supremacy and in the event of an 
inconsistency with another piece of legislation, the PFMA prevails.83  
 
The PFMA defines a ‘public entity’ as a ‘national or provincial public entity’.84 The definition 
afforded to national public entities and provincial public entities mirror each other in that they are 
largely similar.85 The PFMA specifically categorizes entities in accordance with their borrowing 
powers and funding capabilities, hence the distinction drawn between national and provincial 
public entities.86 This research focuses on SOCs which are defined as ‘national public entities’ 
and, therefore further discussion of provincial public entities is not relevant to this research.87  
 
The PFMA defines a ‘national public entity’ as: 
 
a.  a national government business enterprise; or 
b.  a board, commission, company, corporation, fund or other entity (other than a national 
 government business enterprise) which is  
i. Established in terms of national legislation;  
 
80 Ibid at section 2.  
81 PWC op cit note 70 at 3; South African Broadcasting Incorporation Ltd and Another v Mpofu 2009 (4) ALL SA 
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86 Ibid at section 66(1)(c); Bronstein & Oliver op cite note 5 at 7. 





ii. fully or substantially funded either from the National Revenue Fund, or by way of a tax, 
levy or other money imposed in terms of national legislation; and 
c.  accountable to Parliament. 88 
 
The PFMA defines a ‘national government business enterprise’ as an entity which: 
 
a.  is a juristic person under the ownership control of the national executive;   
 b.  has been assigned financial and operational authority to carry on a business activity; 
c.  as its principal business, provides goods or services in accordance with ordinary business 
 principles; and 
d.  is financed fully or substantially from sources other than 
 i the National Revenue Fund; or 
 ii. by way of tax, levy or other statutory money.89 
 
The definition of a ‘national public entity’ necessitates a twofold enquiry. The first leg of the 
enquiry commences with the differentiation between a ‘national government business enterprise’ 
(“Enterprise”) and a board, commission, company, corporation, fund or any other entity which is 
not a ‘national government business enterprise’ (collectively referred to as an ‘Entity’)90 An Entity 
must be established by national legislation and must be fully or substantially funded by the state.91  
 
In order to qualify as an Enterprise, four requirements must be satisfied by the ‘national public 
entity’. First, the entity must be a ‘juristic person under the ownership control of the national 
executive’. 92  The definition of ‘ownership control’ relates to the control which the national 
executive exerts over the entity by holding a majority of the entity’s voting rights and the ability 
to appoint or remove the entity’s chief executive officer or a majority of its directors. 93 The PFMA 
does not define the ‘national executive’ however, it may be reasonably surmised that it is 
equivalent to the definition of the ‘executive authority’ as set out in the Constitution which depicts 
the President and his Cabinet.94 Secondly, the entity must have ‘been assigned financial and 
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operational authority to carry on a business activity’.95 Thirdly, as its principle business, the entity 
must provide goods or services in accordance with ordinary business principles.96 Lastly, the entity 
is financed substantially or fully from sources other than the ‘National Revenue Fund’ or ‘by way 
of a tax, levy or other statutory money’.97 
 
The distinction drawn between an Enterprise and an Entity is, arguably, based on their financial 
sources and borrowing requirements from the state.98 An Entity is substantially or fully reliant on 
funding from the state whereas an Enterprise is substantially or fully financed from sources other 
than the state. 99 Therefore, Enterprises are financially self-reliant and are charged with largely 
commercial mandates whilst Entities are reliant on state funding and discharge mainly non-
commercial mandates.100   
 
The second leg of the enquiry, in the identification of a ‘national public entity’, pertains to the 
principle of accountability. An Enterprise and an Entity are both ‘accountable to Parliament’.101 
The PFMA does not define ‘Parliament’, however it can be reasonably surmised that it is 
equivalent to the definition of ‘Parliament’ as contained in the Constitution. In the premise, 
Enterprises and Entities are accountable to Parliament which consists of the National Assembly 
and the National Council of Provinces (‘NCOP’).102  
 
The PFMA makes no specific reference to the definition of an SOC but applies to all public entities 
which are listed under its schedule 2 and which may be classified as an Entity or Enterprise. 103 
The entities listed under schedule 2 are categorized as ‘major public entities’ and largely consist 
of Enterprises which are financially self-sufficient, such as SAA or Eskom. 104 SAA is subject to 
the provisions of the PFMA as it is listed as a major public entity under schedule 2 and is, therefore, 
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a ‘national public entity’ which is a ‘national government business enterprise’.105  This is a 
convoluted and counterintuitive way of stating that SAA is subject to the provisions of the PFMA. 
 
2.1.2 The Companies Act 
One of the main objects of the Companies Act is to promote compliance with the Bill of Rights, 
as set out in the Constitution, in the application of company law in South Africa.106 The Companies 
Act also streamlines processes, encourages entrepreneurship, improves flexibility and simplifies 
bureaucratic red tape, thereby fostering innovation and providing a uniform regulatory framework 
which is applicable to all incorporated companies.107 The implementation of the Companies Act 
represented a fundamental shift to align South African corporate law with international trends, 
replacing the outdated 1973 Companies Act.108 
The advent of the Companies Act, gave rise for the first time to the definition of an SOC.109 The 
specific identification of an SOC provides a valuable contribution to South African corporate law 
jurisprudence. Neither its predecessor, the 1973 Companies Act, nor the PFMA, provided for the 
definition of an SOC.110 All SOCs, along with the other types of companies, can now specifically 
register with the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission (‘CIPC’). An SOC is now a 
separately defined type of company and much of the uncertainty surrounding the identification of 
an SOC should have been alleviated. However, this is not always the case, as will be illustrated 
below.   
A distinction has been drawn between SOEs and SOCs in that not all SOEs are SOCs, unless they 
comply with the definition of an SOC under the Companies Act, read in conjunction with the 
relevant provisions of the PFMA.111  
A ‘state-owned company’ is defined in the Companies Act as: 
‘… an enterprise that is registered in terms of this Act as a company, and either,  
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a. is listed as a public entity in Schedule 2 or 3 of the Public Management Finance Act, 1999 (Act No. 
1 of 1999); or 
b. is owned by a municipality, as contemplated in the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act, 
2000 (Act No. 32 of 2000) and is otherwise similar to an enterprise referred to in paragraph (a).’112 
The definition of an SOC under the Companies Act comprises a twofold analysis. First, the entity 
must be registered as a company, in accordance with the provisions of the Companies Act. 
Secondly, the registered company must be listed as a public entity under schedule 2 or 3 of the 
PFMA.  
Under the first leg of the analysis the enterprise must be a registered company, as defined under 
the Companies Act: 
“company’ means a juristic person incorporated in terms of this Act, a domesticated company, or a juristic 
person that, immediately before the effective date –  
(a) was registered in terms of the –  
(i) Companies Act, 1973 (Act 61 of 1973), other than as an external company as defined in 
the Act; or 
(ii) Close Corporations Act, 1984 (Act 69 of 1984), if it has subsequently been converted in 
terms of Schedule 2; 
(b) was, in existence and recognized as an ‘existing company’ in terms of the Companies Act, 1973 
(Act 61 of 1973); or 
(c) was deregistered in terms of the Companies Act, 1973 (Act 61 of 1973) and has subsequently been 
re-registered in terms of this Act;’113 
This expansive definition of a company allows for the inclusion of juristic persons which are 
registered under the Companies Act and for juristic persons which, under the 1973 Companies 
Act, were designated as a registered company, recognized as an ‘existing company’ and a 
deregistered company (which has subsequently been re-registered in terms of the Companies 
Act).114 Legislators predicted the upheaval which the implementation of the Companies Act would 
have on existing companies and thus the definition allows for the most seamless transition  
possible.  
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There are two types of companies which can be formed and incorporated under the Companies 
Act: a profit company and a non-profit company.115 A profit company is an SOC if it is not 
registered as a private company, personal liability company or public company.116 This ‘default 
type’ definition of an SOC is confusing as it is determinant on a company not being registered as 
any other company. Therefore, if a company is registered as a private, personal liability or public 
company, it is not an SOC. Viewed from a positive perspective, an SOC is a company which is 
registered in terms of the Companies Act, but which is not registered as a private company, 
personal liability company or a public company.  
Under the second leg of the definition of an SOC, a company, as defined, must then also be a 
public entity listed under schedule 2 or 3 of the PFMA.117 The focus of this research is on SOCs 
which are listed under schedule 2 of the PFMA, such as SAA.  
An entity such as SAA is defined as an SOC as it is a registered public company, in terms of the 
1973 Companies Act and a public entity listed under schedule 2 of the PFMA.118  Any provision 
of the Companies Act which is applicable to a public company automatically applies to an SOC, 
unless specifically exempted.119 Under the Companies Act, an SOC may be deemed to have 
amended its constitution and changed the suffix of its name to ‘SOC Limited’, as at the general 
effective date of 1 May 2011.120 
2.2 Classification Issues for SOCs 
An example of the classification of an SOC which will be utilized throughout this research is SAA. 
SAA may be categorized as an Enterprise due to its satisfaction of the four requirements for a 
‘national government business enterprise’ in accordance with the PFMA.121  
First, SAA is under the ownership control of the national executive in that the state, as its sole 
shareholder: holds all of the voting rights at the annual general meeting, casts the majority of voting 
rights at a board meeting and has the ability to appoint and remove the chief executive officer as 
well as a majority of the directors on the board.122 Secondly, SAA has been assigned the financial 
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and operational authority to carry on a business activity to engage in passenger airline and cargo 
transport services.123 Thirdly, as its principal business, SAA provides passenger airline and cargo 
transport services in accordance with ordinary business principles.124 Whilst SAA is charged with 
a non-commercial mandate, which entails the establishment of trade routes with potential allies 
and trade partners, its principal business is the provision of passenger airline and cargo 
transportation services for a profit. 125 
 
Lastly, SAA is meant to be substantially or fully financed from sources other than the ‘National 
Revenue Fund or by way of a tax, levy or other statutory money’. SAA is charged with performing 
a dual mandate: a non-commercial one, on behalf of the state and a commercial mandate for the 
generation of its own profit.126 The profits borne out of the discharging of its commercial mandate, 
should arguably be utilized in order to perform its non-commercial mandate. However, SAA has 
been substantially or fully reliant on state funding in order to continue its operations, over the last 
decade.127  Therefore, as a result of a change in its financial sources, SAA may arguably be 
categorized as an Entity, as opposed to an Enterprise.  
 
According to the Department of Public Enterprises, these public entities are considered SOCs: 
Transnet SOC Limited (‘Transnet’), SAA, South African Express SOC Limited, Eskom, Denel 
SOC Limited (‘Denel’), SAFCOL SOC Limited and Alexkor SOC Limited.128 All of these SOCs 
are listed as major public entities under schedule 2 of the PFMA.129  These SOCs account for seven 
of the total 21 major public entities, listed under schedule 2 of the PFMA.130  Arguably, the 
remaining fourteen entities are SOEs which are only subject to the PFMA and not the Companies 
Act. 
 
However, the reasoning for the differentiation between the seven SOCs and the fourteen SOEs 
under schedule 2 of the PFMA is not provided and, therefore, remains unclear. It would appear as 
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if there is no uniform method of categorizing the various SOCs and SOEs which are listed under 
schedule 2 of the PFMA. None of the seven SOCs include the suffix ‘SOC Limited’ in their names, 
which is required for their identification in accordance with the Companies Act. The PFMA should 
have been amended so that SOEs which fulfil the criteria of the definition for SOCs are identified 
as SOCs and follow the appropriate naming convention set out in the Companies Act.  
 
Without such an amendment, the distinction and classification between SOEs and SOCs, under 
schedule 2, is inferred based on announcements made by the Department of Public Enterprises and 
appears to have been determined on an arbitrary basis.  Evidence of this arbitrary determination 
between SOEs and SOCs will be shown with reference to the Airports Company South Africa 
(‘ACSA’) and Denel, both of which are listed as major public entities under schedule 2 of the 
PFMA.131  
The ACSA is a registered company, in terms of the Companies Act and is listed as a public entity 
under schedule 2 of the PFMA.132 Denel is a registered company under the Companies Act and 
listed as a public entity under schedule 2 of the PFMA.133 Therefore, both Denel and the ACSA 
meet the requirements for the definition of an SOC in accordance with the Companies Act and the 
PFMA.134 However, according to the Department of Public Enterprises, Denel is an SOC whereas 
the ACSA is not.135 There is no reasoning provided for this differentiation and the categorization 
of Denel as an SOC and the ACSA as an SOE appears to made on an arbitrary basis.    
Even more startling is the fact that the ACSA states that it is ‘legally and financially autonomous 
and operates under commercial law’.136 Without any further explanation as to its exclusion from 
the provisions of the Companies Act or the PFMA, the ACSA seems to be defined as an entity 
which is a law unto itself, operating under the very broad dimensions of the ‘commercial law’ of 
South Africa.  
Notwithstanding the clearly defined statutory requirements for an SOC, there is no uniformity or 
clarity on the identification and categorization of SOEs and SOCs, especially with reference to the 
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public entities listed under schedule 2 of the PFMA. Any SOE which meets the statutory 
requirements for an SOC should be defined as such and will be required to comply with the 
provisions of the Companies Act.  
2.3 Circumvention of the Companies Act by SOEs 
All SOCs are required to comply with the Companies Act, the PFMA and their own founding 
legislation.137 All SOEs, which are not defined as SOCS, are only subject to the provisions of the 
PFMA and not those of the Companies Act.  The primary differentiation between the purpose of 
the PFMA and the Companies Act is that the PFMA focuses on the financial management of an 
entity while the Companies Act regulates matters on a much wider scale than just financial 
management.138 Given the numerous statutory provisions with which SOCs must comply, conflicts 
between the Companies Act and the PFMA were bound to arise. 
In the event of a conflict between the provisions of the two pieces of legislation, the intention and 
purpose of the provisions bear closer examination. It is imperative that the conflicting provisions 
of the statutes be applied concurrently, to the extent that it is possible to apply one of the provisions 
without contravening the other.139 However, to the extent that concurrent application of the two 
statutory provisions is not possible, the provisions of the PFMA prevail.140  
Furthermore, section 9 of the Companies Act allows for an exemption from the provisions of the 
Companies Act for an SOC in the event of a conflict between the PFMA and the Companies Act.141 
The wide discretional nature of section 9 is limited by the narrow scope of the requirements under 
which the Minister may grant an exemption.142 The Minister may only grant an exemption on the 
grounds of an overlap or duplication between the applicable provisions of the Companies Act and 
the provisions of an applicable regulatory scheme established in terms of any other national 
legislation.143  
It is submitted that, as a result of its narrowed application, the provisions of section 9 will not be 
abused by SOCs and the Minister in order to circumvent the provisions of the Companies Act.144 
 
137 Bronstein & Oliver op cit note 5 at 8.  
138 Ibid at 20; Cassim op cit note 63  at 4; PWC op cit note 22 at 6.  
139 Companies Act op cit note 11 at section 5 (4)(a). 
140 Ibid at section 5 (4)(b) (i)(ee); PFMA op cit note 11 at section 3 (3).  
141 Ibid Companies Act at section 9.  
142 Ibid at section 9 (2) & (3); Bronstein & Oliver op cit note 5 at 13.  
143 Ibid at section 9 (2).  





However, given the legislative supremacy of the PFMA and the possibility of exempting an SOC 
from provisions of the Companies Act, the  binding nature of the Companies Act on SOCs is 
somewhat diluted.145 
The Companies Act may still be circumvented by SOEs. All SOEs, which are not defined as SOCs 
for whatever reason, are not subject to the provisions of the Companies Act as the Companies Act 
is only applicable to SOCs and not to SOEs. 146  It is submitted that there are three primary 
justifications for holding all SOEs and SOCs to the provisions of the Companies Act, in addition 
to the PFMA and their own founding legislation.  
First, the Companies Act is a much more recent statute coming into effect in 2011 whereas the 
PFMA came into effect 1999 which is two decades earlier. The Companies Act is, therefore, more 
aligned to the socio-economic and political changes in South Africa and to international trends.147  
Secondly, the directors’ duties which are partially codified in the Companies Act are more 
contemporary than those provided under the PFMA.148 The PFMA only requires its statutory 
duties to be discharged by the board of an SOC, jointly, while the Companies Act requires that the 
board and its directors, individually, fulfil its statutory duties.149 The directors of an SOE may be 
sheltered from the harsh imposition of individual criminal or personal liability, for a breach of their 
statutory duties, under the protection of the board, as a collective body of all of the directors, in 
their joint decision taking.150 Therefore, the individual directors of SOCs are held to a much higher 
standard of duties, the same as for private companies, than the board of SOEs under the PFMA.   
Thirdly, and most notably, the Companies Act contains enhanced standards of transparency and 
accountability which are applicable to SOCs whilst SOEs are only subject to the governance 
requirements set out in the PFMA.151 Directors of SOCs, who are required to comply with both 
the Companies Act and the PFMA, are therefore required to comply with many more requirements 
than SOE directors.152 Although this might come with higher compliance costs, SOCs are held to 
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a much higher level of scrutiny in their attempts to achieve the constitutional principles of 
accountability and transparency.153 
An examination of all of the SOEs and SOCs under schedule 2 of the PFMA should be undertaken 
by the Minister and attempts should be made to define all SOEs, which satisfy the legislated 
requirements, as SOCs. Many more of the SOEs under schedule 2 of the PFMA will then be 
defined as SOCs and be subject to the provisions of the Companies Act, in addition to the PFMA. 
Furthermore, as custodians of national assets and utilisers of taxpayer monies, arguably all SOEs, 
regardless of their identification as SOCs, should be held to the utmost scrutiny and be bound by 
the provisions of the Companies Act. 
2.4 Conclusion  
Two primary issues are evident from the preceding paragraphs surrounding the identification and 
classification of SOEs and SOCs. The first issue relates to the complex and contradictory 
definitions of SOEs under the PFMA, with specific reference to the major public entities listed 
under schedule 2, which may be categorized as Entities or Enterprises, based on their borrowing 
requirements from the state.154 The second issue relates to the arbitrary differentiation between 
SOCs and SOEs, listed under schedule 2 of the PFMA, despite clear statutory requirements 
pertaining to the definition of an SOC contained in the Companies Act.155  
The enactment of an overarching SOE Legislation is re-iterated as the proposed solution to resolve 
the two primary issues, as was concluded by the Presidential Review Committee on State-Owned 
Enterprises in 2012.156 The proposed SOE Legislation will be the overarching statute which will 
govern all aspects relating to SOEs and SOCs, including their identification and classification.157 
Under chapter six of this thesis, there are proposed recommendations for certain provisions to be 
contained in the SOE Legislation.  
 Provisions contained in the Companies Act (especially those pertaining to the enhanced 
accountability and transparency requirements) and the PFMA should be amalgamated into clear 
and uniform provisions for insertion into the SOE Legislation. The amalgamation of the statutory 
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provisions should serve to remove duplications and contradictions surrounding the definition given 
to SOCs and SOEs and eliminate the subsequent confusion regarding the possibility of having to 
comply with the PFMA or the Companies Act or both statutes. SOCs and SOEs should be given a 
transitional period, following enactment of the SOE Legislation, in order to amend their founding 
legislation to remove any inconsistencies with the SOE Legislation which would prevail in the 
event of any contradicting provisions.  
Unless it can be shown to be meaningfully required, there should only be one overarching and 
uniform definition for all SOEs and the distinction between SOCs and SOEs should be removed. 
The SOE Legislation may define various categories of SOEs, based on their mandates and 
borrowing requirements from the state. 158  Those SOEs which are fulfilling non-commercial 
mandates on behalf of the state, such as service delivery and public policy functions, are likely to 
be reliant on the state as the sole source of their financing.159 Those SOEs which discharge dual 
mandates, comprising commercial and non-commercial objectives, are likely to be less reliant on 
the state as a financial source and may be financially self-sufficient. 160  The mandates and 
borrowing requirements are interlinked and should be considered in a holistic manner when 
determining the criteria and for the categorization of SOEs. 
 
Furthermore, the SOE Legislation should incorporate provisions which allow for the 
reclassification of an SOE into a different category should the need arise. The Minister should be 
able to reclassify an SOE in the event of a change in the requirements of its mandate or its financial 
circumstances which may affect its borrowing requirements from the state. 161  The ability to 
reclassify SOEs will allow for their categorisation to be aligned with their current mandates as well 
as their economic, operational and financial circumstances.  
This should have been the case with SAA which has been classified as an Enterprise under the 
PFMA, since its inception in 1999 but which should now be reclassified as an Entity due to its sole 
reliance on state funding over the last decade.162 The inability to reclassify SAA has meant that for 
many years its directors have been complying with the requirements under the PFMA pertaining 
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to Enterprises when they should have been complying with the requirements pertaining to 
Entities.163 This reclassification may have assisted in preventing the downfall of SAA which, in 
late December 2019, voluntarily initiated busines rescue proceedings.164   
All SOEs (and SOCs subsumed under the definition of an SOE) will be subject to the SOE 
Legislation and the specific proposed provisions which will be discussed in chapter six of this 
thesis. It is re-iterated that the definition and categorization of all SOEs should be included in the 
SOE Legislation.165 Uniform, simple and clear provisions in the SOE Legislation will provide 
certainty and clarity and serve to reduce compliance costs for directors who only have to comply 
with one statue as opposed to multiple. A clear and uniform approach to the definition of SOEs 
will assist as a precursor to an analysis of their accountability mechanisms in an attempt to provide 
recommendations to improve their future corporate performance.  
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CHAPTER THREE: THE ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS FOR SOCS 
 
3 Introduction 
South African SOCs have the ability to drive and accelerate national growth and development for 
our budding economy. 166  However, the underperformance of SOCs, which has largely been 
attributed to a chronic lack of accountability, has resulted in their reliance on state funding thereby 
depleting scarce state resources.167 Notwithstanding a plethora of legislation, comprising internal 
and external mechanisms attempting to ensure accountability, the enforcement of these 
mechanisms on deteriorating SOCs is virtually non-existent and in dire need of reform.168 The 
concept of enforceable accountability for SOCs, through the implementation of a novel reward-
based mechanism, is proposed for such reform which may serve to improve their future 
performance.  
3.1 The Concept of Accountability  
King IV defines the principle of accountability as: 
‘the obligation to answer for the execution of responsibilities. Accountability cannot be delegated, whereas 
responsibility can be delegated without abdicating accountability for that delegated responsibility’.169 
Responsibility is then defined as: 
‘taking ownership of a duty, obligation or liability’.170 
Accountability is a principle which attempts to ensure the effective fulfilment of directors’ duties, 
in the execution of their responsibilities, to act in the best interests of the company, at all 
times.171Accountability is a principle which stems from the age old ‘agency issue’.172 Shareholders 
rely on directors to take decisions in the best interest of the company which will serve to  protect 
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and grow their investments.173 In other words, the directors of a company are accountable to the 
shareholders for their decisions which are to be taken, at all times, in the best interests of the 
company.174  
When a director is tempted with personal gains, attained by virtue of her position as director, a 
conflict may arise between the interests of the director and the interests of the company.175 In such 
an instance, the director is meant to act in the best interests of the company and not in pursuit of 
her own personal interests.176The principle of accountability is meant to ensure that the conflicted 
director places the interests of the company ahead of her own in order to protect the investment of 
the shareholder, to whom she must account for any decisions taken in her capacity as director. 177   
Accountability is a principle which may be used to subvert detrimental conflicts of interest which 
could negatively impact the company if left unchecked.178If directors are required to account for 
every decision taken, they will be forced to provide sound judgement and reasoning for their 
decisions, thereby deterring unscrupulous and selfish behaviour.179 It is submitted that directors 
who are not held to account for their decisions may take decisions, on a continual basis, which are 
not in the best interests of the company and may negatively impact the performance of the 
company. The principle of accountability is, therefore, utilised not to promote the ethical behaviour 
of directors but rather as a measure to constrain the unethical.180Accountability also fosters other 
important principles which promote the interests of a company, including: transparency, 
responsibility and fairness.181  
3.2 The Accountability Mechanisms for SOCs 
Section 195 of the Constitution places a pre-emptory, accountability requirement on all public 
administration in South Africa, which includes public enterprises such as SOEs and SOCs.182 This 
section states that: 
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‘1. Public administration must be governed by the democratic values and principles enshrined in the 
Constitution, including the following principles: 
… 
f. public administration must be accountable. 
… 
2. The above principles apply to 
… 
c. Public enterprises.’183 
This inclusion in our supreme law further emphasizes the importance of the principle of 
accountability for all SOCs.184 The current accountability structures which should be implemented 
by all SOCs involve a delicate system of internal and external checks and balances.185 All internal 
and external checks and balances should be continually enforced and monitored by SOC 
stakeholders to ensure their effectiveness as enforceable accountability mechanisms.  
3.3 Internal Accountability Mechanisms 
The internal accountability framework for SOCs comprise three predominant pillars. First, the 
directors, the board and its various committees.186 Secondly, the supervisory role of the state as 
sole shareholder.187 Thirdly, the role of the internal auditors and the company secretary.188  As the 
first hurdle to ensuring enforceable accountability, an SOC needs to fulfil the internal 
accountability mechanisms as a matter of absolute priority. Only once the internal mechanisms are 
completely satisfied, will the external mechanisms be put to the test to establish their true potential 
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3.4 Directors Duties and Liabilities 
The point of departure with regard to a discussion of the accountability of an SOC, must, as a 
matter of course, commence with its directors.189 Directors are required to fulfil their common law 
duties as well as their partially codified statutory duties, contained in the PFMA, the Companies 
Act and its own founding legislation, to act in the best interests of the SOC at all times.190 Directors 
are able to delegate a duty, of which they have taken ownership, however, they remain accountable 
for the execution of such duty. 191  The board of an SOC and its directors, individually and 
collectively, are always held accountable to the state, as its sole shareholder, for the execution of 
their responsibilities which includes the performance of their duties.192 
There is no specific statutory duty to account, which the directors of an SOC are required to fulfil. 
However, fulfilment by the directors of their common law duties and the partially codified 
fiduciary duties together with the duty of care and skill in every decision taken, in the best interests 
of the SOC, should result in their accountability to the state and various other stakeholders. 
Therefore, the effective fulfilment of directors’ duties and the principle of accountability are 
inextricably linked. A director who fails to discharge his or her duties will compromise his or her 
own ability to account for decisions taken, which may not have been in the best interests of the 
SOC and which may ultimately hinder its performance.193   
3.4.1 Definition of Directors: Who Owes the Duty? 
The board of an SOC, jointly and its directors, individually, are required to discharge their common 
law and partially codified statutory duties in accordance with the Companies Act and the PFMA, 
as the predominant pieces of legislation, as well as their own founding legislation.194   
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The Companies Act provides for the wide definition of a director as ‘a member of the board of a 
company, as contemplated in section  66 or an alternate director of a company and includes any 
person occupying the position of a director or alternate director by whatever name designated.’195 
The board of an SOC has the authority, unless restricted in its founding legislation or by the 
provisions of the PFMA, to exercise all of the powers and perform any of the functions of  the 
SOC.196 This extensive definition indicates that all of the members of the board of an SOC, 
regardless of their designation, will be regarded as directors who have the authority to exercise all 
of the powers and perform all of the functions of the SOC.   
In addition, section 76 of the Companies Act, pertaining to directors’ duties, complements the 
extensive definition of a director. 197  Section 76 (1) stipulates that ‘an alternate director, a 
prescribed officer or a person who is a member of a committee of a board of a company  or of the 
audit committee of the company, irrespective of whether or not the person is also a member of the 
company’s board’, will be included in the definition of a director for the purposes of the section.198 
This wide definition affords extensive protection for an SOC by requiring such persons to err on 
the side of caution and take every decision in the best interests of the SOC, even if they are not 
specifically designated as a director of the SOC.199  
As a result of the extensive definition of a director, persons cannot escape liability for a breach of 
their statutory duties on the basis that they are not formally designated as a director of the SOC.200  
Therefore, any executive, non-executive, independent, de facto, nominee, de jure, shadow, ex-
officio director, prescribed officer, alternate director or member of a board or audit committee of 
the SOC is required to perform the statutory duties.201  The all-encompassing definition of a 
director contained in the statutory duties in section 76, coupled with the extensive definition of a 
director in section 1, make it increasingly difficult for persons to escape liability for a breach of 
their statutory duties. 202   
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The PFMA also prescribes statutory duties which the board of an SOC must fulfil.203  The PFMA 
defines the board of directors of an SOC as its ‘accounting authority’.204 The PFMA also contains 
a duty which may be described as a duty to account by the board of an SOC: ‘Every public entity 
must have an authority which must be accountable for the purposes of this Act’.205 The board owes 
statutory duties to the SOC and must be held accountable for its compliance with the provisions 
of the PFMA.206 However, in contrast to the Companies Act, the board, and not the individual 
directors, are specifically referred to in the PFMA with regard to the statutory duties and the 
statutory accountability requirement.207   
It is submitted that a conflict between the PFMA and the Companies Act may arise as the PFMA 
only makes reference to the board of an SOC being required to discharge statutory duties and not 
the individual directors as required by the Companies Act. Where there is a conflict between the 
provisions of the PFMA and the Companies Act, which cannot be reconciled by reading them 
concurrently, the PFMA prevails.208 Therefore, it is submitted that an individual director of an 
SOC may defend a claim based on a breach of his or her statutory duty in the Companies Act, on 
the basis that the board, and not the individual directors, owe a duty to the SOC as required by the 
prevailing provisions of the PFMA.  
Recent case law also suggests a judicial preference to hold the board accountable, as opposed to 
the individual directors, in terms of the overall management and supervision of a company. 209 
However, there is nothing prohibiting the directors, individually, as well as the board, collectively, 
owing the statutory duties to the SOC. In fact, SOCs should be held to a higher level of 
accountability, given their status as custodians of national assets and therefore, it seems likely that 
this discrepancy between the Companies Act and the PFMA is merely due to a legislative 
oversight. The board of an SOC and its individual directors should be required to discharge the 
statutory duties contained in the PFMA and the Companies Act which can be applied concurrently 
to ensure that the utmost level of accountability is achieved.210  
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In this research, for the sake of clarity when PFMA is referred to, it will be stated that the board, 
collectively, owe their duties to the SOC and when the Companies Act is referred to, it will be 
stated that the directors, individually, owe their duties to the SOC. The board will be described as 
a collective body which comprises the directors jointly but only severally where it is possible to 
make a distinction between the directors and where allowed under the relevant statutes. Unless 
specifically mentioned under the relevant statute, reference to the board indicates the directors 
making decisions jointly and as a collective body.   
3.4.2 Definition of ‘the Company’: To Whom do Directors owe their Duties? 
The next issue pertains to the identification of the entity to whom the directors owe their duties. 
The Companies Act requires that directors discharge their duties in ‘the best interests of the 
company’.211 The PFMA stipulates that the board owes its duties to the ‘public entity’.212 The 
Companies Act does not provide for the definition of a ‘company’ whilst the PFMA, as previously 
discussed defines a ‘public entity’, as an Entity or Enterprise. It is submitted that the directors owe 
statutory duties to the SOC, in accordance with the provisions of the Companies Act, read together 
with the PFMA.  
However, the issue which now arises is to whom exactly the directors owe their statutory duties, 
in terms of the ownership structure of the SOC and its various stakeholders. The Companies Act 
and the PFMA do not provide for the description of what constitutes the ‘company’ or ‘public 
entity’ under the provisions encompassing the statutory duties. 213  The provision of such a 
description which sets out the ownership structure of an SOC would greatly assist in identifying 
to whom exactly the board and its directors owe their duties.  
It is trite from the common law that directors owe their statutory duties to the ‘company’ which 
depicts the collective interests of its existing and future shareholders.214  This is a traditional 
approach which requires directors to balance the short-term profit maximization with the long-
term future sustainability of the company, to the absolute benefit of the shareholders, as a collective 
body.215 This approach was further expanded with the ‘pluralist’ and ‘enlightened shareholder 
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value’ approaches which allow for the consideration of other stakeholders interests, in addition to 
the shareholders, in the decision taking by the directors of the company.216   
The most progressively altruistic approach to the duties owed by the directors to a company is that 
of the ‘stakeholder-inclusive’ approach which is advocated by the King Codes.217 Under this 
approach, the directors are required to take into account the legitimate interests and expectations 
of the stakeholders in the execution of their duties, in the best interests of the company.218 The 
shareholders’ interests are not prioritized over that of the other stakeholders, whose interests are 
balanced and taken into account to best serve the interests of the company.219 Aligning with 
international corporate governance trends, the company is to be a responsible corporate citizen 
within the community in which it operates, from an economic, social and environmental 
perspective.220   
However, this ‘stakeholder-inclusive’ approach is not mandated by the Companies Act or the 
PFMA and therefore, the directors of an SOC are not required to consider the interests of all 
stakeholders in order to fulfil their statutory duties. 221  The directors are therefore primarily 
concerned with serving the interests and expectations of the state, as the sole shareholder of the 
SOC, in discharging their statutory duties. The directors of an SOC would only voluntarily 
determine whether to take the interests of various stakeholders into account, on a case by case 
basis, to serve the best interests of the SOC.222   
The ‘stakeholder-inclusive’ approach presents a unique and challenging hurdle for the directors of 
SOCs in terms of the competing dual mandates, comprising both commercial and non-commercial 
objectives, which have to be performed.223 Directors of SOCs may, therefore, be faced with the 
complicated task of having to balance the legitimate interests and expectations of the state, in its 
multiple capacities as: public policy maker, service delivery provider and profit-orientated sole 
shareholder. This may present a daunting challenge as the interests of the state, in these various 
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capacities, may not always be aligned. In addition, the directors of the SOC may also take into 
account the interests of other stakeholders including: employees, trade unions, creditors, suppliers 
and the public.224  
In order to balance the competing interests of the state, in its various capacities, a shareholder 
compact agreement is entered into between the state and the SOC. 225 This compact is meant to be 
executed annually and updated on a continual basis to ensure the achievement of key performance 
indicators by the SOC. This is an important document to maintain an open line of communication 
between the state and the directors of the SOC and to promote the efficient transparency and 
disclosure of the performance of mandates. The directors of the SOC should also set up methods 
to engage with the other stakeholders on a continual basis and not only through the publication of 
the annual, integrated report. 
3.4.3 Specific Duties: What Duties are the Directors Required to Discharge? 
There are two overarching statutory duties which directors of SOCs are obliged to perform: the 
fiduciary duty and the duty of care and skill. 226  Both overarching duties have one supreme 
commonality: to act in the best interests of the SOC at all times.227 The board of an SOC is also 
required to discharge the numerous, additional statutory duties codified in the PFMA.228 An ever-
evolving and flexible concept, directors’ duties are often unclear, which makes their fulfilment a 
question of interpretation and application on a case by case basis.229 
(a) Fiduciary Duties 
The overarching obligation underpinning the core of the fiduciary duties is that directors are 
required to act with the utmost loyalty to the company, as its fiduciary.230 With this core obligation 
in mind, the fiduciary duties of directors contain four primary duties.231 First, the duty to act in 
good faith, in the best interests of the SOC and for a proper purpose.232 Secondly, the duty to 
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exercise independent judgment.233 Thirdly, the duty to act within their powers.234 Fourthly, the 
duty to avoid a conflict of interest.235  
The Companies Act and the PFMA have partially codified these four common law fiduciary duties, 
to various extents and with slight variations.236 In terms of section 76 of the Companies Act, 
directors are required to exercise their powers and perform their functions ‘in good faith and for a 
proper purpose, in the best interests of the company’.237  The duty to avoid a conflict of interest is 
also partially codified in section 50 (3) of the PFMA and under section 76 (2) read with section 75 
of the Companies Act.238  
The fiduciary duties encompassed under the PFMA are more robust than those contained in the 
Companies Act.239 The PFMA specifies four different and distinct fiduciary duties which include: 
exercising the utmost of care; acting with fidelity, honesty and integrity, the duty to disclose 
material and reasonably discoverable facts and to seek to prevent any prejudice to the state’s 
financial interests.240 The PFMA also contains provisions relating to general duties, in addition to 
the fiduciary statutory duties, with which the board of the SOC is required to comply.241 
The duties, encompassed in the PFMA, the Companies Act and the common law, should be applied 
concurrently to ensure the utmost accountability of the  board and its directors for decisions which 
are to be taken in the best interests of the SOC.242 The duty to avoid a conflict of interest has been 
one of the most, if not the most, adjudicated upon duties under the common law.243 A director is 
under a fiduciary duty to avoid placing himself or herself in a scenario where his or her personal 
interests conflict with his or her duties as a director.244 This is a stringent obligation which our 
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courts have emphasized on many occasions. 245  The partial codification of this duty in the 
Companies Act and the PFMA is evidence of its status as a core fiduciary duty.246  
Under the umbrella of the statutory fiduciary duties, the Companies Act also specifically depicts a 
duty to avoid a personal financial interest for directors in the course and scope of discharging their 
duties.247 The introduction of this duty into the Companies Act is due to the numerous instances 
where directors’ personal financial interests have taken precedence over their duties as a 
director.248 The requirements of this duty are that the conflicted director must disclose his or her 
conflict to the board, prior to the decision being taken, and then recuse himself or herself while the 
matter is under discussion for resolution. 249 The statutory duty has a wide ambit in its inclusion of 
the expansive definition afforded to the ‘directors’ which is akin to the definition under section 76 
and also encompasses the personal financial interests of any related party to the director.250  
The difference between this duty and the general duty to avoid a conflict of interest, is the emphasis 
on the presence of a financial gain for the director.251 The outcome of a director’s failure to 
discharge this duty will be that the resultant board decision is regarded as invalid, unless the 
shareholders have subsequently ratified the decision following a disclosure of the interest.252 An 
interested person may also approach the court to declare the board decision valid.253 
In the event of an SOC director taking a decision to benefit his or her own personal interests, to 
the possible detriment of the SOC, he or she cannot be said to be acting in the best interests of the 
SOC.254 Where the personal interests of the director and the SOC diverge, one interest must be 
subverted in order for a decision to be taken. This divergence of interests results in a conflict, in 
which case the requirements of the Companies Act and the PFMA must be followed, failing which, 
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the board and/or director may be in breach of his or her statutory duty and subject to possible 
liability.255  
The statutory fiduciary duties in the PFMA and the Companies Act do not specifically refer to a 
duty of accountability for SOC directors. It is conceivable that the principle of accountability is 
achieved through the directors effective fulfilment of all of their statutory duties.256 The PFMA 
does, however, mention accountability under the statutory fiduciary duties by prescribing a 
requirement for the disclosure of any material facts, including reasonably discoverable ones, by 
the board of an SOC to the legislature, to which the SOC is accountable which may influence the 
actions or decisions of the legislature.257 However, this is a duty to disclose rather than to account 
for the board and a similar duty is also encompassed under the Companies Act for the individual 
directors.258  
There is a requirement stipulating that the board of an SOC must be held accountable for the 
purposes of the PFMA.259 This accountability requirement is not included under the statutory 
fiduciary duties of the PFMA but rather encompassed under section 49 forming a separate and 
distinct obligation on the board of an SOC.260  
One of the fiduciary duties under the PFMA is unique to the position in which the board of an SOC 
finds itself as the manager of an entity where the state is its sole shareholder. This duty prescribes 
that the board of an SOC ‘seek, within the sphere of influence of that accounting authority, to 
prevent any prejudice to the financial interests of the state’.261 This statutory fiduciary duty is 
unlike any other duty which is required of directors of private and public companies in South 
Africa under the common law or the Companies Act.262  
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The imputation of this onerous duty is that the board of an SOC owes this particular fiduciary duty 
specifically to the state, as shareholder.263 The application of this duty is narrowed in its scope due 
to the qualification that the board is only required to act within its own sphere of influence. As a 
result of this qualification, the duty may be subject to circumvention as the board of an SOC may 
argue that the financial prejudice suffered by the state was not within the realm of the board’s 
influence and the prevention thereof was impossible. It may be difficult to prove that the financial 
prejudice suffered by the state ensued as a result of the decisions taken by the board of an SOC.264 
The difficulty in proving a causal link between the financial prejudice suffered by the state and the 
decision taken by the board of the SOC may, therefore, dilute the enforceability of this important 
duty.265  
However, the inclusion of this fiduciary duty under the PFMA clearly depicts the intention of the 
legislature to hold the board of an SOC to the highest level of accountability in taking decisions to 
actively prevent any financial prejudice being suffered by the state.266 It is clear that because SOCs 
may utilise state funding and perform mandates on behalf of the state, the decisions of the board 
may have a significant impact on the state and its limited resources.267 Therefore, the board of an 
SOC is required to act with the utmost vigilance to ensure the fulfilment of this additional statutory 
fiduciary duty which is burdensome and would not be required of the directors of private or public 
companies.   
(b) The Duty of Care and Skill 
In addition to the statutory fiduciary duties, the Companies Act and the PFMA have also partially 
codified the duty to act with a degree of care and skill in taking decisions in the best interests of 
the company.268  However, the Companies Act and the PFMA diverge in respect of the parameters 
of this duty.  The duty of care and skill under the Companies Act comprises an objective and 
subjective element whilst the PFMA contains a duty which is solely subjective.269  
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The PFMA requires that the board act with the ‘utmost care to ensure the reasonable protection 
of the assets and records of the public entity’. 270   Despite the inclusion of an element of 
reasonableness, which is objective but only in relation to the amount of protection to be given, the 
test of ‘utmost care’ is subjective and refers to what the board considers to be in its utmost care.271 
There is no prescribed minimum standard of care and the test is solely determined in reference to 
those directors’ states of mind which is proven with evidence gained from those directors. The 
complete subjectivity of this duty under the PFMA, stemming from common law precedent, may 
leave it open to abuse by the board and therefore undermine its enforceability.272  
The Companies Act requires a degree of care, skill and diligence that may reasonably be expected 
of a person carrying out those same functions and having the same knowledge, skill and experience 
of that director.273 This duty sets out a test for the director’s actions or decision taking which 
comprises both an objective and subjective element.274 The first leg of the test is objective in that 
it tests the director’s care, skill and diligence against that of a reasonable person carrying out the 
same functions as those carried out by that director.275 The second leg of the test is subjective in 
that the knowledge, skill and experience of that particular director must be taken into 
consideration.276  
For inexperienced directors, there is a minimum standard of care and skill which must be displayed 
whereas experienced directors will be held to a much higher standard, given their breadth of 
knowledge, experience and skillset.277 The dual objective and subjective nature of the duty of care 
and skill under the Companies Act is implemented to increase the accuracy of the test in order to 
establish whether a specific director has fulfilled his or her duty.278 The addition of the element of 
reasonableness and objectivity to the duty of care and skill in the Companies Act serves to upgrade 
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the traditional duty, which was completely subjective and to align it with modern international 
trends and foreign law jurisprudence.279 
The duty of care and skill, as set out in the common law, PFMA and Companies Act, should be 
applied concurrently by the board of an SOC and its directors to the extent that it is reasonably 
possible to do so.280  The concurrent application of this duty will assist in attempting to ensure the 
utmost protection of the stakeholders’ interests, primarily focusing on the state as the sole 
shareholder and promote the accountability of decisions taken by the directors of an SOC. 
(c) Other Duties  
The board of an SOC must also comply with the general statutory duties under section 51 of the 
PFMA.281 These general duties focus on the financial governance of the SOC and include duties 
relating to: compliance with tax regulations, safeguarding assets, management of revenue, 
expenditure and liabilities, internal and external audit controls, an appropriate and fair procurement 
and provisioning system, managing working capital, collecting revenue and preventing irregular, 
fruitless and wasteful expenditure.282 
In addition, the board is required to effectively discharge a human relations role in respect of the 
disciplinary measures against employees of the SOC.283 The board is also responsible for the 
submission of all reports, notices, returns and other information to Parliament, the Minister (as the 
relevant executive authority for SOCs under his portfolio) or the National Treasury, as required.284 
The board must inform the National Treasury of any new entity which the SOC intends to 
establish.285 The board must also ensure compliance with the provisions of the PFMA and any 
other legislation to which the SOC is subject.286 In the event of an inability of the board to comply 
with its responsibilities in terms of the PFMA, it must promptly report such inability to the Minister 
and the National Treasury.287  
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The PFMA also contains requirements with which board of an SOC must comply in respect of 
information to be submitted to the Minister, National Treasury or Auditor-General.288 The board 
must compile annual budgets, financial reports and corporate plans which are to be submitted to 
the Minister and National Treasury or Auditor-General.289 The board of an SOC, as a national 
government business enterprise, is required to submit annual budgets and corporate plans, in the 
prescribed form, to the Minister and National Treasury. 290  The annual budget comprises a 
projection of the revenue, expenditure and borrowings for that financial year whilst the corporate 
plan sets out the strategic plans and affairs of the SOC for the following three financial years.291  
In addition to the annual budget and corporate plans, the Minister must conclude an annual 
shareholders compact with the SOCs under his or her portfolio.292 The shareholders compact 
provides an agreement between the Minister and board of the SOC in respect of the key 
performance indicators that the SOC is required to fulfil.293 The shareholders compact is a key 
document for illustrating the relationship between the Minister and the board of the SOC and is 
essential for goal orientation and the effective implementation of strategies and plans. The 
shareholders compact is meant to provide a governance framework from which the board of an 
SOC can derive a performance guidebook.294 
The PFMA also places particular emphasis on the financial affairs of an SOC, over which the 
board must exercise particular care in the fulfilment of their duties.295 The financial management 
and oversight of an SOC is emphasized under the PFMA as a result of the widespread financial 
implications which SOCs may have on the national budget and economy.296  The PFMA stipulates 
stringent borrowing requirements for SOCs which must be complied with, in order to avoid the 
implications of liability due to financial misconduct.297 
 
288 Ibid at section 54.  
289 Ibid at section 52, 54 & 55.  
290 Ibid at section 52.  
291 Ibid at section 52; Thomas op cit note 9 at 463; Public Finance Management Act Treasury Regulations in GN R225 
GG 27388 of 15 March 2005 at reg 29.1. 
292 Ibid at reg 29.2.2. 
293 Thomas op cit note 9 at 463.  
294 Ibid.  
295 PFMA op cit note 11 at section 50.  
296 Madonsela, op cit note 16; National Treasury op cit note 38 at 90.  





In comparison to the PFMA, the Companies Act affords directors a wide discretion in light of their 
responsibility to manage the business and affairs of the SOC, by allowing them to exercise all 
powers and perform any functions required, unless their founding legislation or Memorandum of 
Incorporation (‘MOI’) provides otherwise.298 The MOI of an SOC may limit the powers of the 
board by requiring the passing of a shareholders special resolution opposed to the board’s ordinary 
resolution.299 In this way, the state as sole shareholder of an SOC maintains a degree of control 
over the business and affairs of the SOC in protection of its assets, and the board’s control is 
diluted.300  
The MOI can also include additional duties for directors, as long as there is not a conflict with the 
provisions of the Companies Act, in which case the Companies Act prevails.301 The shareholders 
compact can also be used to specify additional duties for the board of an SOC and should set out 
as much detail as is reasonably possible for the role and responsibilities of the board.302 
The PFMA makes it clear that the board of an SOC is to be held accountable for ensuring 
compliance with its provisions.303 Similarly, there is a reciprocal duty on the Minister to ensure 
that the board of an SOC complies with its statutory duties to take decisions in the best interests 
of the SOC at all times. The Minister of Finance also has a duty under the PFMA to hold the board 
of an SOC accountable for its statutory compliance.304 However, the PFMA does not specify how 
the board of an SOC is to be held accountable to the state and its various stakeholders.305 
The accountability of the board of an SOC is a matter of interpretation in ascertaining whether or 
not the directors have complied with their statutory and common law duties. The omission of a 
specific statutory duty to account, while promoting innovation and flexibility, may result in 
uncertainty and lead to a lack of communication between the board of the SOC and its various 
stakeholders. A lack of clarity and certainty of the manner in which the board of an SOC is held 
to account may undermine the board’s authority to control and manage the SOC and may diminish 
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the effective oversight role which is to be provided by the state, as the sole shareholder.306 
Legislation may have to be amended to include a duty to account in the statutory duties with which 
the board and the directors of SOCs are required to comply. The parameters of this duty to account 
have not been proposed in this research as they will dependent on the proposed amalgamation of 
all of the statutory duties, and how these are worded, in the overarching SOE Legislation.  
3.4.4 Liability of Directors  
The PFMA, Companies Act and common law place numerous duties on the directors of SOCs in 
an attempt to ensure accountability for their decisions. Actual and significant accountability is only 
achieved through the implementation of an enforcement mechanism which attempts to ensure that 
directors effectively discharge their duties. The imposition of statutory liability on the board and 
the directors of SOCs, in the event of a breach of a statutory or common law duty, under the 
Companies Act and the PFMA is currently one of the main enforcement mechanisms.307 Fear of 
the imposition of criminal or personal liability acts as a deterrent for directors of SOCs who are 
contemplating a breach of their statutory and common law duties.308 In the event of such a breach, 
the SOC must bring an action against its board, jointly, or its directors, individually, for a breach 
of the statutory or common law duties under the Companies Act or the PFMA, as set out in the 
case of Hlumisa Investment Holdings (RF) Limited and Another v Kirkinis and Others.309  
The board of an SOC, meaning the directors jointly, may be held criminally liable for a grossly 
negligent breach of certain statutory duties contained in the PFMA, and the directors of the SOC, 
individually, for certain fraudulent activities in terms of the Companies Act. 310  Under the 
Companies Act, the director  of an SOC may be held criminally liable in the event of an act of 
fraud, perpetrated in relation to the SOC, its employees or creditors. 311  Furthermore, the 
Companies Act allows for directors to be held criminally liable in the event of participation by the 
directors in the reckless carrying on of the business of the SOC with the intent to defraud.312   
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The board of an SOC may be held criminally liable in the event of a breach of  a statutory fiduciary 
duty, general duty or any other duty, as dictated by the PFMA.313 Section 86 (2) of the PFMA 
states that the board may be guilty of an offence and liable, on conviction, to a fine or 
imprisonment, for a maximum of five years if there is a wilful or grossly negligent breach of the 
fiduciary, general or financial duties. 314  The inclusion of the condition of wilful or gross 
negligence conceivably eases the burden on the board as it increases the burden of proof which is 
required before criminal liability may be imposed. This is due to the severity of imposing criminal 
liability against directors who are jointly, as the board, guilty of a breach of their statutory duties.   
Furthermore, in respect of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004, 
SOC directors have a further statutory duty to report any knowledge or reasonable suspicion of 
fraudulent conduct, by another person, to any police official.315 A failure to do so would result in 
the director possibly being held criminally liable.316  Criminal liability, may also be imposed on 
the SOC, under the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1997, for any offence committed as a result of 
an act or omission of a director in the exercise of his powers or performance of his duties.317 The 
said director will be guilty of the offence as well, unless it can be proven that he did not take part 
in the commission of the office or could not have prevented its occurrence.318 Therefore, a director 
can be held criminally liable for any criminal offence committed by the SOC unless he can prove 
his innocence. This is a serious burden on directors as it shifts the onus of proof onto the director 
and may result in conviction for a crime for which the director is not responsible.319  
In addition to the imposition of criminal liability, fear of suspension or dismissal for certain 
activities may deter SOC directors from breaching their duties under the PFMA.320  The board of 
an SOC may be found guilty of committing an act of financial misconduct in the event of a wilful 
or negligent breach of a fiduciary, general or any other duty under the PFMA, or the making or 
permitting of an irregular expenditure or fruitless and wasteful expenditure. 321 If the board of the 
SOC is found guilty of financial misconduct then every director is held liable, individually and 
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severally, for the financial misconduct perpetrated by the board.322 Financial misconduct by the 
board of an SOC is a ground for the dismissal or suspension of, or sanction against, every director 
serving on the board regardless of any other legislation.323  
Unlike its predecessor, the Companies Act does not hold directors criminally liable in the event of 
a breach of their statutory duties and only in the event of fraudulent conduct.324 The Companies 
Act holds directors personally liable in the event of a breach of a statutory or common law duty.325 
The liability of directors is categorized in accordance to the specific breach of duty, whether it be 
a breach of a fiduciary duty, the duty of care and skill or other statutory or common law duties.326  
Under the Companies Act, the individual directors of an SOC may be held liable for a breach of 
their duties.327 The statutory personal liability imposed on directors in the event of a breach of their 
statutory duties, under the Companies Act, is separated into two distinct categories.328 First, a 
director may be held liable, in accordance with the principles of the common law, for a breach of 
a fiduciary duty, as a result of which the company sustains any loss, damages or costs.329 This 
liability specifically refers to a breach of the statutory fiduciary duties relating to a disclosure of a 
personal financial interest, the duty to avoid a conflict of interest, the duty to act in good faith and 
for a proper purpose and the duty to act in the best interests of the company.330  
Secondly, a director may also be held liable, in accordance with the principles of the common law 
relating to delict, for any loss, damages or costs sustained by the company due to a breach of the 
statutory duty of care and skill, any duty contained in the Companies Act or any provision 
contained in the company’s MOI.331 The statutory delictual liability imposed on directors arises in 
instances where fiduciary or contractual liability does not arise.332 
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In order for personal liability to be imposed on the director, a causal link needs to be established 
between the breach and the loss, damage or costs sustained by the SOC.333 The director is held 
personally liable for the loss, damage or cost sustained by the company as a result of his or her 
breach. All directors may be held liable, jointly and severally, for the same breach which caused 
the SOC to sustain a loss, damage or cost.334  
The Companies Act places a time limitation on the liability which may be imposed on directors in 
that proceedings to recover any loss, damage or costs sustained by the SOC must have commenced 
within three years from the date on which the act or omission, which gave rise to the liability, took 
place.335  The director may also be held liable for court costs for all parties involved in the 
proceedings contemplated in imposing the liability.336 Furthermore, the director may be required 
to restore to the SOC any amount improperly paid by the SOC as a result of the breach and which 
amount is not recoverable in terms of the Companies Act.337  
Directors of SOCs may also, in certain instances, be held personally liable for losses or damages 
sustained by the shareholders and creditors of the SOC.338 Shareholders may institute a claim for 
damages suffered by them as a result of a director acting intentionally fraudulently or with gross 
negligence which causes the SOC to contravene the Companies Act.339  In this instance, the 
directors will be liable to the state as the sole shareholder of the SOC and not to the SOC itself, as 
a separate legal entity distinct from its shareholder.340 
Aggrieved creditors may establish a cause of action holding directors personally liable under the 
requirements of section 77 (3) and the ‘catch-all’ section 218 of the Companies Act, read with 
section 22 (1) which restricts a company from carrying on its business recklessly, with gross 
negligence or the intent to defraud any person.341 Our courts have also extended the meaning of 
‘sustained by the company’ under section 77 (2) and (3) to allow for any third party to hold a 
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director personally liable for acquiescing to or knowing about conduct that falls within the ambit 
of the reckless trading provisions under section 22 (1) of the Companies Act. 342 The ‘catch-all’ 
cause of action contemplated under section 218 of the Companies Act is discussed in detail under 
the next heading of this chapter. 
The liability imposed on directors, under the Companies Act, is extensive and should act as an 
effective deterrent for unscrupulous behaviour. However, in the event that liability is not an 
effective deterrent, the order of a mandatory delinquency declaration by the court may serve as an 
additional enforcement mechanism for directors’ duties.343 In the event of a person being found to 
be personally liable under section 77(3) (a)(b) or (c) of the Companies Act, a court must make an 
order declaring that person delinquent.344 The result of such an order is that the person will not be 
allowed to act as a director of any company for a period of seven years, from the date on which 
the court order was granted. 345  This mandatory delinquency provision acts as a safeguard, 
protecting other companies from falling victim to the disastrous effects of an unscrupulous 
director.346  
There are various discrepancies between the liability provisions contained in the Companies Act 
and the PFMA. One of the most predominant and confusing is reference in the PFMA to the board 
of an SOC being guilty of an offence and being held criminally liable, in terms of a fine or 
imprisonment.347 Unlike personal liability, it seems improbable to hold directors on the board of 
an SOC jointly and severally liable in the imposition of criminal liability. A possible interpretation 
of this provision is that the entire board of the SOC is held criminally liable and the onus is on 
each and every director to prove their innocence, thereby exempting himself or herself from 
liability.   
The board of an SOC, jointly, as well as the directors, individually, may be subject to the 
imposition of personal or criminal liability, in the event of a breach of the statutory duties under 
 
342 Rabinowitz v Van Graan and Others 2013 (5) SA 315 (GSJ). 
343 Companies Act op cit note 11 at section 162 (5)(c)(iv) read with section 22 (1), 77(3)(b) and 218 (2); Rabinowitz 
case supra note 357; Gihwala and Others v Grancy Property Ltd and Others 2017 (2) SA 337 (SCA).  
344 Ibid. 
345 Myburgh op cit note 356 at 5.  
346 Organisation Undoing Tax Abuse & Others v Duduzile Cynthia Myeni & Others [ZAGPPHC] unreported case no. 
15996/2017 on 27 May 2020.  





the PFMA and the Companies Act.348 Therefore, as SOCs are subject to the concurrent application 
of the PFMA and the Companies Act, it is submitted that the legislature sought to ensure that the 
strong enforcement mechanisms are utilized against the board of an SOC and its directors through 
the possible imposition of criminal and personal liability. 
(a) New Remedy for the Public 
The Companies Act introduced the possibility of an innovative remedy for the stakeholders of an 
SOC against its directors.349 Section 218 (2) reads that ‘Any person who contravenes any provision 
of this Act is liable to any other person for any loss or damage suffered by that person as a result 
of that contravention’.350 This provision expands the statutory liability of directors to be held 
personally liable, not only to the SOC, but to other persons who have suffered any loss or damages 
as a result of a contravention of the Companies Act.351 This remedy has been referred to as a 
‘catch-all’ provision as it is couched in very broad terms in that any person can institute 
proceedings against any other person for a contravention of the Companies Act.352  
Our courts have debated whether the broad ambit of section 218 (2) allows for dissatisfied 
investors to institute proceedings against the director of a company, alleging that the director’s 
breach of the Companies Act has resulted in the investor suffering a loss or damage, mainly 
resulting from a diminution in the value of the shares of the company.353  The predominant 
requirements under section 218 (2) are twofold.  First, there would have be to a causal link between 
the loss or damage suffered by the person and the director’s contravention of the Companies Act.354 
Secondly, the person must prove to have actually suffered a loss or damage, which is differentiated 
from the loss or damage suffered by the company, as a result of the director’s breach of the 
Companies Act.355  
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Recent case law indicates that satisfying these two requirements has proved a challenging task for 
those wanting to institute claims under section 218 (2). 356  Shareholders of African Bank 
Investments Limited (‘ABI’) launched an unsuccessful damages claim under section 218 (2) 
against the directors of ABI for the loss they allegedly suffered as a result of a diminution in the 
value of their shares.357 The shareholders claimed that the directors of ABI breached section 22 (1) 
and section 76 (2) and (3) of the Companies Act which resulted in a drop in the share price causing 
the shareholders to suffer a loss of their investments.358  
The Supreme Court of Appeal upheld the precedent set by previous courts in terms of the  
‘reflective loss principle’ which states that the shareholders cannot claim for a loss suffered by 
them which is merely a reflection of the loss suffered by the company. 359  The claim of the 
shareholders needs to be distinct from that of the company to avoid both the company and the 
shareholder making claims against the directors of a company based on the same set of facts.360 
Following case precedent, the court held that a drop in the share price did not constitute a loss that 
was suffered by the shareholders that was distinct from the loss suffered by ABI itself.361  
Under the ‘reflective loss principle’, the shareholders may not even institute a claim if the company 
decides not to pursue action against the directors.362 The only exception to the principle is that a 
shareholder, who has a separate cause of action, may institute a claim against a director where the 
company is unable to proceed due to the wrongful act of the director.363 In this instance, the ‘loss 
or damage’ requirement would be fulfilled regardless of whether it is reflective of the company’s 
loss.364  
Furthermore, the corresponding provision for a remedy in the event of a breach by directors of 
section 76 (3) is 77 (2) and section 218 (2) cannot be used as a general remedy when a specific 
remedy under the Companies Act is already available. 365  The shareholders of Steinhoff 
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International Holdings N.V (‘Steinhoff’) also unsuccessfully attempted to bring a claim under 
section 218 (2) against the directors for a breach of their statutory duties which resulted in the 
diminution of the value of their shares.366 Following the precedent set by the High Court in the 
Hlumisa  judgement, the court held that the shareholders of a company do not have a cause of 
action under section 218 (2) against the directors a company for a diminution of the value in their 
shares which is simply a reflection of the loss suffered by the company.367  
As a result of the precedent set by the Supreme Court of Appeal in the Hlumisa case, it would be 
difficult for stakeholders to satisfy the requirements under section 218 (2) to institute proceedings 
against directors of SOCs for a contravention of the Companies Act.368 It should be left to the 
board of the SOC to the institute a claim against its directors for a breach of their statutory duties 
under the Companies Act, as may be the case for the directors of Eskom.369 
For SOCs, the implications of a successful claim under the catch-all remedy may be drastic in that 
any member of the public, as a stakeholder, may institute proceedings against a director of an SOC 
for loss which they suffered as a result of a contravention of the Companies Act. SOCs cannot 
even seek refuge under the specific requirements for the organs of state under the provisions of the 
Institution of Legal Proceedings Against Certain Organs of State Act 40 of 2002.370 In accordance 
with relevant case law, SOCs which are not specifically mentioned under section one of the 
aforesaid statute cannot be classified as organs of state and, therefore, the said statute does not 
apply to them.371  
However, due to the strict decision laid down in the Hlumisa judgment, it is arguable that 
substantiating a causal link between the loss suffered to the public and a contravention by the 
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directors of the Companies Act may prove the undoing in the public’s attempt to hold directors of 
an SOC liable in terms of a section 218 (2) claim.372  
(b) Business Judgement Rule, Relief, Condonation, Insurance and Indemnities 
The possible imposition of criminal and personal liability, in the event of a beach of a statutory 
duty, may result in persons being reluctant to serve as directors on the board of an SOC. However, 
there are a number of statutory safeguards available to directors which may, in certain instances, 
serve to negate the punishment levied against them. These safeguards include: codification of the 
‘business judgement rule’, relief from the court, condonation from shareholders and director’s 
indemnification and insurance.373 
In an attempt to counter the higher governance standards placed on directors by the Companies 
Act, the common law business judgment rule was partially codified.374  The rule is aimed at 
providing protection for directors against potential liability claims, subject to compliance with 
certain requirements.375 In order to comply with the rule and be exempt from liability, the director 
must have taken reasonable steps to be informed, should not have a financial interest and should 
have a rational basis for believing, and did believe, that the decision taken was in the best interests 
of the company.376 
Rationality is based on the connection between the purpose for which the power was given to the 
director and the decision taken by the director.377 There must be a rational connection between the 
decision taken and the purpose of the power, in order for the requirement to be fulfilled.378 
Directors are also allowed to rely on the performance of, or information provided by, designated 
persons, in taking their decisions.379 However, there is a minimum standard of reasonableness in 
terms of the information provided and the performance of the person which is required to make 
the reliance acceptable.380  If the requirements of the business judgement rule are satisfied, the 
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director will have discharged his statutory fiduciary duty and the duty of care and skill, acting in 
the best interests of the company.381  
In addition to the business judgement rule, the Companies Act allows for a court, on any terms it 
considers just, to partially or wholly relieve a director from any liability, if the director is or may 
be liable but has acted honestly and reasonably or having regard to all of the circumstances of the 
case, it would be fair to excuse the director.382 The exemption by the court does not extend to 
instances where the director is liable due to wilful misconduct or wilful breach of trust.383 
Furthermore, the shareholders of the company may also condone, through ratification by way of a 
special resolution, any act of the director which contravenes a restriction in the company’s MOI, 
pertaining to powers of the company or the authority of the director.384 The condonation of a 
director’s contravention by the shareholders may still expose the director to being held liable, in 
terms of third party claims initiated against him or her under section 218 of the Companies Act.385 
Shareholders are not able to condone, through ratification, a director’s contravention of a provision 
in the Companies Act.386  
A company may also provide an indemnity to a director, in terms of any liability which may arise, 
unless such indemnification is restricted by the company’s MOI.387 There are certain instances for 
which the indemnification of directors by the company is limited. Directors will not be indemnified 
by the company in the following instances: in the event of gross negligence or fraudulent conduct 
in the reckless carrying on of business, intentional defrauding of a creditor, shareholder or 
employee of the company, liability due to wilful misconduct or wilful breach of trust or a fine 
imposed on the director as a result of being convicted of an offence.388 
Moreover, a company is allowed to purchase insurance to protect a director against any liability or 
expense for which the company is permitted to indemnify the director, unless otherwise restricted 
in the company’s MOI.389 Companies tend to, therefore, take out director and officer insurance 
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with reputable insurance companies, in order to cover any losses incurred by the company or any 
third party as a result of a director executing his duties in good faith but still being held liable under 
the Companies Act.390 
The potential imposition of criminal and personal liability, together with an order of delinquency, 
serve as retribution-based enforcement mechanisms to ensure that directors discharge their duties 
in order to avoid punishment. However, the numerous statutory safeguards available to directors 
in the event the possible imposition of liability tend to dilute these enforcement mechanisms. 
Directors may rely too heavily on the safeguards thereby negating the effectiveness of utilizing 
liability to deter breaches of duties. The duties for SOC directors must be enforceable otherwise 
their effectiveness in holding directors to account for their decisions is largely nullified.  
An alternative to current retribution-based enforcement mechanism is the implementation of a 
reward-based enforcement mechanism which incentivizes directors to effectively fulfil their 
duties. Such incentive methods may include the granting of share options to the directors or linking 
corporate performance to directors’ remuneration and bonus payment structures.391 Although the 
granting of share options to directors may create a conflict of interest between the ability of the 
director to discharge his duties to the company and his own personal interest by virtue of his or 
her shareholding in the company. This reward-based mechanism may be more suited for executive 
as opposed to non-executive directors and the granting of share options may not be suitable for 
SOCs where the state is the sole shareholder. 
3.5 The Board 
The board is required to manage and direct the affairs of the SOC unless restricted by its MOI or 
founding legislation.392 The board of any company has two primary functions: to determine the 
strategic direction of the SOC and to exercise control over it.393 
As discussed, the PFMA requires that the board of an SOC must be held accountable for the 
purposes of compliance with the PFMA. 394  King IV also emphasizes the principle of 
accountability as a fundamental concept of the board’s primary governance roles and 
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responsibilities.395 The board of an SOC must be accountable for the SOC’s performance through, 
inter alia, effective and efficient reporting and disclosure mechanisms.396 The board also oversees 
and monitors the implementation and execution of strategic plans and policies by management 
which will serve to enhance the accountability and performance of an SOC.397   
Therefore, the importance of the role of the board in accounting for the governance, performance, 
strategic planning and control of the SOC cannot be understated.398 There are three primary aspects 
pertaining to the accountability of the board of an SOC: its composition, the role of the independent 
non-executive directors and the governance of board meetings. 
Under the first aspect, the composition of the board of an SOC is addressed. The Companies Act 
only specifies requirements pertaining to the composition of the audit committee and the social 
and ethics committee of an SOC. 399  However, it provides no requirements for the general 
composition of the board of an SOC, in respect of the independence, diversity, skills, knowledge, 
experience and qualifications of the directors, unless otherwise stated in the SOC’s founding 
legislation or its MOI.400 The Companies Act sets a requirement for the minimum number of 
directors to serve on the board of an SOC which is three, subject to the MOI and founding 
legislation.401 Recommended practices for the board composition of an SOC, specifically the 
skills, knowledge, experience, independence and diversity of the directors, is suggested in King 
IV but is not a mandatory requirement.402  
SOCs in South Africa comprise a unitary board composition where all of the directors, executive 
and non-executive, sit together for board meetings.403 This unitary board structure is advocated as 
the most appropriate board structure for South African companies by the King III Report on 
Corporate Governance for South Africa (‘King III’) .404 The King IV report does not mention the 
recommendation of a unitary board structure for SOCs but focuses on providing recommendations 
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in terms of the appropriate mix of the skills, knowledge, independence and experience of the 
directors serving on the board.405  
Under the second aspect, the role played by the independent non-executive directors of an SOC is 
examined. There is no statutory differentiation between executive and non-executive directors and 
all directors, regardless of their categorization, are required to take decisions in the best interests 
of the SOC.406 However, the specific roles which executive and non-executive directors, especially 
the independent ones, are required to fulfil whilst serving on the board of the SOC are very 
different.407  
The common law, together with the King Codes and Reports, provide the primary sources of law 
in distinguishing between and interpreting the roles which executive and non-executive directors 
are required to perform.408 King IV recommends a transparent disclosure of the categorization of 
each director as an executive director, non-executive director or an independent non-executive 
director as well as the reasons for such distinction.409 Transparency in director selection and the 
categorization of directors is imperative to ensuring satisfactory board composition, in relation to 
a diverse range of skills, knowledge and experience.410 
In terms of their roles, non-executive directors are not involved in the day-to-day management of 
the SOC and they provide a supervisory role in the execution of their duties in the best interests of 
the SOC which role is performed on an intermittent basis at board meetings.411 Executive directors 
provide a management role to strategically steer and control the SOC.412 Executive directors are 
involved in the daily operations of the SOC and discharge their duties on a continual basis.413 
Executive directors are under an employment relationship with the SOC, whereas, non-executive 
directors are independently contracted to the SOC for certain periods.414  
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The board of an SOC and its directors are bound, in performing their differing roles, to fulfil their 
duties in respect of the common law, the PFMA, the Companies Act, the MOI and founding 
legislation.415  Labour law legislation may also be applicable to the employment relationship 
between the SOC and the executive director.416 All directors, regardless of their categorization, 
owe fiduciary duties as well as the duty of care and skill to the SOC. In the event of a breach of a 
duty, the board or director of an SOC may be held liable under the provisions of the PFMA or the 
Companies Act.417 
The Companies Act suggests a distinction between the duties of executive and non-executive 
directors under the statutory duty of care and skill.418 The test under this statutory duty compares 
the care, skill and diligence of the director in question with the care, skill and diligence which can 
be reasonably expected of a person ‘carrying out the same functions in relation to the company as 
those carried out by the director’.419 The function or role to be provided by the director, as an 
executive or non-executive director, will have an impact on the outcome of the test for the statutory 
duty of care and skill.  
A non-executive director will have breached his duty if he fails to perform his role to act 
independently and supervise the decisions taken by the executive directors, in the best interests of 
the SOC. 420  An executive director will have breached his duty if he fails to perform his 
management role in taking decisions to strategically control, steer and manage the SOC, in its best 
interests.421 In this respect, the liability imposed on directors, in respect of a breach of their duty 
of care and skill, is determined based on the facts of each case, with reference to the functions 
carried out by that director, as an executive or non-executor director, together with his or her skill, 
knowledge and experience.422  
The most contested issue around board composition remains the hotly debated topic surrounding 
the number of executive and independent, non-executive directors, that should serve on the 
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board.423 There are differing legal perspectives as to whether a board composition comprising a 
majority of independent, non-executive directors contributes to the achievement of accountability, 
improves the performance of the company and prevents conflicts of interest.424 
The King Codes advocate a board composition for all companies, including SOCs, which consists 
of a majority of non-executive directors, most of whom should be independent and a minority of 
executive directors.425 King IV suggests the presence of at least two executive directors, usually 
the chief executive officer (‘CEO’) and chief finance officer (‘CFO’), in order to ensure more than 
one point of direct interaction with management at board meetings.426 The independent, non-
executives directors comprise the chairperson together with a number of independent, non-
executive directors. 427 All of the directors are appointed by the state, as the sole shareholder of the 
SOC.428  
Independent, non-executive directors are appointed for the purpose of providing objectivity and 
ensuring the avoidance of conflicts of interests by bringing an external, independent perspective 
to the management of the company.429 King IV emphasizes the importance of independency as a 
critical element of board decision taking by providing a very detailed definition of ‘independence’: 
Independence generally means the exercise of objective, unfettered judgement. When used as the measure 
by which to judge the appearance of independence or to categorise a non-executive member of the 
governing body or its committee as independent, it means the absence of an interest, position or 
association or relationship which, when judged from the perspective of a reasonable and informed third 
party, is likely to influence unduly or cause bias in decision-making.430 
The independence of directors is twofold. First, all directors who take decisions in the best interests 
of the SOC, should bring an independent mind to bear on the issues at hand and should not be 
influenced by other directors but should deliberate each decision taken based on their own 
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reasoning.431 Secondly, in order to be classified as an independent, non-executive director, the 
director’s independence must be continuously analysed to ensure its authenticity. 432 King IV 
provides recommendations to retain the independence of directors, including: effective rotation 
and succession planning of the board members, maximum time periods for serving on the board 
and the continuous assessment of the independence and identification of any conflicts of interest, 
real or perceived.433  
There are many critics of the recommendation of a majority of independent, non-executive 
directors on the board. Opponents of the recommendation argue that there is not enough empirical 
evidence to support the claim that a majority of independent, non-executive directors results in 
better governance or corporate performance.434 Furthermore, an emphasis on the majority rule to 
the extent of only appointing two executive directors on a board, of a total of say twelve directors, 
may actually be counterproductive. An overemphasis of supervisory and compliance roles over 
the strategic management of the company may actually hinder corporate performance.435  
The intermittent nature of the role of the independent, non-executive directors, in relation to their 
attendance at board meetings together with their huge reliance on the information provided by the 
executive directors is, arguably, disadvantageous to their supervisory roles.436 Independent, non-
executive directors may also have other interests and other directorships which require their focus 
and attention which may detract from their capacity to effectively fulfil their duties.437 King III 
advocates for a reasonable number of directorships so as not to impede the effectiveness of the 
role which the director brings to each board meeting.438 King IV requires that the number of other 
directorships be taken into consideration when appointing independent, non-executive directors.439 
A more balanced approach in respect of the number of independent, non-executive and executive 
directors, would serve to better the accountability of the board. Arguably, a balanced board 
composition would constitute a 60 to 40 per cent ratio, in favour of the independent, non-executive 
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directors. An over reliance on the number of independent, non-executive directors may detract 
from the importance of the role which executive directors play, in terms of the strategic planning, 
control and management of the SOC.  Furthermore, more than two points of contact would be 
beneficial for the independent, non-executive directors, as the recommendation of only the CEO 
and CFO, serving on the board, will only provide for a minimum amount of information from the 
SOC’s executive perspective.  
Whilst a majority of independent, non-executive directors cannot guarantee the effective 
supervision of the board, they are still an indispensable accountability cornerstone for all 
companies, including SOCs. 440  The foundation for the success of the role played by the 
independent non-executive directors lies in the complete comprehension of the exact duties and 
roles required of directors in their appointment to the board. 441 An independent, non-executive 
director who does not understand the supervisory and compliance roles expected of him or her, 
cannot effectively, if at all, discharge his or her fiduciary duties or the duty of care and skill, in 
acting in the best interests of the SOC.  
In addition to its composition, the board of an SOC must always adhere to the minimum statutory 
requirements regarding its meetings. The right to requisition a meeting, the number of meetings 
per annum, notice of meetings, quorums, voting rights and processes, minutes, records and 
resolutions are all board governance requirements mandated by the Companies Act and PFMA.442 
The SOC’s MOI or its founding legislation may adjust the alterable statutory governance standards 
to make them more, and not less, stringent on the board. 443  Fulfilment of these minimum 
governance standards for board meetings is another mechanism used by the legislature in 
attempting to ensure the utmost accountability of an SOC.444  
3.6 The Committees 
The board of an SOC may appoint any number of committees and delegate to any committee any 
authority of the board, unless the founding legislation or MOI provide otherwise.445 However, for 
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SOCs the appointment of an audit committee and a social and ethics committee is compulsory.446 
Other committees which are recommended, but not compulsory include: a risk committee, a 
remuneration committee and a nominations committee.447  The committees established by the 
board may be standing committees which perform a continuous function or ad hoc committees, 
which are required to perform only a specific or once-off task.448 
The members of the committees, unless otherwise stated in the MOI or founding legislation of the 
SOC, may be directors or other persons who are not directors, subject to certain qualifications 
prescribed by the Companies Act.449 It is generally not common or advisable to appoint persons 
who are not directors to the committees due to the fact that such persons would be subject to the 
same duties and liabilities as directors which may dissuade their participation.450 The board and its 
directors remain accountable for the execution of their responsibilities and duties, despite 
delegation of any of the board’s authority to a committee.451  
Board committees are established for the delegation of selected responsibilities from the board to 
the committee. 452  King IV recommends the formal establishment and approval of terms of 
reference for each committee.453  The terms of reference should include the composition and 
rotation of the committee members, details of the committee’s role as well as the specific details 
of the delegated responsibilities, available resources, access to information and meeting 
procedures.454 The composition, functions and meetings of the audit committee are legislated by 
the PFMA and Companies Act due to its importance in the financial regulation of the SOC.455 The 
same is true of the composition, functions and meetings of the social and ethics committee, 
although the prescribed requirements are not as stringent or numerous as those pertaining to the 
audit committee.456 
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Board committees play an important role in the internal accountability structure of SOCs. 
Effectively functioning committees are accountable to the board for the performance of their 
responsibilities through efficient disclosure mechanisms.457 The board is ultimately accountable 
for the execution of the responsibility which has been effectively fulfilled by the committee.458 
Arguably, the board may improve its own performance through delegation by structuring an 
efficient committee system to execute its numerous responsibilities. The delegation of 
responsibilities to various committees is meant to act as a mechanism to improve and not deter the 
accountability of the board 
3.7 Shareholder Supervision  
The shareholders of a company can perform an important internal accountability check on the 
directors. The performance of the company is the focal point for shareholders whose investment 
is directly affected by the financial performance of the company.459 There are a number of statutory 
mechanisms which attempt to ensure that the shareholders of a company maintain a measure of 
control over the affairs of the board, thereby attempting to protect their investment.460 In this way, 
the shareholders ensure that the board is held accountable for its decision taking, in the best 
interests of the company. However, in the case of an SOC the effect of shareholder supervision, in 
holding the board accountable, is significantly diluted due to the state being its sole shareholder. 
3.7.1 Forms of Shareholder Supervision  
There are various forms of shareholder supervision which promote activism and are legislated 
through the Companies Act.461 The most predominant of which include: the passing of shareholder 
resolutions, shareholder meetings and mandatory annual general meetings of shareholders, 
remedial action for minority shareholders, the election and removal of directors, voting blocs and 
the right of access to information.462 
The Companies Act requires the passing of a special resolution of the shareholders in order to 
implement certain transactions. 463 In these circumstances, a board resolution will not suffice. The 
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company’s MOI may prescribe additional transactions which require the passing of a special 
resolution, as an added measure of control for shareholders.464  
The Companies Act facilitates the cost effective and efficient passing of shareholder resolutions. 
A lower percentage of shareholders is required in order to call for a meeting, with institutional 
shareholders holding majority shares in most publicly listed companies.465 Shareholder meetings 
can be held entirely by electronic communication which reduces the attendance costs.466 The 
electronic submission of proxies also reduces attendance costs, thereby promoting shareholder 
activism.467 Quorum requirements for shareholder meetings may be altered in the company’s MOI, 
however, higher requirements may force more shareholders to be present at meetings which may 
improve shareholder activism.468 
The statutory requirement for the holding of an annual general meeting of the shareholders is also 
an internal accountability check for shareholders.469 Shareholders are able to request items to be 
considered at the meetings without advance notice which advocates a forum for the discussion of 
business affairs.470 An opportunity is also provided for the questioning of directors on the contents 
of financial statements and reports as well as for addressing other areas of concern.471 
Minority shareholders are afforded statutory protection for the enforcement of their rights in the 
form of remedies set out in the Companies Act.472 These include: derivate actions, relief for 
prejudicial conduct, appraisal rights, the use of an alternative dispute resolution mechanism, an 
application for protection of the rights of securities holders and filing a complaint with the CIPC.473  
The election and removal of directors through a shareholder’s ordinary resolution, unless otherwise 
stated in the company’s MOI, is also an internal accountability check for shareholders. 474 
Shareholders can elect directors who they deem sufficiently qualified to protect their investment 
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and to manage the affairs of the business.475 If the company performs poorly, a shareholder can 
remove a director, subject to certain statutory requirements.476 Shareholders can exercise a degree 
of control over the performance of directors as well as the management of business affairs by virtue 
of their ability to elect and remove directors to and from the board. However, the Companies Act 
does prescribe specific ineligibility and disqualification requirements which restricts certain 
persons from serving as a director on the board of a company.477  
Shareholders may also supervise the decisions of the board by exercising their voting rights. 
Shareholders do not owe fiduciary duties to act in the best interests of the company when 
exercising their voting rights, and may vote as selfishly as they wish in order to protect their own 
interests.478 Major shareholders of companies may vote together, in the creation of voting blocs, 
in order to adopt their own selfishly motivated resolutions.479 However, the board of a company 
or its minority shareholders can always seek the intervention of the court, under section 163 of the 
Companies Act, in preventing shareholder voting blocs which may act to the serious detriment of 
the company.480  
The rights granted to shareholders to inspect the records and to access the information of the 
company may assist in promoting shareholder supervision.481 Every person who has a beneficial 
interest in the securities issued by a profit company has the right to inspect and copy certain 
information which is contained in the records of a company.482 This inspection of information may 
illuminate any inconsistencies in terms of the company’s performance and decisions taken by the 
directors, thereby prompting pertinent enquiries by shareholders. The enforcement of this right lies 
in the fact that the company will commit an offence in the event that it fails to accommodate any 
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3.7.2 Shareholder Apathy and Activism  
Even with the implementation of the statutory measures to bolster activism, shareholder apathy 
still presents a significant hurdle to the effective oversight of the board.484 Active and informed 
shareholders may assist, although possibly in limited ways, in holding the board to account for 
their decisions.485 The costs of activism for shareholders and a lack of knowledge, in terms of their 
respective rights, often results in shareholders selling their shares as opposed to their becoming 
vocal when the company underperforms.486 Some companies even deter shareholder activism as it 
is thought to disrupt efficient operational workings and subvert long-term managerial goals to the 
detriment of other stakeholders.487 
However, impact of globalization on the corporate platform has resulted in an unexpected 
opposition to shareholder apathy in the form of an increase in institutional investors as the majority 
shareholders of publicly listed companies. 488 The presence of institutional investors may result in 
majority voting blocs over which the company or minority shareholders have no control.489 As a 
result, institutional investors have a greater influence over the way in which companies are 
governed. Institutional codes and guidelines establish principles which provide recommendations 
to institutional investors to act as responsible shareholders.490 Institutional investors are required 
to account to their clients for their investment decisions and are, therefore, more likely to be active 
shareholders and hold directors to account for company performance.491 
In South Africa, the Code for Responsible Investing in South Africa ('CRISA’) was published in 
response to a recommendation proposed by King III.492 CRISA sets out the best recommended 
practices to be initiated by institutional investors in exercising their rights as shareholders, through 
investment analysis and activities, which serve to promote sound governance practices in the 
companies in which they have invested their client’s monies.493 In the premise, CRISA aids in 
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holding the board to account to the institutional investors, who in turn, have to account to their 
clients.  Although CRISA is a voluntary set of principles and recommendations, it has gained 
traction through exposure and implementation by reputable institutional investors such as Old 
Mutual Limited and Liberty Holdings Limited.494 
3.7.3 The State as Shareholder 
The fact of the state being the sole shareholder may compromise its ability to effectively supervise 
the actions of the board of the SOC. 495  Due to the state being the sole shareholder, the 
abovementioned forms of shareholder supervision in holding the board accountable become 
largely ineffectual for SOCs. As the sole shareholder of the SOC, the effect which numerous 
shareholders have over the supervision of the board of an SOC is diluted.496 The passing of a 
special resolution for certain transactions, holding an annual general meeting and the special 
remedies for the protection of minority shareholders will not be effective as supervisory measures 
in holding the board of an SOC to account where the state is the sole shareholder.  
The essential feature of the aforesaid supervisory measures lies in the fact that numerous 
shareholders of the company are able to form voting blocs, pass resolutions and question directors 
at annual general meetings. However, with the state as sole shareholder the effect of active 
interaction debate and discussion amongst various shareholders and their engagement with the 
board of directors is negated. The state, in its sole direction exercises its own judgement and there 
are, arguably, no other counteracting views or healthy debates or differing perspectives in 
shareholder decision taking.497 Remedies for minority shareholders, such as derivative actions, 
prejudicial conduct and appraisal rights, are also not an option with the state as the sole 
shareholder.  
In an attempt to conceivably counteract these issues, the PFMA stipulates certain statutory 
requirements which the state, through its representative (such as the Minister as the ‘executive 
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authority’ of certain SOCs) must fulfil.498 Even though shareholders do not owe fiduciary duties 
and are not accountable to companies for their actions, SOCs are different in that the state is their 
sole shareholder and the state is held accountable for its public administration in terms of the 
Constitution.499 
Under the PFMA, the Minister has two primary responsibilities. First, to ensure that the board of 
an SOC complies with the provisions of the PFMA and the financial policies of the executive.500 
Secondly, to table in the National Assembly the annual financial statements and auditors report of 
an SOC within one month after receiving the report and the findings of any outcome or sanctions 
imposed in any case of financial misconduct against the board of an SOC.501  
In the event that the Minister fails to table the financial statements and auditors report in the 
National Assembly, within six months after the SOC’s financial year-end, the Minister must 
provide a written explanation as to the reasons for the failure and the Auditor-General may issues 
a special report on the delay.502 There is a draft bill in progress to amend section 65 (2) (a) of the 
PFMA to include a requirement that the Minister has 60 days after providing the written reasons 
for the failure to table the annual financial statements and auditors report in the National 
Assembly.503  
The issue with these statutory requirements on the executive authority of an SOC is that they lack 
an element of enforceability. The broad nature of the duty on the Minister to ensure that the SOC 
complies with the provisions of the PFMA means that it does not specify how the Minister is to 
fulfil the duty. The other requirement that any outcome or sanction of a case for financial 
misconduct must be tabled in the National Assembly by the Minister also does not assist in the 
execution of his or her responsibilities to ensure compliance with the PFMA.  
All that the PFMA requires is for the Minister to ensure compliance with its provisions, which 
seemingly implies that the Minister is authorised to ensure that the board complies with the PFMA 
by holding itself liable, jointly and severally, if it commits an act of financial misconduct. 504 
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However, where the board fails to hold itself liable there is no provision which allows the Minister 
to hold the board liable for an act of financial misconduct.505 Unlike the shareholder remedies 
provided in the Companies Act, there is no mechanism for the state, as the sole shareholder of an 
SOC, to hold its board liable in the event of a breach of its statutory duties in a case for financial 
misconduct.506  
Therefore, the ability of the Minister to enforce compliance by the board of an SOC with its 
statutory duties is hindered by the toothless provisions under the PFMA. It is paramount for the 
accountability of an SOC that the executive be able to enforce the accountability of the directors 
of an SOC.507  
The internal accountability check which is meant to be provided by the supervisory role of the 
shareholder for an SOC is further compounded if the state is complacent and corrupt.508 Corruption 
festers in an environment where accountability, transparency and disclosure are lacking. 509 
Corruption begets political interference in board decisions and the appointment and removal of 
directors to and from the board of an SOC, with the sole aim of furthering corrupt practices for the 
personal gain of the minority who are in control.510 Left unchecked, without probing questions and 
disclosure, the state’s control over the board of an SOC, with nefarious goals which are not in the 
best interests of the SOC, will erode the constitutional principles of accountability, responsiveness 
and openness.511 Such principles are meant to be enshrined by government through its institutions 
which are meant to utilise state resources in an effective manner.512  
In addition, the state, as sole shareholder, is arguably not incentivized to look after its investment 
in comparison to the shareholders of a private company.513 Shareholders of a private company are 
driven to ensure good performance and board accountability to promote the maximum growth in 
their investments.514 For the state, the protection and growth of its investment, as an incentive to 
properly supervise and monitor an SOC and board performance may not be a paramount 
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consideration.515 However, the creeping appeal of corruption and personal gain, to the detriment 
of the SOC, may act as a strong incentive for the state in taking decisions as the sole shareholder.516 
3.8 The Company Secretary and Internal Audit Function  
Every SOC is subject to compliance with the enhanced accountability and transparency 
requirements encompassed under chapter three of the Companies Act.517 Although an SOC may 
be exempted from the provisions contained in chapter three by the Minister.518 The enhanced 
requirements pertain to the mandatory appointment of a company secretary, an auditor and an audit 
committee. 519  The requirements under chapter three are indicative of the higher governance 
standards incorporated under the Companies Act, with specific emphasis on the principles of 
accountability and transparency. 520  The focus on accountability and transparency in the 
Companies Act aligns with the fundamental global shift towards good governance and the utmost 
accountability of the board of directors.521 
3.8.1 The Company Secretary  
In compliance with the Companies Act, an SOC must appoint a company secretary either initially 
through its incorporators or, subsequently, by the board or shareholders through an ordinary 
resolution.522 The SOC must maintain a record of the identity of all appointed company secretaries, 
unless specifically exempted by the Minster. 523  A company secretary is required to be 
knowledgeable or experienced in the relevant laws and must be a permanent resident of South 
Africa for duration of the appointment.524 A company secretary may be a juristic person, subject 
to certain statutory requirements.525 A person who has been disqualified from serving as a director, 
in terms of the Companies Act, may not be appointed as a company secretary.526 If the SOC fails 
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to appoint a company secretary, the CIPC may, by notice to the SOC, require the convening of a 
shareholders meeting to make the appointment.527 
The company secretary is accountable to the board of the SOC and his or her duties relate 
predominantly to ensuring fulfilment by the board of its governance and compliance mandate.528 
From an accountability perspective, the company secretary fulfils an important internal check for 
the SOC.529 The duties of the company secretary include providing directors with guidance on 
corporate governance structures, their duties, powers and responsibilities and making them aware 
of any relevant laws which may affect the SOC.530 The company secretary is required to report to 
the board any failure by the board or the SOC of any provision in the Companies Act,  its own 
founding legislation or MOI.531 
The SOC must accurately record all board, shareholder and committee meetings and the company 
secretary is required to ensure that all records are made in accordance with the Companies Act.532 
The company secretary must certify, in the annual financial statements of the SOC, that all notices 
and returns have been properly filed and are true, correct and up to date.533 The company secretary 
is to ensure that a copy of the SOC’s annual financial statements is sent to every person who is 
entitled to receive them, in terms of the Companies Act.534 The company secretary is also required 
to ensure that the SOC complies with all of the requirements under chapter three of the Companies 
Act.535 
The company secretary may resign, on one month’s notice or be removed by the board of the 
SOC.536 In the event that the board removes the company secretary, it may, by notice to the SOC, 
require inclusion in the annual financial statements of the circumstances which, in its opinion, 
resulted in such removal. 537  The inclusion of these provisions is an attempt to increase 
transparency in the event that the board decides to remove a secretary who is considered to be 
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meddlesome.538 It should, for instance, be made transparent that the removal may be due to 
nefarious reasons by the board if the company secretary has, on numerous occasions, pointed out 
contraventions by the directors or the board of various statutory requirements.539  
The PFMA does not make mention of the appointment of a company secretary for an SOC.540 The 
Companies Act stipulates the statutory requirements for SOCs, pertaining to the appointment, 
removal and duties of the company secretary.541 However, the Companies Act is silent as to the 
independence of the company secretary in relation to the SOC.542 King IV recommends that the 
company secretary maintain an arms-length relationship with the company to ensure independent, 
objective and unfettered decision making by the board.543  
The independence of the company secretary is to ensure the effective fulfilment of his or her duties, 
without interference or influence from the board. 544  The company secretary may, and is 
encouraged, to attend shareholder and board meetings but, to maintain independence, should not 
be a member of the board of the SOC or related to any member.545 The position of the company 
secretary should be reviewed annually by the board, in relation to his or her independence, 
knowledge and experience.546 The rotation of the company secretary is  also recommended in order 
to ensure independence.547  
The recommended practices contained in the King IV are only voluntary, however, in order to 
ensure the utmost accountability of SOCs, it would be advisable for all SOCs to appoint an 
independent company secretary.548 A company secretary who is not independent may hinder his 
or her ability to ensure the accountability and transparency of the SOC. Political interference, 
conflicts of interest and undue board influence may negatively impact the ability of the company 
secretary in fulfilling  duties which are the best interests of the SOC. Given the importance of the 
role played by the company secretary in promoting the accountability and transparency of an SOC, 
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the board should ensure that the position is filled only by persons with the sufficient capacity, 
independence, qualifications and experience to effectively perform the requisite duties.549  
3.8.2 Internal Audit Function  
The auditing processes for an SOC depict an intricate system of internal and external checks and 
balances. The PFMA is the predominant statute governing the internal audit function for SOCs 
and the National Treasury may make regulations pertaining to the financial management, internal 
control and internal audit components to which SOCs must adhere.550 All SOCs must have an 
internal audit function, the effectiveness of which is monitored by the mandatory audit 
committee.551 The internal audit function and the audit committee are the two most predominant 
pillars of the internal, financial accountability mechanisms for SOCs. The two pillars work 
interactively and simultaneously with an aim to ensure the effective financial management and 
internal control of the SOC.552  
The internal audit function may be outsourced to an external institution with specialist audit 
expertise, however, the external auditors of the SOC may not provide the internal audit function.553 
An internal auditor must be a member of the Institute of Internal Auditors South Africa (‘IIASA’) 
and must comply with the rules and regulations set by the IIASA at all times.554 An internal audit 
charter must be established, in consultation with the board of the SOC, which sets out the purpose, 
authority and responsibility of the internal audit function.555 The internal audit must be conducted 
in accordance with the provisions of the IIASA.556  
The IIASA defines an ‘internal audit’ as the following: 
Internal auditing is an independent, objective assurance and consulting activity designed to add value 
and improve an organisation’s operations. It helps an organisation accomplish its objectives by bringing 
a systematic, disciplined approach to evaluate and improve the effectiveness of risk management, control 
and governance processes.  
 
549 Blackman op cit note 440 at ch 9A at 3.  
550 PFMA op cit note 11 at section 76 (4).  
551 Treasury Regulations op cit note 291 reg 27.2.2. & 27.1.10. 
552 Makwethu (AGSA) op cit note 18 at 5.  
553 Treasury Regulations op cit note 291 reg at 27.2.4. 
554  Institute of Internal Auditors South Africa (IIASA) ‘About Internal Audit’ available at 
http://www.iiasa.org.za/page/About_IA, accessed on 23 August 2020.  
555 Treasury Regulations op cit note 291 reg 27.2.5.  





Although accounting is an important skill for an internal auditor, the focus for internal auditors is the 
evaluation of operational risk management, internal control and the governance processes of the 
organisation.557 
The role of the internal audit function differs from that of the external audit, both of which are 
mandatory for an SOC. 558  The internal audit function, whilst having a focus on financial 
management, is not a financial discipline, like the external audit.559 The role of the internal audit 
encompasses evaluating key risk areas and the effectiveness of operations, safeguarding assets, 
monitoring and examining financial controls and relaying such controls to all managers and 
employees as well as analysing and confirming information and reviewing compliance.560  
The internal audit function is a continual analysis of the financial controls and operations within 
the SOC, whereas, an external audit occurs only once a year.561 The internal audit function must 
also prepare, in consultation with the audit committee, a rolling three-year strategic internal audit 
plan for the SOC.562 King IV recommends that the integrity of the internal audit function be 
maintained by the board of the SOC which ensures a review by the external auditors once every 
five years.563 
The internal auditor must have unlimited access to any information required in order to effectively 
perform his or her duties and must report to the board of the SOC.564 The internal audit function 
must assist the board of the SOC by providing recommendations and improvements through which 
accountability is ensured.565 King IV recommends the appointment of a Chief Audit Executive to 
facilitate the internal audit function and report to the board of the SOC.566 
Under the PFMA, the board of the SOC also has specific functions and duties to ensure that 
effective risk management and internal controls are in place to prevent irregular expenditure and 
to ensure the continued financial health and operations of the SOC.567 The board is required to 
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fulfil its statutory duties failing which the directors may be guilty of financial misconduct and 
criminal or civil liability may be levied against them, individually and severally.568  
The board of an SOC must also comply with requirements under the PFMA pertaining to the 
financial management and strategy of the SOC.569 Without compliance with these prescribed 
functions by the board, the internal audit function of the SOC may be severely compromised. The 
Accounting Standards Board prescribes updated accounting standards, known as the Standards of 
Generally Recognized Accounting Practices, which are to be applied in the preparation of the 
annual financial statements of SOCs.570 The board is required to adopt these standards when 
preparing the financial statements of SOCs in order to ensure transparency and uniformity of the 
measures for the control of expenditure for all organs of state.571 
The board of the SOC is required to prepare and submit annual budgets and a three-year corporate 
plan to the Minister and the National Treasury.572 The board of the SOC is also required to 
conclude an annual shareholder compact with the Minister which sets out the agreed key 
performance indicators to be attained by the SOC.573 The shareholder compact is the document of 
communication between the Minister and the board of the SOC and must be prepared with 
reference to the previous year’s indicators and their fulfilment, together with future expectations 
and indicators which the board of the SOC can reasonably be expected to achieve.574  
The board of an SOC is required to provide any information requested by the Auditor-General or 
the National Treasury or by prescribed by legislation.575 There are certain transactions for which 
the board of an SOC must obtain approval from the Minister, and inform the National Treasury, 
in writing, prior to their conclusion.576 There is a default acceptance provision, wherein the SOC 
can assume approval has been given for conclusion of the transaction from the Minister if the board 
of the SOC receives no response from the Minister within 30 days (or a further agreed period) 
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from the date of submission.577 The Minister may also exempt an SOC from this statutory approval 
requirement.578 
The PFMA contains stringent provisions regarding the preparation and submission of annual 
financial statements and the annual report, on those financial statements, for SOCs.579 There are 
prescribed requirements and specific information which must be included in the annual financial 
statements of the SOC.580 
The annual financial statements of an SOC must be submitted by the board to the external auditor 
and to the National Treasury within two months of the end of the financial year end of that SOC.581 
The board must then submit the audited annual financial statements, the auditor’s report and an 
annual report, within five months of the end of the financial year for that SOC, to the Minister and 
the National Treasury. 582 The audited statements and report must also be submitted to the Auditor-
General if the external audit of the SOC was not performed by the Auditor-General.583 These 
reports are usually combined in the annual integrated report of the SOC which is made public.   
The internal auditors work closely with the board of the SOC, and specifically the members of the 
audit committee, in assisting with the achievement of their objectives. 584  Maintaining the 
independence of the internal auditor is imperative to the effective functioning of its internal 
accountability role.585  However, the independence of the internal audit function is contradicted by 
the provisions in the PFMA relating to the duties of the board and the audit committee of the SOC.  
According to section 51 of the PFMA, the board is under a statutory duty to ensure that the SOC 
has and maintains ‘a system of internal audit under the control and direction of the audit 
committee’.586 This subsection of the PFMA directly contradicts the regulations which prescribe 
complete independence of the internal audit function. 587  The internal audit function cannot, 
simultaneously, be under the direction and control of the audit committee and maintain its 
 
577 Ibid at section 54 (3). 
578 Ibid at section 54 (4).  
579 Ibid at section 55.  
580 Ibid at section 54 & 55 (2).  
581 Ibid at section 55 (1)(c). 
582 Ibid at section 55 (1)(d).  
583 Ibid.  
584 Treasury Regulations op cit note 291 at reg 27.2.11.& 27.2.1. 
585 Ibid at reg 27.2.8.  
586 PFMA op cit note 11 at section 51 (1)(a)(ii).  





independence. This statutory contradiction, between the PFMA and its regulations, is an oxymoron 
in its requirement of ‘controlled independence’ and should be amended to avoid confusion.  
The importance of the internal audit function as a mechanism for ensuring the accountability of an 
SOC cannot be overstated. Although not binding on SOCs, the recommended practices in King IV 
highlight the importance of the internal audit function, in achieving the principles of accountability 
and transparency.588 From a theoretical perspective, all of the statutory provisions are in place to 
ensure an effective internal audit function for SOCs which should promote accountability and 
transparency. 589  However, from a practical perspective, it is arguable that the internal audit 
function has not been effectively implemented by the boards of SOCs.590  
3.9 External Accountability Mechanisms 
The accountability of an SOC is best achieved through a combination of internal and external 
checks and balances. Notwithstanding the effectiveness of the internal accountability checks, the 
external accountability checks of an SOC should bring to the fore any discrepancies in the internal 
processes and controls. The external accountability checks for SOCs are embodied in four primary 
mechanisms. First, and perhaps most importantly, from a financial accountability perspective, the 
external audit. Secondly, through independent institutions such as the Auditor-General and the 
Public Protector. Thirdly, through the separation of powers doctrine, which comprise the checks 
and balances amongst the three arms of government: the executive, legislature and judiciary. 
Lastly, and as the last resort, through the public, including public activist watchdog groups such 
as Corruption Watch and the Organization Undoing Tax Abuse (‘OUTA’).  
3.10 The External Audit and the Auditor-General 
The auditors of SOCs are either the Auditor-General or an independent registered auditor, in terms 
of the Auditing Profession Act 26 of 2005 (‘APA’).591  Every SOC is required to appoint a 
registered auditor at its annual general meeting of the shareholders each year.592 An auditor is an 
individual or firm that has been registered as an auditor by the Independent Regulatory Board for 
Auditors (‘ IRBA’).593 There are specific statutory requirements with respect to the appointment, 
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removal and duties of the auditors of an SOC, as set out in the Companies Act.594 The role and 
function of the auditor is largely determined for an SOC by the Companies Act, the Auditing 
Profession Act and the Public Audit Act 25 of 2004 (‘PAA’).595 The provisions in the PFMA which 
related to the external auditors for SOEs were repealed by the PAA, which came into effect on 1 
April 2004.596 
SOCs are, therefore, subject to the PAA, together with applicable provisions from the APA and 
the Companies Act, if any, in respect of the external audit of their annual financial statements. The 
provisions of each statute must be applied concurrently.  However, in the event of a conflict, the 
PAA prevails.597 The PAA is the supreme legislation in South Africa, in respect of and governing 
all aspects relating to the auditing of SOCs.598  
The board of an SOC is required to submit, within two months of the end of every financial year, 
annual financial statements, in the required form, to its auditors and to the National Treasury, in 
the case of a national government business enterprise.599 The definitions of an ‘authorised auditor’ 
and the ‘Auditor-General’ are provided by the PAA, as the possible auditors of SOCs.600 In the 
event that the Auditor-General opts not to perform the external audit for an SOC, a registered 
auditor must be appointed by the SOC to perform the external annual audit.601 
3.10.1 Appointment and Removal  
An SOC, for which the Auditor-General has elected not to perform the annual audit, must elect as 
its auditor a person who is registered in terms of the APA as an accountant and auditor and engaged 
in public practice as an auditor and accountant.602 The registered auditor is usually a company 
which is appointed by the board of the SOC and such appointment is subject to the approval of the 
Auditor-General.603  The appointment of a registered auditor by the SOC is restricted to a period 
of one financial year.604 In the event that the Auditor-General elects to do so, he or she may perform 
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the external audit of an SOC for its financial year-end, subject to the requirements under part one 
of chapter three of the PAA.605  
The Auditor-General is a state institution which is appointed to strengthen constitutional 
democracy in South Africa. 606   The Auditor-General is the supreme audit institution of the 
Republic, has full legal capacity, must be independent, is subject only to the Constitution and 
accountable to the National Assembly.607 The Auditor-General is an institution established to 
ensure the utmost accountability of all organs of state, in fulfilment of their constitutional 
accountability to the National Assembly. 608  The Auditor-General must be appointed by the 
President, on recommendation of the National Assembly, for a fixed period of between five to ten 
years.609 
There are specific statutory and constitutional requirements with which the registered auditor or 
the Auditor-General must comply in order to be appointed. 610  In the event of a firm being 
appointed as the registered auditor for the SOC, that firm must immediately after the appointment 
is made, take a decision as to the individual registered auditor who will be responsible and 
accountable for the audit of the SOC.611 Legislation prescribes certain categories of persons which 
cannot be appointed as the registered auditors for SOCs, which predominantly relate to 
maintaining the capacity, independence and integrity of the external auditor.612 There are also 
specific requirements for firms which are appointed as the registered auditors of the SOC.613  
The independence and impartiality of the registered auditor, or Auditor-General, is emphasized in 
order to effectively discharge his or her statutory duties.614 The Code of Professional Conduct for 
Registered Auditors, published by the IRBA, sets out mandatory rules with which every registered 
auditor must comply.615 Amongst others, the rules stress the importance of the independence of 
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the registered auditor in effectively discharging his duties in conducting an audit of the SOC.616 
Independence is predominantly preserved through the rotation of the registered auditors and the 
avoidance of conflicts of interest.617 The Companies Act promotes the independence of the auditor 
by prescribing a mandatory rotation of the registered auditors every five years as well as the 
satisfaction of the independence of the auditor by the audit committee.618 
The removal processes are different for discharging the Auditor-General or the registered auditor, 
as the case may be, as the external auditor of the SOC. The Auditor-General may resign on three 
months written notice to the President.619 The office of the Auditor-General is vacated if that 
person resigns, his or her term expires or if he or she is removed from office, in terms of section 
194 of the Constitution.620 The grounds for removal of the Auditor-General by the President, on a 
finding by a committee of the National Assembly, include: misconduct, incompetence or 
incapacity.621 Alternatively, the Auditor-General must be removed from his or her office by the 
President on the passing of a resolution, calling for the removal of the Auditor-General, by at least 
two thirds of the members of the National Assembly.622 The Deputy Auditor-General assumes the 
role of the Auditor-General until the appointment of another Auditor-General.623 
The registered auditor of an SOC may be discharged by the board, before expiry of its one year 
term, on written notice and after being given an opportunity to make representations, subject to 
the consent of the Auditor-General and Minister.624 The Auditor-General is required to report any 
discharge of an auditor by an SOC to the National Legislature.625  An auditor’s registration may 
also be terminated in accordance with the provisions of the APA, at which point the auditor may 
not carry on with its audit function, as he or she no longer meets the requirements of the PAA626  
The Companies Act allows for the registered auditor to include in the annual financial statements 
of the SOC, a statement as to the reasons, in auditor’s opinion, for his or her removal.627 However, 
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the PAA does not allow for the same and as the prevailing legislation, it is unlikely that an SOC 
will be required to provide reasons for removal of the auditor in its annual financial statements.628  
3.10.2 Duties and Powers  
The PAA confers extensive powers on the auditor of an SOC, whether it be the Auditor-General 
or an independent, registered auditor.629 The auditor has such wide powers in order to give effect 
to the purpose of the PAA in enshrining the constitutional principle of accountability by all organs 
of state.630 There are two predominant duties which the auditor is obliged to fulfil when performing 
the annual audit function of the SOC: to audit the annual financial statements and to compile a 
report on the audited financial statements.631  
If the auditor of the SOC is the Auditor-General, the processes and requirements of the audit 
function are prescribed under part one of chapter three of the PAA.632 The Auditor-General, in 
consultation with the Standing Committee on the Auditor-General, must set the standards to be 
complied with in performing the audit of the SOC, as well as the nature and frequency of the audit 
of certain institutions by the Auditor-General.633 If the auditor of the SOC is a registered auditor, 
the audit function must be performed in terms of the processes and requirements set out in the 
APA, read together with part two of chapter three of the PAA.634 
The PAA prescribes the minimum requirements on which the auditor must express an opinion or 
conclusion, which are to be contained in the auditor’s report on the annual financial statements of 
the SOC (‘Auditor’s Opinion’).635 In addition to the Auditor’s Opinion, the Auditor-General or the 
auditor (if requested by the Auditor-General) must report on two issues. First, on whether the SOC 
has procured its resources in an economic fashion and utilized them efficiently and effectively.636 
Secondly, the auditor must report on any matters arising out of an investigation required by the 
Auditor-General that should, in public interest, be brought to the attention of the national 
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legislature.637 The auditor is required to report to the legislature any matter, ascertained within the 
audit investigation and which, in the opinion of the auditor, is in public interest.638 A copy of the 
report on any of the two aforementioned issues, by the auditor of an SOC, must be sent to the 
Minister for submission to the national legislature.639  
The Auditor’s Opinion, contained in the auditor’s report, must be submitted by the auditors to the 
Auditor-General, the SOC, the Minister and the National Treasury.640 The board of the SOC is 
required to ensure that the Auditor’s Opinion, in the auditor’s report, is submitted to the relevant 
institutions within five months of every financial year end of the SOC.641 
If the Auditor-General performed the external audit, he or she must submit the report to the SOC 
in respect of whom the audit was performed and to the national legislature for tabling in 
Parliament.642 In the event that the report is not tabled within one month after Parliament’s first 
sitting after the report was submitted, the Auditor-General must promptly publish the report.643 
The Auditor-General also has the power to submit any report which may be in the public interest 
to any legislature or organ of state.644 
In addition to the constitutional audit function, the Auditor-General may, without compromising 
its independence, provide other functions. Amongst these other functions is the discretion to carry 
out an investigation or conduct a special audit of any SOC if it is in the public interest to do so or 
upon the receipt of a complaint or request.645 The registered auditor must, at the request of the 
Auditor-General, also carry out such an investigation or conduct a special audit of an SOC.646  
The scope and enforceability of the powers of the Auditor-General, in the performance of audit 
functions, investigations and special audits, was extended by the enactment of the Public Audit 
Amendment Act 5 of 2018, which came into effect on 1 April 2019 (‘PAAA’).647  The PAAA 
specifically widened the powers of the Auditor-General to include three primary powers. First, the 
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conducting of performance audits to refer material irregularities arising from an audit to the 
relevant institutions for investigation in order for appropriate remedial action to be taken.648 
Secondly, to issue a certificate for the collection of debt by the Minister.649 Thirdly, to make 
requirements pertaining to audit fees and the remuneration of the Auditor-General.650 The Auditor-
General published specific regulations which allow for the facilitation of these additional duties 
and powers, as set out in the PAAA.651  
The implementation of the PAAA and its regulations, appears to be an effort to identify and prevent 
financial mismanagement and the occurrence of material irregularities of SOCs which may result 
in significant financial loss.652 The Auditor-General will identify these issues by conducting a 
special audit and investigation of the SOC.653 Recommendations to remedy such irregularities and 
prevent future occurrences will then be prescribed to the board of the SOC by the Auditor-
General.654 In the event of the board of the SOC failing to implement the recommendations 
provided by the Auditor-General, the Auditor-General will prescribe remedial action which must 
be taken by the board of the SOC.655  
A failure to implement the remedial action prescribed by the Auditor-General by the board of the 
SOC will result in the issuing of a certificate of debt by the Auditor-General.656 The certificate of 
debt stipulates an amount to be collected from the board of the SOC, jointly and severally, due to 
the failure to implement the remedial action.657 Those persons who were directors of the SOC 
when the failure to implement the remedial action occurred will be liable to pay the amount 
specified in the certificate of debt to the state.658 
The PAA also emphasizes the role which auditing of the annual financial statements of SOCs plays 
as a mechanism to prevent  irregular, wasteful and fruitless expenditure by the SOC. 659 Such 
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expenditure will be detrimental to the SOC’s financial and operational performance.660 Although 
the Act allows for the provision of secrecy in certain instances, any such secrecy provision may 
not be abused in order to prevent detection or disclosure of an audit finding by the Auditor-General 
or disclosure of any unauthorized, irregular or fruitless and wasteful expenditure.661 
The PFMA defines irregular expenditure as ‘expenditure, other than unauthorized expenditure 
incurred in contravention of, or that is not in accordance with a requirement of any applicable 
legislation’.662 Unauthorised expenditure is defined as the overspending of a vote or main division 
within a vote, or expenditure not in accordance with the purpose of the vote or main division within 
a vote, as the case may be.663 A vote is defined as one of the main segments into which an 
appropriation Act is divided and which specifies the total amount which is usually appropriated 
per department in an appropriation Act and is separately approved by Parliament before it approves 
the relevant draft appropriation Act.664 Fruitless and wasteful expenditure is defined, under the 
PFMA, as ‘expenditure which was made in vain and would have been avoided if reasonable care 
had been exercised’.665 
In an attempt to bolster the importance of the PAA and its purpose, any person who hinders or 
interferes with the ability of the Auditor-General in the performance of his or her functions will be 
guilty of an offence and, on conviction, subject to a fine and/or imprisonment for a maximum of 
one year.666 Similarly, the IRBA has the power to investigate and review the practice of any 
registered auditor and, in the event of a finding of improper conduct, disciplinary measures may 
be implemented against the auditor.667 A registered auditor may be guilty of an offence if found 
guilty on a charge of improper conduct, if he fails to report an irregularity or if he recklessly or 
knowingly expresses an opinion or makes a report which is materially false and may be subject to 
a fine or a maximum of five years imprisonment.668 Any person who hinders the performance of 
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the auditor may be guilty of an offence and subject to a fine or imprisonment of a maximum of 
one year.669 
The PAA also provides for the administrative requirements of the Auditor-General, which include 
an external, independent audit, an audit committee and disciplinary measures for non-compliance 
with legislative requirements.670 The Auditor-General remains, at all times, accountable to the 
National Assembly for the performance of his or her duties and functions. 671  The National 
Assembly established the Standing Committee on the Auditor-General in 2004 as the oversight 
mechanism of the Auditor-General to ensure fulfilment of his or her duties and compliance with 
the Constitution and relevant legislation, to advise the National Assembly and to ensure the 
independence and impartiality of the Auditor-General.672  
The imposition of certain liability provisions against the board of an SOC and its directors, as well 
as the registered auditors, under the PAA and the APA are meant to act as retribution-based 
mechanisms to ensure an effective and efficient annual audit of an SOC.673 The enactment of the 
PAAA provides for the implementation of additional, harsh remedies against the recalcitrant board 
of an SOC in the event that they fail to implement recommendations made by the Auditor-
General.674 Stringent audit requirements provided by the PAA and APA ensure the uniformity and 
certainty of the standards against which all SOCs are to be audited.675 There are numerous statutory 
requirements with which the auditors of SOCs must comply and which should, if actually enforced,  
project an accurate display of the financial and operational performance of an SOC for every 
financial year.  
3.11 The Public Protector  
The office of the Public Protector was established as a state institution with the purpose of 
strengthening constitutional democracy in South Africa.676 The Public Protector was essentially 
established in order to provide a guard for the guardians themselves, a watchdog over the watchers 
 
669 PAA op cit note 595 at section 54 (2).  
670 Ibid at part 4.  
671 Ibid at section 10.  
672 Ibid at section 2 (c) & 10 (3); Constitution op cit note 11 at section 55 (2)(b)(ii).  
673 Ibid at section 5B; APA op cit note 591 at ch 4, 5 & 6.  
674 Ibid at section 5B & 20 (1).  
675 Ibid at ch 3.  





and an indispensable tool for ensuring the accountability of all organs of state.677 The Public 
Protector is required to be independent and to exercise its powers and perform its functions 
impartially, without fear, favour or prejudice, subject only to the Constitution.678 Other organs of 
state are to protect  and assist the Public Protector to ensure his or her independence, effectiveness, 
impartiality and dignity, and no organ of state is to interfere in the functioning of the Public 
Protector. 679   As the name aptly suggests, the office of the Public Protector was ultimately 
established in order to serve and protect the interests of the public against those in power with 
unscrupulous intentions and nefarious motives.680 
3.11.1 Appointment, Removal and Powers  
The Public Protector is appointed by the President, on recommendation of the National Assembly, 
for a non-renewable tenure of seven years.681 The Constitution and the Public Protector Act 23 of 
1994 (‘PPA’) stipulate statutory qualification criteria that a nominated person must meet in order 
to be appointed as the Public Protector.682 The Public Protector can only be removed, prior to 
expiry of his or her tenure, on a finding of misconduct, incompetence or incapacity, with a two-
third majority resolution by the National Assembly calling for such removal.683 Upon adoption of 
the National Assembly resolution, the President must remove such person from the office of the 
Public Protector.684 In certain instances the Public Protector may be allowed to vacate his or her 
office, on three months written notice to the National Assembly.685 
The constitutional function of the Public Protector requires the discharging of three primary 
powers. First, the power to investigate the conduct of state affairs or public administration, in any 
sphere of government, which includes SOCs, that is alleged or suspected to be improper or result 
in impropriety or prejudice.686 Secondly, to report on such conduct.687 Thirdly, to take appropriate 
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remedial action to correct any improper conduct.688 Additional powers of the Public Protector are 
contained in the PPA which attempt to assist in the effective performance of the three overarching 
constitutional powers.689 The Public Protector may not investigate court decisions and must be 
accessible to all persons and all communities.690  
The Public Protector may investigate any matter referred to him or her by a complainant or at his 
or her own initiative or may refuse to investigate a complaint, in certain instances.691 The method 
and procedure of an investigation is determined by the Public Protector, subject to certain specified 
rules and requirements.692 Unless exceptional circumstances exist, the Public Protector shall not 
investigate a complaint if it is not reported within two years from the date on which the alleged 
incident occurred. 693  Any person who: interferes with the office of the Public Protector, 
contravenes sections of the PPA or fails to disclose a personal interest, as required, may be guilty 
of an offence and subject to a fine or imprisonment.694 
The Public Protector is one of the most important accountability checks on the powers exercised 
and the functions performed by organs of state, including SOCs.695 In order to ensure that the 
Public Protector can perform his or her essential watchdog function and strengthen constitutional 
democracy, he or she is given extensive statutory powers.696 The investigative powers of the Public 
Protector centre around allegations of maladministration, abuse or unjustifiable exercises of power, 
improper or dishonest conduct, corruption or improper or unlawful enrichment in government 
affairs, public administration or any public entity, which includes SOCs.697 
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Any report issued by the Public Protector must be made public unless exceptional circumstances 
exist, which are embodied in legislation, dictating the confidentiality of the report.698 The Public 
Protector is accountable to the National Assembly and must report on its activities and 
performance of his or her functions at least once a year.699 
3.11.2 Binding Nature and Enforceability of Remedial Action 
The Public Protector is constitutionally empowered to ‘take appropriate remedial action’.700 The 
power of the Public Protector to take appropriate remedial action against the improper conduct or 
maladministration is essential to enforcing the accountability of SOCs.701 The binding nature of 
the remedial action issued by the Public Protector in her reports has been pronounced and 
confirmed by the Constitutional Court.702  
Notwithstanding bolstering from the Constitutional Court, remedial action prescribed to, and 
binding upon, an SOC by the Public Protector is, arguably, perceived as voluntary.703 Acting 
outside of the bounds of their discretion, the board of an SOC and the Minister undertake a 
unilateral review of the remedial action dictated by the Public Protector and then disregard it 
entirely.704 An application for a formal review is the proper channel for challenging the scope and 
implementation of any remedial action prescribed by the Public Protector.705 Unless an application 
for review is made to the appropriate court with jurisdiction, there is no statutory provision for a 
unilateral review and the setting aside of a remedial action contained in a Public Protectors report 
by the board of an SOC or the Minister.706  
The remedial action taken by the Public Protector is binding and enforceable and it should not 
have to be made an order of court before being effectively implemented by an SOC.707  A failure 
to abide by and implement the remedial action stipulated in the Public Protector’s report dilutes 
the entire purpose for which the office was established, as an accountability check on organs of 
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state.708 Therefore, the enforceability of binding remedial action prescribed by the Public Protector 
on the board of an SOC and the Minister is paramount to ensuring the effective fulfilment of the 
function of the Public Protector, as a mechanism for upholding the accountability of SOCs.  
Enforcement mechanisms, in general, are either reward or retribution based. 709  The current 
enforcement mechanism to guarantee the implementation of remedial action stipulated by the 
Public Protector is largely retributive in nature. The board of an SOC and its directors may be held 
liable for failing to discharge their statutory duties which may include failing to implement 
remedial action directed by the Public Protector.710  
Furthermore, unless set aside by an order of court on an application for review, remedial action is 
enforceable by the Public Protector in terms of the rules of the PPA.711 The enforceability of the 
remedial action directed by the Public Protector rests in  his or her right to report non-compliance 
to the Minister.712 The Public Protector may also enforce the implementation of remedial action 
by requesting assistance from the National Assembly or by initiating contempt proceedings against 
any person failing or neglecting to comply with the remedial action.713  
The remedial action directed by the Public Protector is undoubtably binding on organs of state, 
including SOCs. In order for remedial action to be truly binding on SOCs, it needs to be enforced 
to ensure compliance by the board of the SOC and the Minister. The retributive measures, 
including liability for non-compliance and contempt of court proceedings, need to actually be 
implemented on recalcitrant directors of SOCs and the Minister. Idle threats of retribution, as 
opposed to the actual imposition of retribution, will continue to render the binding nature and 
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3.11.3 ‘Appropriateness’ of Remedial Action 
There are a number of cases where applicants have approached the court to have the remedial 
action, prescribed by the Public Protector, set aside.714 The Public Protector is authorized to ‘take 
appropriate remedial action’.715 The rules of the PPA shed light on how ‘appropriate remedial 
action’ by the Public Protector may be taken.716 The Public Protector must, if remedial action is 
taken, provide timelines within which the plan for the implementation of the remedial action by 
the SOC must be submitted to the Public Protector.717  
The Public Protector shall monitor implementation of the plan by the SOC or any agreement 
reached between the parties to resolve the complaint.718 Save for these limited rules, there is no 
statutory definition of what would constitute appropriate remedial action to be taken by the Public 
Protector. The task of interpreting the appropriateness of the constitutional power of the Public 
Protector is, therefore, left to the judiciary.  
The Constitutional Court has held that taking appropriate remedial action by the Public Protector 
means ‘providing a proper, fitting, suitable and effective remedy for whatever complaint and 
against whomever the Public Protector is called upon to investigate.’719 The court must, on the 
facts and circumstances of each case, ascertain whether the remedial action prescribed by the 
Public Protector was appropriate.720 The court has also held that the remedial action directed by 
the Public Protector must be rationally connected to her reasoning for taking the action and to the 
purpose for which his or her power was given, otherwise the remedy will be arbitrary.721 The 
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proposed remedial action taken by the Public Protector must be based on accurate findings of fact 
and a correct application of the law in order to pass legal muster.722 
The appropriateness of the remedial action taken by the Public Protector may have a bearing on 
its enforceability, with respect to the board of an SOC or its Minister. If the Public Protector erred 
in his or her findings of fact or on an application of the law, the remedial action will not be 
appropriate, rational, effective or capable of enforcement by the Public Protector or any court.723 
Therefore, the Public Protector should take care in the formulation of the remedial action to ensure 
that it is effective, rational, proper and fitting in order to be enforceable and not set aside by the 
court on an application to review.   
3.12 The Separation of Powers Accountability Mechanism 
An SOC is under the supervision and control of the  executive branch of government as set out 
under the provisions of the PFMA.724 South Africa, as a constitutional democracy, subscribes to 
the doctrine of the separation of powers which requires that the three tiers of government: the 
executive, legislature and judiciary provide accountability checks over one another’s actions.725 
The legislature and the judiciary act as the separation of powers accountability mechanism for an 
SOC, as part of the checks and balances they provide over the actions of the executive. 726  As a  
precursor to their accountability checks over the executive, and particularly SOCs, a brief 
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3.12.1 The Executive  
An SOC is a juristic person under the ownership control of the national executive.727 The PFMA 
does not provide a definition for the national executive.728  However, it defines the ‘executive 
authority’ for an SOC as ’the Cabinet member who is accountable to Parliament  for that public 
entity or in whose portfolio it falls.’729 Most SOCs fall under the portfolio of the Department of 
Public Enterprises under the auspices of the Minister.730 Therefore, many SOCs are accountable 
to the Minister, as their executive authority under the PFMA and representative of the state, as the 
sole shareholder.731  
The accountability check which the state, specifically the Minister, performs over an SOC as its 
sole shareholder is discussed previously under the internal accountability mechanisms. This 
discussion now revolves around the broader measures which the executive takes in order to hold 
SOCs accountable. Therefore, a brief overview of the structure of the executive and its 
accountability mechanisms is required in order to understand the accountability of an SOC. 
The executive is responsible for the implementation of national legislation. 732  Therefore, the 
executive is responsible for ensuring that an SOC complies with all of its statutory duties, 
obligations and responsibilities to ensure the effective implementation of legislation and to 
accurately account for its decisions to the executive. The accountability of an SOC to the executive 
is hierarchical in nature in that the board is accountable to the Minister, the Minister is accountable 
to Cabinet and Cabinet is accountable to Parliament.733  
Parliament consists of the National Assembly and the NCOP. 734  The National Assembly is 
expected to account to the public, as their representative, by overseeing and scrutinizing executive 
action, including the implementation of legislation and to establish mechanisms to ensure the 
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accountability to it of all executive organs of state, in the national sphere of government.735 The 
national sphere of government would include SOCs which indicates that the National Assembly 
has the responsibility to provide for mechanisms which ensure the accountability to it of all SOCs. 
The NCOP represents the provinces and has a mandate to ensure that the interests of the respective 
provinces are taken into account in the national sphere of government.736 
Cabinet consists of the President, as the head of cabinet, the Deputy President and the ministers.737 
The President exercises the executive authority of the Republic, together with the Deputy President 
and ministers. 738  The ministers and Deputy President are appointed and removed by the 
President.739 The President also assigns the powers and functions of each minister as well as the 
Deputy President.740 The Deputy President and Ministers are selected from the members of the 
National Assembly, save for two ministers which may be appointed from outside of the National 
Assembly.741  
Although the Constitution confers wide powers on the President in respect of the ministers and the 
Deputy President, all members of Cabinet are accountable, collectively and individually, to 
Parliament for the exercise of their powers and the performance of their functions and are bound 
by the Constitution.742 The Cabinet members are to abide by a code of conduct as directed by the 
Executive Member’s Ethics Act 82 of 1998.743  Ministers may assign any of their powers or 
functions to an executive provincial council or municipal council but remain responsible for the 
performance of the function or power and accountable to the National Assembly.744  
The President is required to uphold, defend and respect the Constitution, as head of the Republic 
and national executive and is specifically responsible for fulfilling certain constitutional duties.745 
The President has the sole discretion to dismiss ministers and there are no constitutional 
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requirements pertaining to such dismissal which confers a wide, often abused, power to reshuffle 
un-cooperative ministers.746  
The President may only be removed, on certain grounds, on a resolution of a two-third majority 
vote of the National Assembly.747 The National Assembly, through a majority, may pass a vote of 
no confidence in the President or in the Cabinet, excluding the President.748  If a vote of no 
confidence in Cabinet is passed, the President must reconstitute the Cabinet.749 If a vote of no 
confidence in the President is passed, the President, the Deputy President and the ministers must 
all resign.750 
The national executive consists of a clustered system of government portfolios which comprise 
various government departments.751 Each government portfolio has a specific aim and objective 
and the government departments are then categorized according the portfolio they will best 
serve.752 The main objective of the portfolio system is to ensure the alignment of government 
strategies, plans and policies, to monitor the implementation of such and to create a platform for 
consulting on matters which are to be taken to Cabinet.753  
Many SOCs report to the Department of Public Enterprises which is under the purview of the 
Minister.754 The Department of Public Enterprises falls under two government portfolios: the 
cluster for economic sectors, investment, employment and infrastructure development and the 
cluster for governance, state capacity and institutional development.755  Whilst each government 
department is distinct in its portfolio categorization, they are inter-related and interdependent in 
overlapping functions and provide oversight and accountability checks on one another.756  
The National Treasury was established by the PFMA, in accordance with the Constitution and 
comprises the Minister of Finance and the Department of Finance.757 The National Treasury is 
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essential to ensuring transparency and expenditure control for each sphere of government.758 As a 
result of its importance, the Department of Finance falls under almost all of the government 
clusters.759 The PFMA, and the treasury regulations, dictate the powers and functions which are to 
be performed by the National Treasury.760 The Minister of Finance exercises an accountability 
check over SOCs by ensuring that the board complies with the provisions of the PFMA.761 
 
One of the functions which must be performed by the National Treasury is to prepare consolidated 
annual financial statements for public entities under the ownership control of the national executive 
which includes SOCs.762 In the preparation of the financial statements, the National Treasury may 
uncover certain financial issues for SOCs, and therefore provides an important accountability 
check over the financial affairs of SOCs 763   
There are stringent statutory provisions which are meant to ensure the accountability of SOCs to 
the executive, as the sole shareholder. However, in order to ensure compliance with these statutory 
provisions, the executive should be ready and willing to impose retributive measures against the 
boards of SOCs which fail to fulfil their obligations.  An unwillingness from the executive to 
enforce the accountability of an SOC will, by necessary implication, increase the need for the 
judiciary and legislature to ensure the accountability of SOCs.  
3.12.2 The Legislature 
The national legislative authority vests in Parliament which consists of two houses: the National 
Assembly and the NCOP.764 The National Assembly and the NCOP discharge legislative powers 
and processes, designated with respect to national, provincial and local spheres of government, in 
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.765 The National Assembly has the legislative 
authority to make and amend the Constitution and national legislation.766 As SOCs fall under the 
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purview of national legislation, a further discussion on the legislative authority vested in the 
provincial and local legislatures is not germane to this research.  
The National Assembly comprises no more than four hundred members who are citizens and 
qualified to vote for the National Assembly.767 Members of the National Assembly are elected in 
terms of a proportional representation electoral system, based on the common voters roll and 
national legislation.768 The composition of the members of the National Assembly is proportional 
to the number of votes every political party wins in the national elections.769  Therefore, the 
majority of the members of the National Assembly will be members of the political party who won 
the national elections, on a proportional representation basis.770  
The National Assembly has two primary constitutional powers.771 First, the National Assembly is 
required to initiate or prepare legislation (except money bills) and to consider, pass, amend or 
reject legislation which comes before it. 772  Secondly, the National Assembly is required to 
maintain oversight over: the exercise of national executive authority (including the implementation 
of legislation) and any organ of state and to provide for mechanisms which ensure that all organs 
of state in the national sphere of government are accountable to it.773 This constitutional obligation 
of the National Assembly corresponds to the constitutional requirement placed on Cabinet, to 
account to the National Assembly.774  
The National Assembly utilises its constitutional function of passing legislation to maintain 
oversight and accountability of SOCs. 775  Various legislative enactments contain mandatory 
reporting, disclosure and accountability provisions with which the boards of SOCs are required to 
comply, the most predominant of which being the PFMA together with the treasury regulations.776 
The efficiency and accuracy of the legislature, in passing national legislation, will assist the 
executive in its function of implementing legislation.777 The power and functions of the executive 
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are determined and prescribed by the legislature through the passing of national legislation, to that 
effect.778  
The National Assembly establishes committees in order to assist with its constitutional obligation 
to provide mechanisms to ensure that the executive is accountable to it and to maintain oversight 
of any organ of state and the exercise of the executive authority to implement legislation.779 The 
establishment, composition, powers, functions, procedures and duration of the committees are 
provided for by the National Assembly.780 There are various types of committees which may be 
established by the National Assembly namely: portfolio’ committees, standing committees and ad 
hoc committees.781  
Portfolio committees are established by the National Assembly to monitor and supervise each 
government department of the executive. 782  Permanent committees are known as standing 
committees and a committee combining both members of the National Assembly and the NCOP 
are joint committees.783 Ad hoc committees are once off, temporary committees, established to 
consider specific issues and are disbanded once their mandates are fulfilled.784 
These committees do not take decisions but make recommendations to the legislature, generally 
in the form of reports submitted to the National Assembly.785 Committees are also empowered, 
subject to legislation and the Constitution, to: summon persons to appear before them to give 
evidence, conduct public hearings, consult any assembly or council committee, determine their 
own working arrangements and exercise any other powers assigned to them by the Constitution, 
legislation, the Rules of the National Assembly or a resolution of the National Assembly.786  
There are a number of committees established under the rules of the National Assembly, legislation 
and the NCOP to supervise and monitor the performance of SOCs.787 The powers and functions 
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of the various committees, pertaining to the oversight and monitoring of SOCs may overlap and 
are usually inter-related and performed simultaneously or concurrently to ensure the accountability 
of the national executive for the performance of SOCs under its ownership control. These 
committees include: The Portfolio Committee on Public Enterprises (‘Portfolio Committee’), the 
Standing Committee on Public Accounts (‘SCOPA’), the Standing Committee on Finance and the 
Standing Committee on the Auditor-General.788 
The two most influential of these committees are, arguably, the SCOPA and the Standing 
Committee on Finance.789 Over the last decade, both committees have held numerous meetings 
and published reports concerning the oversight and monitoring of various SOCs, including SAA 
and Eskom.790 
Even though the doctrine of the separation of powers implores a strict separation between the 
legislature and the executive, the appointment of ministers, by the President, from the members of 
the National Assembly makes an overlap of membership between the two spheres, a practical 
eventuality.791 As a result of the concurrent membership of the ministers, in terms of the executive 
and legislative spheres, the accountability check which these two spheres have over each other is 
relatively diluted, as their respective independence from each other may be compromised.792 As a 
result, the judiciary is considered the most vital accountability check over the legislature and the 
executive.793 
3.12.3 The Judiciary  
The third sphere of government is the judiciary, whose authority is vested in the court system.794 
The judiciary is independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law of the Republic,  
which must be applied without fear, favour or prejudice.795 The independence of the judiciary is 
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integral to its effectiveness and must be maintained, protected and upheld by the legislature and 
executive spheres of government and all organs of state.796 The judicial authority of the courts is 
paramount to a constitutional democracy and any order of court is binding on all persons and all 
organs of state to whom it applies.797 
The court system comprises the magistrates courts, high courts, the Supreme Court of Appeal and 
the Constitutional Court.798  Any other court may also be established by an Act of Parliament 
which will be included in the court system, having similar status as that of the magistrates courts 
or high courts.799 The court system depicts a hierarchical judicial authority, from the magistrates 
courts to the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court is the highest court in South Africa 
and will only adjudicate upon constitutional matters, unless it decides otherwise that it is in the 
public’s interest for a matter to heard within its jurisdiction.800  
Judges of the courts are appointed by the President on the advice of the Judicial Services 
Commission which is established and mandated by the Constitution and national legislation.801 
The Chief Justice and Deputy Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court and the President and 
Deputy President of the Supreme Court of Appeal are all appointed by the President after 
consulting the Judicial Service Commission and the leaders of the political parties represented in 
the National Assembly.802 Other Constitutional Court judges are appointed by the President after 
consultation with the Chief Justice and leaders of the political parties represented in the National 
Assembly.803 All judicial officers must take an oath to uphold the Constitution prior to engaging 
in any of their judicial functions.804  
The National Prosecuting Authority (‘NPA’) is structured according to national legislation, subject 
to the Constitution and is responsible for instituting criminal proceedings, and ancillary activities, 
on behalf of the state.805 The NPA is headed by the National Director of Public Prosecutions, who 
 
796 Ibid at section 165 (3) & (4); Personal Injury Lawyers supra note 726 para 31. 
797 Ibid at section 165 (5).  
798 Ibid at section 166 (1).  
799 Ibid at section 166 (2).  
800 Ibid at section 167 (3).  
801 Ibid at section 174 (6).  
802 Ibid at section 174 (3).  
803 Ibid at section 174 (4).  
804 Ibid at section 174 (8).  





is appointed by the President. 806  The Directors of Public Prosecutions and prosecutors are 
appointed in accordance with national legislation. 807  Directors of Public Prosecutions are 
responsible for prosecutions in specific jurisdictions, subject to possible review by the National 
Director of Public Prosecutions.808 The ultimate responsibility over the functions and performance 
of the NPA rests in the Minister of Justice and Correctional Services.809 
The judiciary provides an important, impartial and independent check on the executive and 
legislature.810 Each sphere of government must respect the independency of the other and perform 
constitutional obligations without overstepping into the bounds of another sphere’s functions.811 
The judiciary is authorized to review executive conduct and national legislation to ensure 
compliance with the Bill of Rights and the Constitution.812 The judiciary is not subsuming the 
functions or powers of either the legislature or the executive by maintaining oversight and making 
the branches of government accountable to one another.813  
The judiciary exercises its oversight function over the executive by scrutinizing conduct, through 
applications or actions brought to the courts, to ensure compliance by all organs of state with the 
Constitution.814 This includes supervision of the conduct of ministers and government departments 
who are required to supervise the conduct of the board of an SOC. The President also has the 
power to establish judicial commissions of inquiry to inquire into any actions or conduct of the 
executive.815 A commission of inquiry would be able to scrutinize the conduct of the board of an 
SOC, as national public entity as well as the conduct of the Minister to whom the board is required 
to account.816   
The court system and judicial commissions of inquiry provide the most effective judicial check 
over the executive in an attempt to curb abuses of power and improve the constitutional precepts 
of accountability and transparency. The independence of the judiciary is paramount to its 
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effectiveness as an external accountability check on the executive in its supervision over SOCs.817 
In an unstable economic climate, with many allegations of state corruption, it is imperative that 
the integrity and independence of the judiciary is maintained and any threat to it should be curtailed 
as a matter of priority to ensure our constitutional dispensation.  
3.13 The Last Resort: The Public 
The public is the ultimate stakeholder of SOCs as the executive may utilise taxpayer monies to 
fund SOCs.818 The extent to which the board of an SOC is accountable to the public is limited 
through the provisions of the Constitution and national legislation. The Constitution makes 
provision for the government of South Africa to observe and adhere to the principles enshrined 
therein and to conduct their activities within the parameters of ensuring the well-being, security, 
national unity, peace and protection of the Republic and its people.819  
The government, and all organs of state, are to provide effective, transparent, accountable and 
coherent government for the Republic.820 Although there is a constitutional requirement for organs 
of state and public administration to be accountable, there is no specific constitutional requirement 
which states that the government must be directly accountable to the people of South Africa.821  
Similarly, the board of an SOC is accountable to the executive, particularly the Minister but there 
is no statutory requirement on the board of an SOC to specifically account to the public.822  The 
Constitution allows for public access and involvement in the legislative processes and activities of 
the National Assembly and its various committees.823 However, the right of public access may be 
curtailed by the National Assembly, if it is reasonable and justifiable to do so in an open and 
democratic society.824  
The only mechanism for holding the National Assembly, the President and his cabinet accountable 
is through a vote of no confidence, for which a two third majority resolution of the National 
Assembly is required.825 If the ruling party holds a two-third majority of the votes in the National 
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Assembly, the likelihood of a motion of no confidence being passed is remote. Arguably, the 
Constitution did not make provision for any checks and balances for possible abuses of power by 
the ruling party which holds a two-third majority in the National Assembly. This Constitutional 
oversight has resulted in a lack of accountability for the ruling party to the public.826  
 A mechanism available to the public in attempting to hold an SOC, and the executive, to account 
is through activism including public protests, rallies and applications to court, where possible. The 
public have rallied behind institutional organizations, founded and funded by private citizens, such 
as OUTA and Corruption Watch. 827  These institutions have motivated the public, in their 
stakeholder activism roles, by bringing court applications against directors of SOCs who have 
allegedly breached their duties or committed criminal offences.828 The most infamous of which is 
the successful delinquency order which the court granted against Duduzile Myeni (‘Myeni’), 
former non-executive chairperson of SAA, in an application brought by OUTA.829  
Although there are mechanisms for the public to act as an external accountability measure for 
SOCs, these should be considered an avenue of last resort. The impact brought about by public 
protests is meant to place pressure on the executive to hold SOCs accountable. This is especially 
evident when the protests gain local and international traction through media reports. However, it 
is unrealistic to expect the public to continually resort to protests in order to hold SOCs and the 
executive to account. Without having a direct interest in the performance of SOCs, as is the case 
with shareholders of private companies, the motivation of the public to continually hold the board 
of an SOC and its Minister to account, understandably wanes over time. With the advent of the 
Constitution, it remains the primary responsibility of the executive, legislature and judiciary to 
hold an SOC and the Minister accountable.830  
3.14 Conclusion  
There are numerous internal and external accountability measures available for SOCs, most of 
which are mandated through statutes. It is submitted that it was the intention of the legislature, 
with the enactment of numerous statutes to ensure that SOCs, as custodians of national assets are 
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held to the utmost level of accountability. The board of an SOC and its directors, as the focal point 
for accountability, should discharge their duties at all times to ensure that the interests of the SOC 
are protected and that they remain accountable to the Minister, as the representative of the state as 
the sole shareholder. The external accountability measures should also be enforced to ensure that 
the board of an SOC remains accountable. However, without the continuous enforcement of the 






CHAPTER FOUR: A LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY FOR SOCS 
4 Introduction  
It is submitted that many SOCs in South Africa have had significant accountability and 
performance issues over the last decade. 831  Notwithstanding the aforementioned internal and 
external measures, the omission of an adequate enforcement mechanism has effectively eroded the 
actual accountability of SOCs. A case study of SAA, based on research garnered from a direct 
analysis and interpretation of the SAA Reports, will be used as an illustration of an SOC which 
has exhibited accountability and performance issues over the last decade.832 It is proposed that the 
enforcement of the accountability of SOCs, such as SAA, may assist in improving their future 
performance, on a holistic basis with a focus on financial performance.   
4.1 The Performance of SOCs 
South African SOCs have the ability to drive and accelerate national growth and development for 
the economy.833 Essential for the provision of certain service delivery and public policy functions, 
as well as the ability to discharge commercial mandates, the role of SOCs remains pivotal.834 
Prolific in the strategic sectors of energy, transport, telecommunications and manufacturing, the 
performance of SOCs may heavily impact the growth and development of our economy.835  
Unfortunately, the historical track record of almost all SOCs in South Africa is underwhelming.836   
The worst performers of these SOCs are undoubtably Eskom, the South African Broadcasting 
Corporation SOC Limited (‘SABC’) and SAA which has recently gone into business rescue.837 
The dismal financial performance of these three SOCs, over the last decade, has had a direct 
negative impact on the growth of the economy.838  
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Arguably, the intention in the establishment of these SOCs was for them to discharge dual 
mandates, fulfilling commercial and non-commercial objectives. 839  In order to effectively 
discharge their non-commercial goals these SOCs are to ensure the successful performance of their 
commercial mandates.840 The successful financial performance of these SOCs meant that they did 
not have to rely substantially or fully on state funding, in accordance with the definition of them 
as ‘Enterprises’ under the PFMA.841 It was not the intention of the legislature, on the promulgation 
of the PFMA, that the state, with its limited resources, be the sole funder of SOCs, defined as 
‘Enterprises’, such as Eskom and SAA.842  
However, many SOCs, such as SAA and Eskom, have not been able to sustain their own 
commercial operations for many years and are now reliant on state funding to continue their 
commercial and non-commercial operations.843 It is conceivable that the very cause of the financial 
distress for these SOCs may have been the requirement to discharge a dual mandate.844 The 
conflicting goals, which are often present when attempting to fulfil both mandates, creates an 
inevitable strain on the ability of the SOC to perform either mandate effectively.845 SAA, for 
instance, has to comply with designated trade routes, in terms of policy directives issued by the 
state, notwithstanding the profitability considerations of such routes.846 The commercial objective 
of SAA may therefore be hindered by its non-commercial objective.  
The financial performance of these SOCs is further compounded due to the costs of compliance 
with various pieces of legislation. 847  The convoluted provisions of the PFMA and, possibly 
contradictory requirements of the Companies Act, make compliance a cumbersome and difficult 
task for the board of these SOCs.848  The compliance costs for these SOCs may far outweigh any 
such similar costs faced by their private counterparts which may then out compete SOCs operating 
in the same industry.849  
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The cost of compliance with the legislation coupled with conflicting mandates, may result in an 
unlevel playing field for SOCs attempting to compete with their private counterparts in the same 
industry.850 The hindered competitiveness of SOCs may inevitably negatively affect their financial 
performance. South Africa’s economy, can ill afford to completely subsidize these SOCs which 
are a heavy burden on the national purse. 851  Notwithstanding many of the reasons for their 
underperformance, SOCs exhibit a dire lack of accountability which may hinder their ability to 
effectively implement a solution to improve their future financial performance. 852  
4.2 The Accountability Issue 
Numerous allegations of a complete lack of accountability from certain SOCs such as SAA, over 
the last decade, have been well documented.853 It is arguable that a lack of accountability will 
negatively impact the financial performance of an SOC, as may be illustrated with the use of SAA 
as a case study in the subsequent paragraphs of this chapter. It is submitted that the accountability 
of SOCs is further compounded by two predominant issues which are specific to SOCs due to their 
very nature. First, the issue associated with the concept of ‘double agency’.854 Secondly, the issue 
arising from the fact that the state is an SOC’s sole shareholder.855  
The double agency issue represents the dual layer of accountability faced by SOCs.856 First, the 
board and its directors are accountable to the state, as sole shareholder of the SOC.857 Secondly, 
the shareholder representative of the state, the Minister, is then accountable to the National 
Assembly.858 This dual layer represents inherent risks which are specific only to SOCs, in that 
accountability needs to be actively enforced on two levels as opposed to just one level as would 
be the case for their private counterparts.  
A breakdown in communication or transparency, at either level, may result in a lack of 
accountability for SOCs. The dual accountability structure of SOCs needs to be continually 
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applied, protected and enforced to counter the double agency issue. This is difficult task to perform 
given the complex structure of the executive, depicted in our three-tier government system which 
was explained in the previous chapter.859  
The second issue facing SOCs is that an, arguably, complacent state and public are their 
predominant stakeholders.860 SOCs are the agents appointed by South Africans to care for the 
assets of the nation.861 An SOC is therefore accountable to both the state and the public for its 
performance and the state and the public are under a reciprocal duty to ensure that an SOC is held 
accountable. However, neither the public nor the state are incentivized to watch over the interests 
of the SOC with the same vigilance as they would attribute to their own assets and interests.862  
The public, as a stakeholder, should provide an oversight role for the performance of SOCs, but a 
complacent populace may often forget their watchdog role.863 Collective bodies, such as the public 
or the state, are not the best accountability mechanisms for SOCs as there is a presumption in a 
group of people that someone will hold SOCs accountable but no single party actually takes 
responsibility to enforce such accountability.864  There is a requirement for continuous analysis, 
on a multi-layered approach, for all stakeholders to ensure the actual accountability of SOCs for 
their performance.865 Without public outcry and activism the supervisory role of the public over 
the SOC is diluted.  
Under this second issue, the accountability of SOCs is further exacerbated by the fact that the state 
is the sole shareholder.866 This removes the oversight role provided by serving the interests of 
multiple shareholders as opposed to just one.867 A failure to account by these SOCs is served by 
an environment in which corruption festers.868 A complacent state does not effectively monitor or 
oversee the functions and proper performance of an SOC.869 Corruption begets personal gain 
prompted by conflicts of interest which entails the subordination of the interests of the SOC in 
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favour of the interests of those in power. 870  As a result of complacency and corruption, the 
supervisory role of the state over the SOC is also significantly compromised.871  
Without a measure of enforceable accountability for SOCs they are not held to account to the state 
or the public for their poor performance. Arguably, the state tends to try to alleviate the negative 
impact caused by the poor performance of SOCs through state funding.872 A side-effect of this 
short-term thinking is that it is only a temporary solution and by no means ensures the long-term 
sustainability and performance of SOCs.873  
4.3 The Zondo Commission  
The financial, governance and operational failures of South African SOCs have plagued media 
reports over the last decade. 874  A series of scathing reports published by Advocate Thuli 
Madonsela during her seven-year tenure as Public Protector, from 2009 to 2016 highlighted the 
massive governance failures of SOCs, focusing on a failure by the board to discharge its statutory 
duties. 875  Corruption, maladministration and unchecked abuses of state power, as the sole 
shareholder of SOCs, were also uncovered.876  
The final nail in the coffin of state coffers was the last report issued by Advocate Madonsela, 
before her vacating of office in late 2016, which is infamously known as the State Capture 
Report.877  A slew of court cases followed the State Capture Report, which incriminated those in 
power as well as the boards of SOCs and which, following the recommendation of the Public 
Protector in her report, culminated in the establishment of the Zondo Commission in February 
2018.878  
The Zondo Commission was supposed to be established by the President, as recommended by 
Advocate Madonsela, within 30 days of the release of the State Capture Report on 2 November 
2016.879 However, as a result of the delay caused by the state in its launching of an unsuccessful 
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court application to review the remedial action provided in the State Capture Report, the Zondo 
Commission was only established on 23 January 2018.880 The Zondo Commission is a judicial 
commission of inquiry which is mandated to investigate allegations of state capture, corruption 
and fraud in the public sector, including organs of state.881 The terms of reference for Zondo 
Commission align with the remedial action prescribed by the Public Protector in the State Capture 
Report.882 
The Zondo Commission is mandated to: ‘inquire into, make findings, report on and make 
recommendations’ in its investigation into matters of public and national interest concerning 
allegations of state capture, corruption and fraud, guided by the report of the Public Protector, 
legislation, policies and guidelines and the Constitution.883 SOEs are specifically referenced in 
relation to any improprieties in the appointments or removals of board members by the state and 
the unlawful awarding of tenders by SOEs as a result of a conflict of interest by the board or 
state.884  
The investigation has brought into focus many of the operational and governance deficiencies of 
various SOCs, which subsequently opened the door for corruption, state capture and fraud.885 The 
SOCs which were highlighted under the State Capture Report, in terms of allegations relating to 
corruption, state capture and fraud, are subject to investigation by the Zondo Commission and 
these SOCs are: Eskom, Transnet, Denel, SAA and SABC.886 All of these SOCs have commercial 
mandates and, as Enterprises, their poor financial performance has had a far-ranging ripple effect 
on the economy.887  
The Commission was to submit its report and make recommendations, on the basis of its 
investigation, to the President within 180 days of its commencement.888 The commencement date 
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of the Commission was 1 March 2018 and the first public hearing was held on 20 August 2018.889 
The deadline for the submission of the report from the Zondo commission was extended by the 
North Gauteng High Court to 1 March 2020 and was subsequently extended again by the court to 
31 March 2021.890  
There were numerous concerns raised by the High Court in granting the extension as the interests 
of justice and the public would be best served if finality was reached by the Zondo Commission 
and its investigation concluded and report submitted.891 As a result, the court granted this extension 
as a final extension for the Zondo Commission which indicates that it cannot approach the court 
to grant a further extension of the submission deadline of 31 March 2021.892   
The extensions granted to the Zondo Commission serve to dilute one of its main purposes which 
is to act as a preventative measure in deterring future unethical and corrupt behaviour from the 
state and the board of an SOC and its directors. Whilst the Zondo Commission conducts its 
investigation, current and future boards of SOCs and members of the state are not dissuaded from 
similar behaviour in future. 
The Public Protector and the Zondo Commission are authorised to refer any matter for prosecution, 
further investigation or the convening of a separate enquiry, to the appropriate law enforcement 
agency, government department or regulator regarding the conduct of certain persons.893 The 
tenure of Advocate Madonsela expired before she could bring any matters, identified as alleged 
crimes in her State Capture Report, to notice of the NPA for possible prosecution. The current 
Public Protector, Advocate Busisiwe Mkhwebane, has yet to bring any matters to the notice of the 
NPA and is accused of failing to effectively monitor the conduct of the Zondo Commission in 
accordance with the remedial action set out in the State Capture Report.894 Chairperson of the 
Zondo Commission, Deputy Chief Justice Raymond Zondo has also not referred any persons to 
the NPA for prosecution.  
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There are no time limits prescribed for the referral of matters for prosecution to the NPA and the 
chairperson of the Zondo Commission or the Public Protector need not wait until submission of 
the report in order to make a referral. A referral would serve as an effective deterrent, as those in 
breach of their duties, as directors of SOCs, may be held criminally and personally liable. There 
are reports of a special directorate to be implemented by the NPA which will be mandated to deal 
with criminal prosecutions, following the evidence gathered by the Zondo Commission’s 
investigation.895 Until there is an effective enforcement mechanism, whether retribution or reward-
based, to hold recalcitrant boards and directors of SOCs to account, their dismal performance is 
likely to continue unabated.  
4.4 SAA Case in Point 
SAA is utilized as a prime illustration of the lack of accountability exhibited by the board of an 
SOC and its directors, despite a plethora of statutory requirements and the possibility of liability 
being imposed due to breaches of duties.896 This research will be conducted directly from an 
analysis and interpretation of the SAA Reports.897 SAA is an SOC and classified as an Enterprise 
and is, therefore, capable of being financially self-reliant although it has been unable to do so in 
the recent years due to its financial underperformance.898 
SAA was chosen as the case study for this chapter primarily because, unlike other failing SOCs, 
such as Eskom, SAA has a non-commercial mandate which does not involve a public interest 
objective, such as the provision of free electricity for indigent households.899 The non-commercial 
mandate of SAA involves the creation of trade routes in order to facilitate trade relations with 
various countries.900 SAA is not tasked with the performance of a service delivery function, which 
would, to a certain extent, make its continued existence inevitable. The main objective of SAA is 
the provision of services as passenger airline and cargo transporter.901 Therefore, utilising the 
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failures of SAA as the SOC under the spotlight paves the way for reform of SOCs with similar 
mandates. 
The continuous systematic failures of SAA will be highlighted as a case in point for the 
ineffectiveness of the current retributive measures which are utilized in an attempt to hold directors 
of SOCs accountable.902 As an enforcement mechanism for accountability, the available legislated, 
retributive measures have had little effect on the governance failures of almost all SOCs over the 
last decade.903 Plagued with internal and external accountability failures, spanning over the past 
10 years, SAA finally succumbed when it entered into voluntary business rescue on 5 December 
2019.904  Although certainly not the only SOC with governance and financial failures, SAA is the 
only SOC to date to have entered  business rescue proceedings.905  
4.5 Accountability Failures of SAA 
The financial performance of SAA has progressively declined since as early as 2011.906 This poor 
financial performance has a hugely detrimental impact on the scarce national resources, as 
taxpayers’ monies are constantly being utilized to fund the struggling airline, despite the presence 
of its commercial mandate.907 It is submitted that SAA’s continued financial and operational 
failures, primarily stem from a lack of accountability exhibited by its board and directors which is 
exacerbated by ineffective supervision from the Minister. 908  The internal and external 
accountability measures, allegedly implemented by the board of SAA, have, arguably, failed and 
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4.6 Internal Accountability Failures  
The internal accountability mechanisms available to the board of SAA include the statutory 
director duties, the responsibilities of the board and committees, the supervision of the state as its 
sole shareholder and the functions performed by the internal audit and the company secretary.  
4.6.1 The Directors 
In terms of the PFMA and the Companies Act, the board of SAA and its directors are required to 
discharge their statutory, fiduciary duties and the duty of care and skill, taking decisions in the best 
interests of the SOC.910 The duties of the board will be discussed in the subsequent chapter and the 
duties of the directors of SAA, under the Companies Act, will be initially discussed.  
The conduct of many of the directors of SAA, spanning the last couple of years, has resulted in a 
failure of one of the core internal accountability checks for the SOC.911  A complete lack of 
corporate governance structures also contributed to the directors’ inability to effectively discharge 
their fiduciary duties and the duty of care and skill.912 Numerous decisions, riddled with conflicts 
of interest, have been taken which cannot be said to have been in the best interests of the SOC.913 
A stellar example lies in the delinquency order which OUTA sought from the North Gauteng High 
Court under section 165 (2) of the Companies Act against former non-executive chairperson of 
SAA, Myeni.914  
OUTA sought to declare Myeni a delinquent for her conduct, during her tenure as non-executive 
chairperson of SAA from 2012 to 2017, claiming a gross abuse of her position as director and a 
breach of her duties under the PFMA which constituted criminal offences which should also be 
referred to the NPA for prosecution.915  The court granted the order declaring Myeni a delinquent 
under section 162 (5)(c) of the Companies Act for grossly and intentionally abusing  her position 
as director and breaching the duties she owed to SAA.916 
In addition, the court ordered that the delinquency declaration subsist against Myeni for her 
lifetime, that she pay the costs of the action and that the judgement and evidence led be referred to 
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the NPA for possible criminal prosecution.917 The court sought to impose the highest possible 
punishment on Myeni, as a result of her actions which contributed to the inevitable downfall of 
SAA which, as an SOC, has a drastic impact on the economy of South Africa.918 This landmark 
judgement serves as a precedent and warning to all directors on the boards of SOCs that they are 
not untouchable and that a breach of their duties will lead to severe consequences.  
Notwithstanding the obvious negligent conduct of Myeni during her tenure, it is submitted that her 
appointment to the board of SAA, as a non-executive, independent chairperson, was heavily 
flawed and ultimately should never have occurred. The board of SAA has repeatedly stated its 
application of the King Codes in the SAA Reports. 919  Following the King Codes, as the 
chairperson, Myeni was meant to act as an independent non-executive director to ensure the 
objective and effective discharging of the roles and responsibilities of the directors on the board.920  
On her appointment date in 2012 as chairperson, Myeni had already been a non-executive director 
on the board of SAA since 2009 and, as a result, her independence may have already been 
compromised.921 Furthermore, Myeni had close links to the former President, Jacob Zuma, and 
served on the board of one of his foundations, the JZ Foundation (SA), at the time that she was 
appointed as director to the SAA board.922 The potential for conflicts of interest which may arise 
when the chairperson is so closely linked to the state, as sole shareholder of SAA, would have been 
inevitable.  
It is conceivable that this conflict of interest materialized as Myeni would go on to take numerous 
unilateral decisions, as a result of a complacent board, which were not in the best interests of 
SAA.923 Therefore, Myeni could not reasonably have been regarded as independent which is a 
crucial recommendation of the King Codes for the chairperson, as the leader of the independent, 
non-executive directors on the board.924 
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Furthermore, Myeni was appointed with no previous knowledge or experience of the role of an 
independent non-executive chairperson and seemingly did not receive any training on the duties 
she owed, in such capacity, to SAA.925  This lack of knowledge and experience undoubtably 
compromised her ability to effectively lead the board of SAA in fulfilling its governance objectives 
and responsibilities. 926  In addition to the lack of independence, Myeni was also completely 
unqualified to fulfil the important role of the chairperson of SAA. 
The fact that SAA has no separate nominations committee to assist in the appointment of directors 
may also have contributed to the unsuitable appointment of Myeni, initially as an executive 
director and then subsequently as the chairperson of the board.927 The nominations committee of 
SAA was always established together with another committee, usually the social and ethics or 
governance committee.928 Jointly combining the important mandate of a nominations committee 
with that of another committee may have subverted its importance which lead to the unsuitable 
appointment of Myeni. 
The state, as the sole shareholder of SAA, has sole discretion in the appointment of directors, and 
with her close ties to the former President Jacob Zuma at the time, it is arguable that Myeni’s 
appointment to the board of SAA was due to political and personal motives rather than to benefit 
the composition of the board of SAA in its best interests.  
The frequent turnover of the position of CEO of SAA has also provided an aspect of instability to 
the board.929 As a pivotal position on the board of directors and as one of the two executive 
directors, the CEO has an important role to play in the strategic management and control of the 
SOC.930 Since 2013, SAA has seen over four CEO’s take the helm, a position which requires skill, 
experience and expertise and the constant rotation has placed strain on the rest of the board.931 The 
inconsistency of the vital position of CEO, who provides a crucial link to the information around 
the strategic management and control of the SOC for the non-executive director also contributed 
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to Myeni’s reign of tyranny.932 Unchecked by the CEO, Myeni was able to conduct the affairs of 
SAA as if she was its sole executive director and shareholder.933  
Myeni’s tenure ran over a period of nine years, commencing in 2012 and contributed to the 
downfall of the airline, which was profitable in 2012 and which voluntarily applied for business 
rescue in 2019.934 During Myeni’s nine-year tenure, the board of directors were mere puppets who 
amicably agreed, by silent omissions,  to her decisions, which were not taken in the best interests 
of SAA. 935 As is evident from testimony given to the Zondo Commission by former CFO of SAA, 
Phumeza Nhantsi, Myeni was given unfettered discretion to take complete control of the board 
and to take unilateral, executive decisions on behalf of SAA.936  
It is submitted that the rest of the directors who served on the board of SAA during Myeni’s tenure 
should also have delinquency applications brought against them for a breach of their fiduciary 
duties in failing to take decisions for a proper purpose and with an independent mind.  
Therefore, from an examination of the SAA Reports, it is submitted that the lack of accountability 
exhibited by the board of the SOC, in allowing Myeni to unilaterally take decisions which were 
not in the best interests of SAA, had a negative effect on financial performance of the SOC from 
2012, when Myeni was appointed as the non-executive chairperson.  
4.6.2 The Board and Committees 
The composition of the board and the delegation of responsibility to management and committees 
are also important aspects to achieving the accountability of SOCs.   
(a) The Board 
The composition of the board of an SOC is an important factor in promoting accountability and 
enhancing performance.937 The composition of the board of an SOC is not regulated (save for 
members of the social and ethics and audit committees) and should comprise directors of an 
appropriate mix of knowledge, skills, experience, diversity and independence, in order to 
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effectively manage and control the SOC.938 For an SOC, the directors are appointed by the state 
as the sole shareholder which may do so without consultation with the board which may shroud 
the principles of transparency and disclosure. 939The state, as shareholder, may abuse its power in 
appointing directors due to political or personal motivations, rather than in the best interests of the 
SOC.940  
The composition of the board of SAA makes an interesting case in point for the apparent 
application of the recommendations provided by the King Codes. It may appear as though SAA 
has applied the recommendations, alleging a description of their board composition as a majority 
of independent non-executive directors, over the last decade.941 Following the recommendations 
of the King Codes, there were only two executive directors on the board of SAA, the CEO and 
CFO, at any given time with the rest of the board comprising non-executive directors.942  
The value which a majority of independent, non-executive directors provides in respect of the 
performance of an entity has been a hotly contested issue.943  It is argued that a majority of 
independent, non-executive directors does not necessarily result in improved supervision, fewer 
conflicts of interest, greater accountability and overall better corporate performance.944 SAA may 
be evidence in support of this argument, as its board composition seemingly complied with the 
majority recommendation for over a decade but still managed to be placed under business rescue 
in 2019 and have a delinquency order granted against its former chairperson.945  
However, the value of a majority of independent, non-executive directors may not have been the 
primary issue for SAA and there may have been other underlying factors which inevitably led to 
the downfall of the airline.  
First, the actual independence of the non-executive directors serving on the board of SAA may 
have been questionable. A continual analysis of the board may have illustrated the compromised 
 
938 Companies Act op cit note 11 at section 94 & 72 (4); King IV op cit note 19 at principle 7 at 115.  
939  Shirley N Matsiliza ‘Corporate Governance of the State-Owned Enterprises In an Emerging Country: Risk 
Management and Related Issues’ (2017) 7 Risk Governance & Control: Financial Markets & Institutions 35 – 43 at 
39; Makoni op cit note 13 at 22.  
940 Matsiliza op cit note 939 at 39; Makoni op cit note 13 at 22.  
941 SAA reports op cit note 20; 2013 report at 62; 2014 report at 82; 2015 report at 10; 2016 report at 64; 2017 report 
at 80.   
942 Ibid.  
943 Wiese op cit note 63  at 32; Bhagat op cit note 440 at 235; Olson op cit note 399 at 237. 
944 Ibid.  





independence of many of the non-executive directors serving on the board of SAA. An 
independent non-executive director is a director who is not involved in the day to day management 
of the company, is not a representative of the shareholder, has not been employed by the SOC in 
any executive capacity and has no contractual relationship or interest in the SOC or any of its 
subsidiaries. 946 King IV provides a detailed assessment of the independence of a non-executive 
director which can be applied by the shareholder, in collaboration with the board, in the 
appointment of the directors.947 
At the outset of the appointment of Myeni as the chairperson, her independence was conceivably  
compromised due to her relationship with the former President Zuma and his foundation.948 Myeni 
was described as a non-executive director and included, on several occasions, as one of the 
independent, non-executive directors.949 In the 2013 integrated report of SAA, the first mention of 
the independence of the board is made, which was followed by a statement that all the non-
executive directors appointed to the board, by the Minister were independent.950 This amounted to 
a blanket claim by SAA, as opposed to an individual assessment, despite reference to the 
implementation of a system to determine the independence of the directors. 951  There were 
references made in the SAA Reports to declarations of conflicts of interest which are submitted 
annually by each director, however, the actual submission of these declarations is not certain.952 
Independence also seems to have been evaluated solely from the point of view of conflicts of 
interest between directors, or their related parties and SAA or its subsidiaries.953 However, the test 
for independence for the director of an SOC should be much broader and include potential conflicts 
of interest that directors might have due to their relationship with the state. For these directors, the 
temptation to act as a puppet director of the state and not in the best interests of the SOC is, 
inevitable and an appointment where this conflict is even a possibility should be avoided. 954 The 
nominations committee should have been consulted and a proper reference and analysis on each 
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director carried out prior to their appointment to the board. Had this been the case, the appointment 
of Myeni may have been circumvented as the potential for conflicts of interest were too great.   
Furthermore, there was never any distinction made, in the 2015 and 2017 annual integrated reports, 
between the non-executive directors and the independent non-executive directors serving on the 
board of SAA.955 It is therefore impossible for stakeholders to ascertain which directors are meant 
to act independently and serve as the majority on the board. An analysis of the directors’ 
independence, including Myeni’s could never have been accurate, given that her designation 
varied between being described as a non-executive and an independent, non-executive director.956 
The independence being the key differentiating factor and the crux of the recommendations for 
independent supervision on the board. 957  In stark comparison, Comair Limited, specifically 
designated each of their independent, non-executive directors in their annual reports and provided 
reference to an analysis of their independence.958  
Adoption of the recommended practices in King IV in analysing the independence of Myeni and 
the other non-executive directors by the board of SAA, may have aided in their earlier removal.959 
The board of SAA would also have done well to appoint an independent, non-executive director 
to lead the performance appraisal of the chairperson.960 On appointment or re-appointment of non-
executive directors, there is no evidence of an evaluation of their independence or reasons provided 
for their appointment by the shareholder.961  
The section dedicated to the evaluation of the board of directors in the SAA Reports also reads as 
a brief curriculum vitae for each director.962 There is no analysis of independence or reasons 
provided for the appointment of directors to enhance board composition, as suggested and 
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recommended by King IV.963 The SAA Reports are indicative of a mindless ‘tick-box’ approach, 
which King III and IV seek to avoid, to the recommendations for the independence and majority 
of the non-executive directors in respect of board composition.964  
Secondly, staggered rotation of the directors is important to introduce new skill sets whilst 
retaining valuable knowledge and experience. 965  Continuity of the skillset, knowledge and 
experience of the board is paramount to achieving its effective composition. 966  Considered 
succession planning and continual analysis of the independence of the non-executive directors are 
key factors for determining board rotation.967  The rotation of the directors serving on the board of 
SAA can be described as anything but staggered as is evident from the SAA Reports.968 The SAA 
Reports show that the number of directors, executive and non-executive, which were appointed 
and removed every year was almost tantamount to a complete board reconstitution.969  
The frequent and numerous director turnarounds for the board of SAA holistically diluted the 
valuable skills, knowledge and experience of the board. It is recommended that the tenure of 
independent, non-executive directors does not exceed a period of nine years, in order to maintain 
actual independence.970 However, short tenures of one or two years may also hamper the beneficial 
impact provided by independent directors as they have not gained sufficient knowledge and 
experience of the workings of the SOC and its board to effectively discharge their duties. Constant 
board reconstitution at major SOCs such as SAA is disruptive and should only be undertaken if 
absolutely necessary.971 In almost all instances no explanation was provided by the board as to 
resignation or removal of its directors.972  
Thirdly, a failure by the independent non-executive directors to comprehend and understand their 
requisite roles is likely to result in a failure to effectively discharge the duties they owe to the SOC. 
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There is no distinction between the executive and non-executive directors in light of the fact that 
they are all required to discharge their statutory and common law duties, in the best interests of the 
SOC.973 All directors are required to act in the best interests of the SOC at all times and not to use 
their position to gain a personal advantage.974 In order to achieve this duty, all directors are 
required to take decisions with an unfettered, independent and objective mind.975 However, the 
manner in which these duties are effectively discharged by each director may differ, in relation to 
their designation as an executive or non-executive director.  
Non-executive directors are required to apply their minds in discharging their duties, utilizing the 
information provided to them in board packs and through questions raised at the board meetings.976 
Executive directors are privy to much more information as they are involved in the daily 
management of the business.977 Independent, non-executive directors are required to understand 
that their continued independence from the SOC is primary to their role on the board. They should 
also understand that they are to discharge the same duties as those of executive directors, with 
often, less information and to provide a supervisory role over the executive directors to ensure the 
avoidance of conflicts of interest.978   
Key questions and concerns are to be raised by all directors at board meetings, especially with 
reference to any perceived or real conflicts of interest amongst board members, pertaining to the 
matter on which a decision is to be taken.979 All information should be gathered to ensure that the 
directors are able to discharge their duties and if non-executive directors require further 
information in order to make an informed decision, they should request it instead of blindly 
acquiescing or deferring to other directors or the shareholder, due to time constraints or political 
influences and motivations.980  
In many instances, such as was the case with Myeni at SAA, independent, non-executive directors 
overstep their bounds by becoming involved in the management and control of the business of the 
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SOC.981 In this instance, such directors cease to be independent from the SOC and can no longer 
be described as forming part of the recommended majority of the independent, non-executive 
directors, serving on the board. A proper independence assessment by the board of SAA, on a 
continual basis, would have shown that Myeni was no longer considered as an independent, non-
executive chairperson as she continually took unilateral decisions to control and manage SAA 
which is a role to be performed by the executive directors.982 Although the SAA Reports mention 
that the board conducted independence assessments of their directors, the reality depicted by the 
OUTA case is evidence to the contrary.983  
Uninformed and untrained non-executive directors also tend to follow the vote of the majority, as 
was the case with Myeni, where the rest of the board became puppet directors blindly acquiescing 
to the tyrant chairperson.984 These ‘puppet’ directors cannot be said to be discharging their duties 
if they are unable to take a decision with an unfettered, independent and objective mind.985 The 
board of SAA should have been properly trained in respect of the duties the directors owed to the 
SOC in performing their respective roles as executive and non-executive directors.  
The SAA Reports refer to compliance training with the PFMA but do not specifically refer to 
training the directors as to their roles and duties, save for the 2015 report which sets out a detailed 
training programme for the board which was allegedly implemented.986 Continuous training and 
the provision of adequate information at board meetings may have prevented a complacent SAA 
board who acquiesced to seemingly unilateral decisions taken by Myeni which were not in the best 
interests of SAA.987  
Fourth, a failure to properly conduct board evaluations at least once every two years may have 
negatively impacted SAA’s board performance. The board’s ability to evaluate its own 
performance is essential to achieving accountability.988 It is argued that there is a direct correlation 
between the performance of the board and the performance of the SOC for which the directors 
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provide strategic management and supervision.989 The performance of the individual directors 
should also be continuously assessed to ensure the effective fulfilment of their duties. 990 
Evaluations of the directors and the board’s performance should be disclosed to the shareholder 
and possibly included in the annual, integrated reports to ensure transparency and accountability.  
The SAA Reports differ as to the evidence of conducting director and board evaluations, some 
reports refer to an independent assessment by a third-party institution and other reports do not 
mention them at all. 991  Therefore, the continuity of the assessments is uncertain which was 
undoubtably impacted by the constant board reconstitutions.992 Furthermore, there is no evidence 
of the board evaluations in that no reasons for the appointment or removal of directors was 
consistently provided and there is no transparency or disclosure of the evaluations.993 
Fifth, a board comprising of only two executive directors may be counterproductive to its 
performance. King IV recommends a minimum of two executive directors on the board, at least 
the CEO and CFO, subject to the size of the board.994 Companies which have larger boards, such 
as SAA, comprising on average fourteen directors, may benefit from more executive directors 
serving on the board in order to achieve a balanced and appropriate composition. 995  By 
comparison, the board of Comair Limited, also with an average of fourteen directors, comprises at 
least four executive directors.996  
Whilst King IV recommends a majority of independent-non-executive directors on the board, the 
board must always be cognizant of its nature and size in applying this recommendation. 997 
Executive directors have their place on the board and are important to convey strategy and 
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management information to the non-executive directors.998 With only two executive directors on 
the board, the other non-executive directors may not be able to glean all of the information that 
they require to take an informed decision.  
It is only a majority of non-executive directors that is the appropriate recommendation and not an 
outright majority, such as is the case with SAA where on average above 80 per cent of the board 
are non-executive directors.999 It is also a current corporate trend for boards to be much smaller 
which may be more beneficial from a time, cost and diversity perspective.1000 Large boards tend 
to be less efficient at their meetings as too many conflicting and competing minds are difficult to 
co-ordinate and manage to ascertain a majority resolution.1001 SAA may have benefited from a 
board composition comprising only a 60 per cent majority of non-executive directors and reducing 
the size of their board contingent.  
Finally, the governance of the board is essential to realizing its maximum potential as an internal 
accountability measure. The board should ensure that there are requirements in place to promote 
high board attendance at their meetings for all directors.1002  For an SOC such as SAA it is 
imperative that attendance at board meetings remains high, so that all of the directors are afforded 
the best opportunity to effectively discharge their duties. Directors who attend very few of the 
stipulated board meetings cannot be said to be abreast of the business operations of the SOC.  
The SAA Reports show that on average the board of SAA only achieved an attendance of 57 per 
cent per annum.1003 In comparison, Comair Limited maintained an average 76 per cent board 
attendance per annum over relatively the same period.1004 The dismal level of board attendance at 
SAA may be directly related to the high turnover of directors over the last couple of years.  
The average number of board meetings during the year should also be realistic, given the size of 
the board. The SAA Reports illustrate that the board held on average ten meetings a year in 
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comparison to Comair Limited’s four.1005 The high number of board meetings held by SAA may 
have set an unrealistic expectation for board attendance given its average of fourteen directors.1006 
Fewer scheduled board meetings for SAA may have been more realistic and prevented an 
unnecessary expenditure of time, money and resources from holding too many poorly attended 
meetings.  
It is submitted that the SAA Reports display a perceived implementation of corporate governance 
structures recommended by the King Codes for SAA’s board composition.1007 The SAA Reports 
mention implementation of the apparent governance structures which are applied by the board and 
a governance committee which is amalgamated with the social and ethics and nominations 
committee.1008  There is reference to a ‘full governance report’ in the 2017 integrated report for 
SAA however, no such report has been published.1009 
(b) The Committees 
The board is able to delegate any of its responsibilities to a committee, to be executed on its behalf, 
in accordance with its terms of reference.1010 Delegation of a responsibility by the board to a 
committee does not result in an abdication of the accountability for the execution of that 
responsibility by the board.1011 The board always remains accountable for the execution of its 
responsibilities, whether delegated to a committee or not. The line of communication between the 
board and its various committees should be direct, open and clear and effective reporting and 
disclosure mechanisms implemented, in order to achieve meaningful collaboration.1012 
For SAA, the establishment of certain committees and the composition of its members its 
mandated by legislation. SOCs are required to establish an audit committee and a social and ethics 
committee, each of which is delegated mandatory responsibilities to execute. 1013  SAA has 
complied with the mandatory establishment of these committees as well as the establishment of 
the following committees: a governance and nominations committee, a financial risk and 
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investment committee, a remuneration and human resources committee, a long-term turnaround 
strategy committee and a procurement and tender processes committee.1014 In addition to these 
portfolio committees, ad hoc committees for specialized litigation matters and stakeholder 
management have also been established.1015  
In order to effectively execute their delegated responsibilities, the composition of the committee 
must be carefully established, often in accordance with statutory prescripts, and the terms of 
reference must be clear, in writing and enforceable.1016 The performance of each committee should 
also be evaluated by the board, on a regular basis, in order to enforce execution of their mandated 
roles and responsibilities.1017 The number of board committees should be dependent on the size of 
the board, having regard to the nature of the business. Too many or too few a number of committees 
may be counterproductive to their goal to executive responsibilities on behalf of the board.  
For SAA, a nominations committee which assists the board and shareholder in the appointment of 
its directors should have been a mandatory establishment. As the sole shareholder, the state, 
through the Minister, can wield extensive power over the appointment of directors to the board of 
an SOC. 1018  Directors may be appointed who are not suitably qualified, compromised by 
conflicting interests or who do not possess the necessary skill, knowledge and expertise to 
effectively discharge their duties.1019 The appointment of directors through a unilateral decision of 
the shareholder, without consultation or collaboration with the board or its nominations committee 
may, be one of the greatest contributors to the demise of SAA, as is illustrated by the OUTA v 
Myeni case.1020  
SAA had a separate governance and nominations committee until 2012 when it was subsumed 
under the establishment of the mandatory social and ethics committee.1021 Under the auspices of 
the mandatory committee, the nominations committee played a secondary role. The mandatory 
social and ethics committee is required to comply with legislated responsibilities and as a result 
the role of the governance and nominations committee may be completely overshadowed. This is 
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illustrated by the dismal appointment of Myeni, with little or no requisite skills, knowledge or 
experience which has also resulted in the high turnover rate of the board since 2013.1022 Without a 
competent and defined nominations committee in place, it is submitted that the state, as sole 
shareholder, was able to exercise unchecked power in appointing unsuitable directors to the board 
of SAA. 
The constant dissolution and reconstitution of many of the committees of SAA may have caused 
instability with respect to the board’s ability to effectively execute its delegated responsibilities.1023 
There were also a large number of committees and in 2015 there were six committees with only 
thirteen directors. 1024  With a recommended minimum of three members per committee, this 
resulted in the same directors sitting on numerous committees. 1025  Given the nature of each 
committee’s terms of reference, the number of members and their capacities should be carefully 
considered by the board prior to establishing a committee.1026  
Ad Hoc committees established to assist with litigation against SAA’s CEO and to improve 
stakeholder relations may have been an unnecessary expenditure of resources, given the numerous 
portfolio committees which were already in existence at the time.1027 Board committees, when 
utilized effectively, serve an important purpose by unburdening the board of its numerous tasks 
and responsibilities. However, the committees should not be seen by the board as an escape hatch 
from the accountability of their responsibilities and duties to SAA.    
4.6.3 The Shareholder 
International corporate trends have seen an increase in the oversight role  which shareholders can 
have over an entity.1028 Whilst there are differing views as to the benefits of shareholder activism 
on the performance of the entity, the argument is almost moot  when it comes to SOCs.1029  
 
1022 SAA Reports op cit note 20; 2013 report at 62; 2014 report at 83; 2015 report at 79; 2016 report at 65; 2017 report 
at 97. 
1023 SAA Reports op cit note 20; 2013 report at 36; 2014 report at 82; 2015 report at 12 – 13; 2016 report at 64; 2017 
report at 81. 
1024 SAA Report 2015 at 12 – 13.  
1025 Ibid. 
1026 IODSA op cit note 967 at 5.  
1027 SAA reports op cit note 1054.  
1028 Wiese op cit note 63  at 104; Christopher Wood ‘Shareholder Activism’ Part 1: Steinhoff: Red-flagging the 
business mode’ Prudential Insights 2018 available at http://prudential.co.za/media/31260/steinhoff_shareholder-
activism.pdf, accessed on 31 August 2020.  





For most SOCs, the state is the sole shareholder and, therefore, the impact of shareholder activism 
as an oversight mechanism for the performance of the board is diluted, if not redundant.1030 King 
IV goes so far as to state that the principles surrounding the responsibilities of institutional 
investors and the corresponding recommended practices are not applicable to SOEs. 1031  As 
discussed in the preceding chapter, a complacent and corrupt state, as the sole shareholder for an 
SOC, may be less incentivized to engage in shareholder activism than shareholders of private or 
public companies who expect a growth in their investment.  
Over the last decade numerous allegations of fraud and corruption at SAA have indicated a lack 
of accountability by the board or sufficient, if any, supervision over the board by the state, as its 
sole shareholder.1032 Alleged mismanagement of resources and wasteful expenditure from SAA 
are particularly concerning, given its status as a major public entity.1033 Political interference and 
governance transgressions at board level indicate that the shareholder is actually hampering the 
performance of the SOC, as opposed to providing effective monitoring and oversight.1034 The 
failure of such an imperative internal accountability measure left the SOC vulnerable to an abuse 
of power from the state and a failure by the board of SAA to actually implement effective corporate 
governance structures may have  compounded the issue.1035  
A distinct lack of communication between the board and the state resulted in increased operational 
and financial failures at SAA.1036 The SAA Reports should have been sufficiently detailed and 
accurate to allow all the stakeholders to make informed assessments regarding the SOC’s 
performance and its sustainability prospects.1037 There should also have been detailed and constant 
communication between the board of SAA and the state, in terms of a continual analysis of the 
SOCs performance in the form of annual shareholder compacts.1038 
The SAA Reports set out the annual key performance indicators, drawn from the shareholder 
compacts, which were to be achieved by the board and brief reasons are provided for the indicators 
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which were not achieved.1039 The 2015 and 2017 annual integrated reports, however, do not depict 
reasons for all of the key performance indicators which were not achieved by the board.1040  The 
SAA Reports provide no indication as to the repercussions or consequences for the board failing 
to achieve any of the indicators.1041 
Therefore, there appears to be no enforcement mechanism implemented by the state, to whom the 
board of SAA is meant to account, for failing to achieve any of the key performance indicators. 
Whether by retribution or reward, accountability needs to be enforced, in order for it to be actually 
achieved by the board. In its shareholder compact, the state should set out the enforcement 
mechanism which it intends on utilising in the event of a failure to fulfil any of the key performance 
indicators by the board. Reasons for failing to fulfil the indicators does not absolve the board of 
SAA of its accountability for the SOCs performance. Unfortunately, shareholder compacts for 
SAA, although referred to as being concluded annually between the board and the state, were never 
made publicly available.1042 
From an analysis of the SAA Reports, and the 2011 and 2012 annual integrated reports, interesting 
conclusions regarding SAA’s performance and the accountability of the board and the reciprocal 
duty on the state, as sole shareholder, to hold the board accountable, can be surmised. Despite 
having suffered net profit losses in 2007 and 2008, SAA brought itself back to profit making status 
in 2009, which continued until 2011.1043  
As illustrated in the 2012 annual report, the performance of SAA plummeted when the targeted 
retained earnings underperformed by a  massive 303 per cent, with a target profit of R460 million 
and an actual stated loss of R935 million.1044 It is now evident that the 2011 annual report was the 
last time SAA would should an annual profit as the record losses experienced by SAA continued 
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until their last published report for the 2017 financial year-end, which set a record loss for the 
airline at a monumental amount of R5, 569 million.1045  
Due to the significant discrepancy in the targeted earnings and the actual earnings of SAA in the 
2012 annual report, it is submitted that the state, as its sole shareholder should have been extremely 
concerned. As is the case with private companies, the shareholder should have raised queries and 
concerns to the management of SAA and demanded reasons for the inaccuracies and discrepancies 
within the annual report and the overall poor performance of the airline.1046 Austerity measures 
should have been set in place and the state should have exercised stringent supervision over SAA, 
in order to return the airline to profit-making status.  
The continual annual losses should have been especially alarming given the status of SAA as an 
SOC and a major public entity which may have to rely on taxpayer monies for its future 
funding.1047 However, the 2014 and 2015 annual reports show that there was a significant increase 
in the salaries of the non-executive chairperson and the CEO, despite the airline’s continued 
reported loss of R2 590 million and R5 619 million, respectively.1048 The chairperson’s salary 
increased by 64 per cent in 2014 while the CFO’s by 20 per cent in 2015, according to the annual 
reports.1049 The report also illustrated contradictions where it stated that no performance bonuses 
were paid to board members, however, the acting CEO, received a performance bonus of 
approximately R2,8million.1050  
From an examination of the SAA Reports, it appears that, despite reporting significant annual 
losses, the remuneration of the executive directors increased.1051 Signing bonuses, performance 
bonuses or gratuities, arguably described as ‘variable pay’ from the 2015 report onwards, were 
paid to executive directors and housing allowances and travel benefits continued to increase, 
overall.1052 The King Codes promote a correlation between performance and renumeration as well 
as shareholder approval of remuneration every two years and a reasoned, transparent and disclosed 
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remuneration process. 1053  Despite the presence of a remuneration committee, it cannot be 
reasonably deduced from the SAA Reports that there was in fact a correlation between the 
performance of the SOC and the renumeration of its board of directors.1054 
The state, as shareholder, cannot have been said to have effectively supervised the board of SAA 
during this tumultuous period. 1055  An examination of the SAA Reports showcased glaring 
discrepancies and concerns which should have been monitored and corrected by the state.1056 It is 
submitted that the SAA Reports illustrate an example of a mindless compliance with statutory 
requirements and a ‘tick box’ method of applying the recommended practices in the King 
Codes.1057 The SAA Reports depict lengthy extracts which are mirrored, or copied verbatim, year 
on year and which may, therefore, not be a true or accurate reflection of the annual performance 
of SAA.   
Therefore, it can be surmised that the SAA Reports depict a lack of accountability from the board 
and a failure in the state’s reciprocal duty to hold the board accountable every year for the dismal 
financial performance of the SOC.  Any mechanisms which the state used to supervise the 
performance of the SAA board were largely theoretical in nature and presumably a meagre attempt 
to show compliance with the PFMA.1058  
The establishment and review of shareholder compacts, board evaluation systems, independence 
tests, conflicts of interest declarations and a committee for long-term turnaround strategy were all 
internal accountability checks, alleged to have been performed by the state, mostly through the 
annual shareholder compacts.1059 However, the minutes from the committee’s meetings, its terms 
of reference and the documentation concerning the shareholder compacts, declarations, tests, 
evaluations and systems were never published by SAA or the state. Due to the business rescue 
proceedings initiated by SAA in 2019, it may be argued that these mechanisms remained 
theoretical in nature and that their actual implementation was never achieved. 
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Once the state’s shareholder supervision of an SOC fails as an internal accountability check on its 
performance, an inevitable downfall begins. 1060   The failure of the state, as shareholder, to 
effectively supervise and oversee the performance of the board of SAA was, arguably, its greatest 
internal accountability failure which had disastrous repercussions for the airline and the economy 
at large.1061  
The uniqueness of this accountability failure of the state, as the sole shareholder of an SOC, was 
also highlighted in the case involving SABC.1062 The Supreme Court of Appeal recognized that, 
as absurd as it appears, there need to be checks and balances in place for instances where the state, 
as supervisor, is unable to effectively supervise the performance of a failing SOC.1063 As a result  
of the wide powers given to the state, especially in its ability to solely appoint and remove directors 
to and from the board of an SOC, the political influences and motivations of the state may likely 
traverse into the decisions taken by the board and the best interests of the SOC are subverted.1064  
Although the state, as shareholder, does not owe fiduciary duties or the duty of care and skill to 
act in the best interests of the SOC, the state, as the executive, is held constitutionally accountable 
for the performance of its duties and responsibilities.1065 The PFMA also requires that the board 
be held accountable and that the executive hold the board accountable for compliance with its 
provisions.1066 Therefore, the supervision of an SOC, such as SAA, forms part of the constitutional 
and statutory duties of the state and any failures to discharge these duties may result in a breach 
by the state of its constitutional obligation.1067  
Despite constitutional accountability obligations corruption is always a risk, especially in a 
developing country.1068 In the premise, there should be an effective and efficient enforcement 
mechanism available to ensure that the state, specifically the Minister, abides by his or her statutory 
and constitutional duties.1069  
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4.6.4 Internal Controls: The Internal Audit and Company Secretary 
Subsequent to the internal check provided by the state, as shareholder of the SOC, the internal 
audit and the company secretary are the next internal accountability mechanisms for SOCs.  
(a) The Internal Audit  
Given their utilisation of taxpayer monies SOCs should continuously seek to improve the 
effectiveness of risk management strategies, incorporated through the roles played by the internal 
audit function and the audit committee.1070 It is the responsibility of the state, as the executive 
authority of an SOC, to ensure that the board complies with the statutory requirements set out by 
the PFMA.1071 However, the implementation of the internal audit by the audit committee as an 
accountability check for SOCs appears largely unenforceable, despite statutory retributive 
measures.1072 Certainly for the board of SAA a failure to submit the last two financial year-end 
statements for the 2018 and 2019 years has yet to result in the levying of any punishment on the 
board.1073 
Whilst statutory and, therefore, regulatory in nature, a failure by the board of an SOC to effectively 
carry out continuous internal audits and to set out an internal audit strategy plan for future financial 
and risk management, seems to have been met with little retribution.1074 Without an enforceable 
mechanism for ensuring compliance with regulatory requirements, their mandatory nature is 
compromised and the requirements become more like guidelines which are voluntary in nature. 
This is evident from the annual report given by Auditor-General which illustrates SOE compliance 
with the PFMA and outlines the deteriorating state of the internal controls displayed by all SOEs 
across the board, with none of them receiving clean audits for the 2018 financial year-end.1075 
 
The Auditor-General, as the external auditor for many SOCs, has stated on numerous occasions 
when conducting the audit of SOCs, including SAA, that the implementation of an effective 
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internal audit seems to be lacking.1076 Whilst the internal audit function is mentioned in the SAA 
Reports it is impossible to ascertain whether or not the audit was actually carried out by the audit 
committee.1077 From statements passed by the Auditor-General, for the years during which he 
carried out the external audit of SAA, it would appear that the internal audit was not actually 
carried out by the audit committee.1078 The board of SAA may have been more concerned with the 
external audit, which was carried out religiously every year by allegedly independent auditors until 
2017 when the Auditor-General carried out his first external audit of the flailing airline.1079 
The independent external auditors for SAA stated, in their reports attached to the SAA Reports, 
that there were no sufficiently significant deficiencies identified in the internal controls which were 
to be included such report.1080 This was the official line of the external auditors of SAA from the 
financial year-ends from 2013 to 2016.1081 For the 2017 financial year-end, the external auditor of 
SAA was the Auditor-General who uncovered numerous deficiencies in the internal controls and 
a lack of financial and risk management.1082 It is surprising that the independent auditors, prior to 
the Auditor-General, did not uncover similar internal control deficiencies by the board of SAA, 
and its audit committee, in their financial and risk management analysis.  
For the 2017 and 2018 financial year-ends SAA has failed to provide annual financial statements 
for auditing and review purposes.1083 Therefore, any repercussions for board or the independent 
auditors, as a result of the deficiencies uncovered by the Auditor-General in 2017, are yet to be 
ascertained. The investigation into the board of SAA and its independent auditors, during the 
disastrous period from 2013 to 2017, may fall under the scope of the Zondo Commission.  It is 
unquestionable that certain repercussions should be enforced against those found to have breached 
their statutory duties as directors of SAA during that period, as well as possibly against joint 
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independent auditors, who failed to actively engage with obvious internal control deficiencies, 
exhibited by the board and audit committee of SAA from 2013 to 2017.  
It is arguable that a failure by the board of SAA to implement an effective an internal audit led to 
the financial and operational downfall of the airline from 2013 and contributed to the dire lack of 
accountability for its performance. There have been no retributive measures implemented against 
directors who served on the board of SAA, for the 2013 to 2017 financial year-ends. 
(b) The Company Secretary  
SOCs are required to comply with the enhanced accountability and transparency requirements 
contained in the Companies Act.1084 Unless exempted by the Minister, an SOC is required to 
appoint a company secretary, in accordance with the provisions of the Act.1085  The board is 
required to appoint a company secretary for the SOC who has the requisite knowledge and 
experience to effectively comply with its statutory duties.1086  
For an SOC, the independent guidance provided by the company secretary may assist in negating 
possible abuses of power by the state, in its appointment and removal of board members.1087 By 
consulting with the board and receiving guidance from the company secretary, the state can be 
steered into making director appointments which complement the board composition of the SOC 
and which will ultimately serve the best interests of the SOC.1088 Informed, trained and educated 
directors are an asset to the board on which they serve which will ultimately be in the best interests 
of the SOC. Directors who are appointed without the requisite capacity, skill, knowledge or 
experience to effectively discharge their duties are burdensome and may actually hinder the 
performance of the SOC. 
Directors who are unable to discharge their duties due to a lack of knowledge and information may 
well become puppet directors who blindly follow instructions given by other directors.1089 This 
seemed to be the case with the entire board of SAA with former chairperson Myeni who 
unilaterally concluded transactions which were not in the best interests of the SOC.1090  The 
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inability of the SAA board to effectively implement accountability mechanisms should be regarded 
as a collective breach of their duties and not only a breach by an individual chairperson.  
The excuse of uninformed directors who act as puppets for the dominant chairperson and acquiesce 
to decision by omission cannot be justifiable.1091 Especially, in the context of SAA who had 
appointed a company secretary who was meant to be training, informing and guiding directors, as 
to the effective performance of their duties.1092 It is alleged in the SAA Reports that all directors 
had independent and separate access to the company secretary at all times.1093 If this was in fact 
the case then there may have been three possible issues which could have contributed to the 
ineffectiveness of the board.  
First, the company secretary was not adequately skilled, knowledgeable or competent to give 
advice when directors requested guidance on their duties. Secondly, the directors did not approach 
the company secretary for assistance or guidance and no mandatory training programmes were 
implemented on their induction to the board. Thirdly, the company secretary was approached by 
the directors for training and guidance, which was given, only for the director to ignore it or fail 
to put any such advice into practice.  
The board of SAA should, therefore, have been held responsible in the event of the appointment 
of a company secretary for an SOC who was not adequately skilled, knowledgeable or experienced 
to effectively perform his or her duties.  
4.7 External Accountability Failures  
The external accountability mechanisms available to the board of SAA include: the external audit, 
the role of the Auditor-General and Public Protector, the executive, legislature and judiciary and 
the public. Following a failure of many of the internal measures, it would appear that these external 
measures did not significantly improved the accountability of the board of SAA or the Minister. 
4.7.1 The External Audit  
The external audit of an SOC is one of the paramount external accountability checks on the 
performance of the SOC and its board of directors.1094 There is a plethora of rules and regulations 
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which govern the mandatory audit for all SOCs.1095 It remains the responsibility of the board of 
the SOC, particularly its audit committee, to ensure compliance with statutory provisions 
pertaining to the mandatory, annual audit of the SOC.1096  
The SAA Reports show that an external auditor was appointed and considered independent by the 
board for every financial year up until 2017 when the Auditor-General elected to conduct the 
external audit.1097 PricewaterhouseCoopers Inc and Nonki Inc were the joint external auditors for 
SAA, in terms of the 2013 to 2016 annual integrated reports.1098 These joint auditors were in their 
fourth consecutive year of auditing SAA and the 2017 financial year-end should have been their 
last year to conduct the audit in accordance with the statutory five year rotation set by the 
Companies Act.1099 
The external auditors did not identify any material non-compliance with key legislation or any 
significant deficiencies in the internal control for inclusion in their report on the annual financial 
statements for SAA from 2013 to 2016 financial year-ends.1100 The Auditor-General identified 
numerous non-compliance issues and significant deficiencies in the internal controls for SAA for 
inclusion in their report on the annual financial statements for the 2017 financial year-end.1101 
Receiving clean audits for four years prior to the qualified audit opinion provided by the Auditor-
General led to the Zondo Commission investigating the role played by joint external auditors, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers Inc and Nonki Inc, in the financial and operational demise of SAA.1102  
SAA failed to submit annual integrated reports for their 2018 and 2019 financial year-ends and 
have since gone into business rescue.1103 Therefore, any further analysis into the external audit 
function of SAA is not possible. A brief summary of the results of the external audits conducted 
by the Auditor-General of other similar SOCs will be provided for the 2018 and 2019 financial 
year-ends. 
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In an effort to curb the recent increase in the excessive amounts of fruitless and wasteful 
expenditure by SOCs, there are newly legislated enforceability mechanisms.1104 The board of an 
SOC which fails to implement remedial action, stipulated by the Auditor-General to recover 
certain debt of the SOC caused by fruitless, wasteful and irregular expenditure, may be held jointly 
and severally liable for such debt.1105  
This newly legislated accountability mechanism is still in the early phases of being implemented 
by the Auditor-General in respect of material irregularities which were reported during the audit 
process for various SOCs for the 2019 financial year-end.1106 Whilst there have been positive 
responses to the amended provisions, with boards taking immediate steps to address reported 
irregularities, the full impact of the amendments has yet to be realised.1107  
Despite such stringently legislated, retributive provisions to curb the inadequate financial 
management of SOCs, the external audits conducted by the Auditor-General illustrate a drastic 
increase in the number of non-compliant SOCs over the last couple of years.1108 The Auditor-
General identified three root causes which may have contributed to the deteriorating financial 
performance and non-compliance of SOCs.  
First, a lack of internal control and oversight in the consistent monitoring of the SOC’s financial 
and operational performance by its board and audit committee. 1109  Secondly, the capacity 
constraints of SOC boards and their high director turnover rate negatively impacts the strategic 
continuity plans for improved performance and the effective implementation of financial risk 
management and internal controls.1110  Thirdly, inadequate consequences levied against board 
members for the poor performance of SOCs and a lack of accountability for such performance.1111  
As a result of the continuing lack of accountability of SOCs, the Auditor-General has implemented 
an accountability plan which consists of four pillars: plan, do, check and act.1112 The board of the 
SOC, together with the Minister, must strategically plan and set indicators and targets to be 
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achieved by the SOC which are set out in the shareholders compact each year.1113 In order for the 
plan to be achieved, there must be consistent implementation of effective internal controls to 
analyse the ongoing performance of the SOC.1114 The internal controls and resultant performance 
of the SOC must be continually monitored and supervised by relevant assurance providers, such 
as the external auditors.1115 In the event that an external check on the performance of the SOC 
yields mismanagement, the board of the SOC must be held accountable and consequences must be 
enforced.1116 
The accountability plan by the Auditor-General exhibits a formula for achieving the better future 
performance of SOCs. However, this plan has yet to be accurately implemented, as evidenced by 
the continued poor performance of SOCs, spanning the last five years.1117 A lack of accountability 
and transparency in the governance of SOCs by the board and the Minister may have primarily 
contributed to their poor performance.1118 These accountability issues arise due to non-compliance 
with legislation followed by an increase in the amount of irregular expenditure which is not 
curtailed, prevented or remedied by any enforceable mechanisms by the boards of SOCs or the 
Minister.1119 
In order to address the accountability issues, and as a result of increased allegations concerning 
state corruption and capture, the number of SOCs which the Auditor-General has opted to audit 
has increased.1120 The Auditor-General focused on SOCs which are expected to perform dual 
commercial and non-commercial mandates and whose budget makes up 27 per cent of the allocated 
budget for public entities, with financial guarantees amounting to R446 billion going to eleven 
SOEs.1121 For the 2019 financial year-end only eight out of the 22 SOEs, categorized under 
schedule 2 of the PFMA, received clean audits.1122  
The number of disclaimed Auditor opinions with findings increased, as did the number of 
outstanding audits for SOCs as a result of failing to submit financial statements in accordance with 
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the PFMA. 1123 Such failures to submit financial reports by SOCs  will cause inaccurate results for 
the consolidated reports of the Auditor-General.1124 Increases in non-compliance with legislation 
(up to 94 per cent non-compliance) and irregular expenditure were highlighted as major concerns 
for SOCs.1125  
Whilst the outcome of the external audits of SOCs remains underwhelming, the performance of 
the Auditor-General has been above reproach under the leadership of Thembekile Kimi 
Makwethu.1126  The procedures and audit reports of the Auditor-General have been hailed as 
exemplary and the independence and impartiality with which audits have been conducted and 
investigations made are of the highest expertise. 1127  A institution tasked with an important 
oversight and supervisory role over numerous SOCs, to strengthen constitutional democracy by 
ensuring the utmost accountability and transparency, the role of the office of the Auditor-General 
is essential.   
The Auditor-General was appointed in 2014 for a period of seven years and his tenure expires in 
2021.1128  If the Auditor-General utilises the new enforcement mechanism contained in the Public 
Audit Act during his tenure, the accountability and performance of SOCs may improve. The 
executive must also fulfil its duty under the PFMA to hold the board of an SOC accountable in 
terms of complying with its statutory financial reporting obligations.1129 Whatever the mechanism 
utilized, enforcement for compliance by the board of an SOC and its auditors with statutory 
requirements is essential to ensuring the effectiveness of the accountability check provided by the 
external audit.  
4.7.2 The Public Protector 
The office of the Public Protector is a constitutional institution established to strengthen democracy 
by holding the spheres of government accountable.1130 The Public Protector is constitutionally 
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empowered to investigate, report on, and take appropriate remedial action against, allegedly 
improper conduct in state affairs or public administration which would include SOCs.1131 
The Zondo Commission has taken over the investigation into various SOCs as a result of the 
remedial action prescribed by the Public Protector in the State Capture Report.  The conduct of 
SAA was investigated by the Public Protector due to allegations of corruption at the SOC raised 
by various media platforms. 1132 As a result, the Zondo Commission has carried on with this 
investigation into the alleged corrupt activities at SAA.1133  
SAA has been under the spotlight of the Zondo Commission’s inquiry on numerous occasions due 
to allegations of improper conduct, dishonesty, irregular and wasteful expenditure and 
maladministration at the SOC.1134 The Public Protector has the power to refer any of the board 
members of SAA to the NPA for prosecution if she is of the opinion that the facts uncovered at 
the Zondo Commission’s inquiry disclose fraudulent conduct or financial misconduct by the board 
of SAA, which contravenes the provisions of the PFMA. 1135  This referral and subsequent 
prosecution would serve as an effective deterrent for directors of other SOCs who are also currently 
under the spotlight for maladministration, such as Eskom and the SABC.1136  
The initiation of voluntary business rescue proceedings by SAA, is, illustrative of the 
consequences of failing to enforce retributive measures against boards of SOCs for failing to 
account. SAA may have avoided such proceedings if the Public Protector had referred alleged 
offences made by the board to the NPA in 2016 when the State Capture Report was published.1137 
The prolonged proceedings of the Zondo Commission and an inability to refer matters to the NPA 
by the Public Protector have contributed to the continued lack of accountability exhibited by the 
SAA board.  
The office of the Public Protector has further been compromised, as the conduct of the current 
Public Protector, advocate Busisiwe Mkhwebane and the content of her reports have been the 
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subject of various court review applications.1138 The courts have been approached with various  
applications for the review of the Public Protector’s remedial action, on allegations of its 
inappropriateness.1139 The power of the Public Protector to take appropriate remedial action must 
be rationally connected with its purpose to undo or redress prejudice or improper conduct.1140 
Remedial action which cannot be rationally explained or justified by the Public Protector, based 
on accurate factual findings and a correct application of the law, calls into question not only the 
capacity but the motives of the Public Protector, in fulfilling her constitutional duties.1141  The 
continuous court proceedings against the Public Protector detract from the effectiveness of her role 
to monitor the outcome of the Zondo Commission.1142  
The Public Protector lacks the ability to enforce her own remedial action which may dilute from 
the effectives of her role as an external accountability measure over SOCs. The Public Protector is 
empowered to take remedial action against SOCs and the state, through the Minister, should 
enforce compliance with the remedial action in fulfilment of its constitutional accountability 
obligation. However, the state has not proven itself to be effective in enforcing any accountability 
measures over SOCs and therefore, it is submitted that the legislature should amend the PPA to 
empower the Public Protector to implement measures to ensure the enforcement of her own 
remedial action by SOCs.  
4.7.3 The Separation of Powers  
Constitutional, democratic dispensation is based on the doctrine of the separation of powers which 
entails a complex and intricate system of checks and balances amongst the three spheres of 
government.1143 The legislature, executive and judiciary are independent from one another and are 
accountable to one another. 1144  SOCs fall under the executive arm of government and the 
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legislature and judiciary provide external checks on the executive, in respect of the performance 
of SOCs.1145  
(a) The Executive 
The executive places internal accountability checks on its own actions by implementing a 
hierarchical structure, in accordance with its statutory and constitutional obligations.1146  This 
hierarchy of accountability is as follows: the board of the SOC reports to the Minister who then 
reports to Cabinet and members of the Cabinet report to Parliament.1147  
It is submitted that the internal accountability check placed on SOCs by the executive has not been 
effective.1148 The executive established a number of institutions charged with the responsibility of 
supervising and monitoring executive action which included: the Scorpions, the HAWKS, the 
Anti-Corruption Task Team and the Special Investigating Unit.1149 None of these institutions, save 
for the Scorpions which have since been disbanded, made significant inroads into combating the 
lack of accountability  and poor performance demonstrated by SOCs.1150  
The Minister also seemed to be able to exert only a limited degree of control over the board of 
SAA which effectively compromised his or her ability to enforce the accountability of the SOC.1151 
It is not certain whether shareholder compacts were concluded annually between the state and 
SAA, which is a key tool for ensuring the accountability of the board, in the achievement of its 
key performance indicators.1152 The Minister also failed to hold the board to account, as is evident 
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from a lack of any retributive measures which were enforced against board of SAA, for failing to 
submit integrated reports for the 2018 and 2019 financial year-ends.1153  
A failure in the direct accountability line between the board of SAA and the Minister was enabled 
by a failure from Cabinet to hold the Minister accountable.1154 Despite Pravin Gordhan being 
appointed as the new Public Enterprises Minister in 2018, the board of SAA have yet been held to 
account for the poor performance of the airline over the last decade.1155 It is possible that the 
Minister may be given additional statutory powers to dissolve SOC boards and step in when an 
SOC exhibits continuous financial mismanagement, non-compliance and performance issues.1156 
SOCs are also held accountable for compliance with the PFMA under the supervision of the 
Minister of Finance.1157 The Minister of Finance stipulated conditions in the 2019 National Budget 
Review which were to be met by SAA prior to transfer of government funding or the issuing of 
further government guarantees.1158 These measures were not met by the board of SAA as it entered 
into voluntary business rescue proceedings in late 2019.1159 Without confirmation of the fulfilment 
of any of the previously stipulated requirements, government set aside a further R16.4 billion of 
its 2020 national budget for SAA.1160  
The state has failed to provide an effective internal accountability check over SAA over the last 
decade. The Minister and the Minister of Finance have failed to hold the board of SAA and its 
directors accountable for financial, governance and operational failures which ultimately led to 
business rescue proceedings being initiated in 2019. The President, Deputy President or Cabinet 
have also failed to effectively supervise the board of SAA by failing to hold the Ministers 
accountable. Moreover, none of the executive institutions established by the state to oversee and 
monitor its own conduct, including that of SOCs, have ensured their accountability. The legislature 
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and judiciary are left a formidable task of enforcing the accountability of SOCs, as the internal 
check provided by the executive has become largely redundant.  
(b) The Legislature 
The legislature is constitutionally obligated to maintain oversight over the executive, by 
establishing mechanisms which require that all organs of state, in the national sphere of 
government, be held accountable to it.1161  
Whilst the SAA Reports state the board’s continual compliance with the provisions of the PFMA, 
it is doubtful whether the executive actually effectively supervised and ensured such 
compliance.1162 This is evidenced by the fact that SAA received a qualified audit opinion from the 
Auditor-General who conducted the external audit for their 2017 financial year-end which opinion 
set out various instances of non-compliance by the board of SAA with its statutory obligations.1163  
Furthermore, the board of SAA failed to comply with its statutory obligation under the PFMA to 
submit annual financial statements for the 2018 and 2019 financial year-ends and no retribution 
has been levied against the board by the executive for its failure to comply with its statutory 
obligation.1164  Therefore, despite exercising its oversight function by passing legislation, the 
effectiveness of the legislature’s supervisory role, in this capacity, is hindered by the executive’s 
failure to implement the legislation and enforce statutory compliance by board of SAA.    
The slightly more effective oversight role provided by the legislature over the actions of the board 
of SAA is provided by two primary committees, the SCOPA and the Portfolio Committee.1165 
SCOPA was established by the rules of the National Assembly and draws its powers and functions 
therefrom.1166 SCOPA is primarily mandated to consider financial statements, audit reports and 
any other reports which review the expenditure of funds by SOCs.1167 SCOPA may report on those 
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financial statements or reports to the National Assembly and may initiate an investigation into any 
matter which falls under its area of competence.1168  
SCOPA has called upon the Minister to explain the non-submission by SAA of its annual financial 
statements for the 2018 and 2019 year-ends, requested updates from the Minister and engaged with 
the Business Rescue Practitioners over its plans to rescue the airline.1169 SOCPA is easily labelled 
as the most interactive and vocal committee in the fight against corruption. SCOPA has worked 
with various anti-corruption institutions, including the HAWKS, the Special Investigating Unit 
and the Anti-Corruption Task Team to investigate corruption allegations, many of which are levied 
against SOCs such as SAA and Eskom.1170 SCOPA continues to chisel away at corruption, with 
its recent report into the financial and governance failings at Eskom and providing numerous strict 
recommendations to resolve the SOC’s many issues.1171 
The Portfolio Committee has a mandate to monitor, supervise and maintain oversight of the 
Minister, the Department of Public Enterprises and certain SOCs.1172 This Portfolio Committee 
must ensure that the strategic plans and annual performance of SOCs in accordance with statutory 
requirements.1173The Portfolio Committee, after monitoring the performance of the Minister and 
the Department of Public Enterprises, will provide recommendations which are to be followed by 
the Minister to improve the aforesaid Department’s performance.1174 The Portfolio Committee will 
then also make a recommendation to the National Assembly on any matters pertaining to the 
Department of Public Enterprises and the Minister.1175  
The Portfolio Committee has been very involved with the financial and governance issues for SAA 
as well as its turnaround strategy and has requested updates from the Minister on various 
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occasions.1176The Portfolio Committee has also recommended the establishment of a State-Owned 
Enterprise Council by the Minister of Public Enterprises to provide feedback to the Portfolio 
Committee on the outcomes and implementation of all SOE reform proposals.1177  
Under the instruction of the National Assembly, the Portfolio Committee has conducted its first 
investigation into state capture, through the submission of its report into the Eskom Inquiry.1178 
This investigation by the Portfolio Committee has been hailed as an inroad into combating the 
endemic state corruption.1179 In its report the Portfolio Committee recommended to Parliament 
that the entire report be handed to the Zondo Commission for further investigation.1180 
To a lesser extent, the Standing Committee on Finance also plays an oversight role in monitoring 
and reporting on the financial governance of SOCs. The Standing Committee on Finance was 
established by the rules of the National Assembly, in terms of the Money Bills Amendment and 
the Procedure and Related Matters Act. 1181  All of the powers and functions of the Standing 
Committee on Finance are mandated by the rules of the National Assembly, as well as 
legislation. 1182  The Standing Committee on Finance is responsible for considering 
macroeconomic, fiscal and revenue policy of all spheres of government and maintaining oversight 
over any organ of state which falls into its portfolio, including SOCs. 1183 The Standing Committee 
on Finance may also monitor, investigate, enquire into and make recommendations to any SOC in 
respect of any matter which falls under its competence.1184  
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The financial reports and performance of SAA have been monitored by the Standing Committee 
on Finance, however, it has been largely inactive in the monitoring of SAA since June 2018.1185 
In 2015, the Standing Committee on Finance received a report from the Parliamentary Budget 
Office setting out measures to strengthen SOCs financial operations through the sale of non-
strategic state assets by specific SOCs, thereby reducing their reliance on state funding,.1186 Given 
its financial responsibility and oversight mandate, the Standing Committee on Finance is primarily 
focused on the financing aspects of SOCs, such as SAA, and the ability of the Minister and the 
Department of Public Enterprises to curtail the unnecessary and wasteful expenditure of the 
SOCs.1187 
Since early 2018, the activities of the various committees under the auspices of the National 
Assembly have been overshadowed by the establishment of the Zondo Commission. The Zondo 
Commission has become the primary vehicle of investigation into the activities and operations of 
many failing SOCS, of which SAA has been highlighted as one of the most deteriorating.1188 
(c) The Judiciary 
The judiciary, as the third sphere of government, acts as an external check on the executive by 
scrutinizing its conduct. 1189  The independence of the judiciary is essential to its ability to hold the 
executive accountable for its conduct and the executive and legislature are bound to maintain, 
protect and uphold the integrity of the judiciary at all times. 1190   
The boards of Eskom and the SABC have had the most publicized cases involving allegations of 
a breach of their fiduciary duties which, arguably, stem from a chronic lack of accountability from 
these SOCs.1191 The Minister and the Minister of Communications have also been accused of 
failing in their constitutional obligation to hold the boards of SOCs accountable.1192 Although 
 
1185  Parliamentary Monitoring Group ‘Standing Committee on Finance: Committee Meetings’ available at 
http://pmg.org.za/committee/24/?q=SAA, accessed on 2 September 2020.  
1186 Parliamentary Monitoring Group ‘State Owned Enterprises Programme Report: Parliamentary Budget Office 
(PBO) Briefing 12 August 2015 available at http://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/21300/, accessed on 2 September 
2020.  
1187  Ibid.  
1188 The Commission of Inquiry into State Capture op cit note 936.  
1189 Constitution op cit note 11 at section 165 (3) & (4).  
1190 Ibid.  
1191 SABC case supra note 167; Democratic Alliance v Minister of Public Enterprise and Others; Economic Freedom 
Fights v Eskom Holdings Limited and Others; Solidarity Trade Union v Molefe and Others [ZAGPPHC] unreported 
cases numbers 33051/2017; 34568/2017; 34042/2017 of 25 January 2018. 





personal liability was sought as the remedy for a breach of their fiduciary duties by two of the 
directors of SABC, it is not yet evident whether this form of retribution will deter future breaches 
by current directors on  SOC boards.1193  
The personal liability imposed on the directors of SABC was limited to the costs of the 
application.1194 It is conceivable that the longer the tenure of the director and the repeated breaches 
of duties during such tenure, the higher the amount of personal liability that should be imposed. In 
the premise, the loss suffered by the SOC during the director’s tenure should be considered in the 
court’s calculation of the personal liability claim. This causal link will serve as a better deterrent 
for future directors who are seeking to make undue personal gains, at the expense of the SOC.  
Another popular method of seeking retribution against unruly directors of SOCs appears to be 
through the use of delinquency applications which are brought to court by interested parties. 
OUTA launched a successful delinquency application against former non-executive chairperson 
of SAA, Myeni who has now been declared a delinquent which order subsists for her lifetime.1195 
Corruption Watch have launched delinquency applications against certain SOC directors at 
Eskom. 1196 These applications are brought on the basis that, during the directors’ tenure, huge 
losses were suffered by the SOCs which were allegedly caused by the directors’ actions in terms 
of intentional or gross negligence, a gross abuse of power or undue personal advantage.1197  
It is submitted that a delinquency order is a better form of retributive punishment against directors 
than the imposition of personal liability for a breach of their duties. While personal liability may 
be a painful but fleeting remedy, a delinquency order may be unconditional and endure for a seven-
year period or subsist for the lifetime of the director depending on the circumstances which brought 
about the application.1198  
The Companies Act does not distinguish between executive and non-executive directors in terms 
of a delinquency order and prevents the delinquent from serving on any board, whether as an 
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executive or non-executive director.1199 For non-executive directors, this delinquency order can 
have the effect of forcing them to seek other avenues of income if they were solely dependent on 
the income derived from serving on multiple boards. The delinquency order also protects future 
SOCs from the disastrous effects which may be suffered as a result of grossly negligent 
directors.1200  
At the conclusion of Zondo Commission’s investigation there may be more cases instituted against 
SOC directors who are alleged to have breached their duties. From these cases, it may become 
evident whether the imposition of personal liability or a delinquency order against directors will 
serve as an effective retributive mechanism to enforce the accountability of SOCs.  
In addition to bringing a court application against an SOC director, the NPA may criminally 
prosecute any director alleged to have committed an offence as a result of a breach of their statutory 
duties.1201 The Public Protector or the Zondo Commission may refer any matter for prosecution, 
further investigation or the convening of a separate enquiry to the appropriate law enforcement 
agency, government department or regulator regarding the conduct of certain persons.1202 The 
tenure of the previous Public Protector, advocate Thulisile Madonsela expired before she could 
bring any matters, identified as alleged crimes in her various reports, to the notice of the NPA. The 
current Public Protector has yet to refer any matters to the NPA and is accused of failing to 
effectively monitor the conduct of the Commission in accordance with the remedial action set out 
in the State Capture Report.1203 
It is arguable that criminal prosecution would serve as an even better deterrent than delinquency 
orders or the imposition of personal liability for directors of SOCs. There are reports of a special 
directorate to be set up by the NPA to deal with criminal prosecutions following the evidence 
gathered at the Zondo Commission. 1204  The actual enforcement of the prosecution of SOC 
directors or the Minister found guilty of committing criminal offences, through the Zondo 
Commission’s investigation, has yet to ascertained.  
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Lastly, the establishment of the Zondo Commission, as a judicial commission of inquiry, places 
an external accountability check on SOCs and the Minister.1205 SOCs have been under the spotlight 
following allegations set out in the State Capture Report.1206 The Zondo Commission’s mandate 
is wide and far-reaching and no executive action will escape scrutiny which will include: decisions 
taken by SOCs boards and their directors, the Minister’s actions and the President’s conduct.1207 
SAA has been implicated on numerous occasions in respect of corrupt activities and 
maladministration and the Zondo Commission has delved into an in-depth investigation of the 
various internal and external accountability failures by the SOC.1208 
There is an ongoing debate which revolves around the necessity and effectiveness of a judicial 
commission of inquiry. In conducting the inquiry of the commission, members of the judiciary are 
inevitably required to perform executive actions by investigating matters instead of adjudicating 
upon them.1209 The appointment of judicial members to the commission may also be abused by the 
executive, as a result of political pressures which may erode the independence of the judiciary.1210 
Judicial commissions are generally established where there are no applications or complainants to 
institute proceedings in a court setting. 1211  It is arguable whether the judicial commissions, 
established by the executive, are the most effective way to investigate executive maladministration 
and corruption. 
Despite the fact that numerous judicial commissions of inquiry have been established in the past, 
they have not had the desired effect of preventing corruption.1212 Costly and lengthy exercises, 
 
1205 Terms of Reference op cit note 14; Commissions Act 8 of 1947. 
1206 Madonsela op cit note 16 at 55 -71.   
1207 Terms of Reference op cit note 14 at term 1.  
1208 Commission of Inquiry into State Capture op cit note 1190. 
1209 SARFU case supra note 814 para 141; Okpaluba, Chuks & Mtendeweka Mhango ‘Between separation of powers 
and justiciability: Rationalising the Constitutional Court’s Judgement in the Gauteng E-tolling litigation in South 
Africa’ (2017) 21 Law, democracy & development 1 at 6.  
1210 Ibid.  
1211Grant Hoole ‘Reconceiving Commissions of Inquiry: as Plural and Participatory Institutions: A Critical Reflection 
on Magidiwana (2016) Constitutional Court Review 221 at 230; Magidiwana & Others v President of the Republic of 
South Africa & Others [2014] 1 ALL SA 61 (GNP) para 26.  
1212 Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr ‘Groundbreaking judgement redefines the role of Commissions of Inquiry and civil society 
– Part 2’ 5 February 2020 available at 
http://www.cliffedekkerhofmeyr.com/en/news/publications/2020/dispute/dispute-resolution-alert-5-february-
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judicial commissions of inquiry seem to be a method in placation as opposed to resolving the issue 
of a lack of enforceable accountability for underperforming SOCs.1213 
The findings and recommendations of the Zondo Commission may be subject to judicial review 
and can be set aside by a court on application by an interested party.1214 There are two promising 
outcomes of a courts authority to set aside the findings of a judicial commission of inquiry. First, 
the findings of the commission cannot be used by any person as evidence in further court 
proceedings.1215 Secondly, precedent has been set for the importance of accurate findings to be 
ascertained by judicial commissions of inquiry which have a fact-finding mission mandate.1216  
Therefore, even if the Zondo Commission finds that directors of SOCs have not breached their 
statutory duties, this finding cannot be used as evidence in a court case against that director for a 
breach of his or her duties. The Zondo Commission does not have the final say as to the liability 
which may be imposed on directors of SOCs who are alleged to have breached their duties and 
directors may still be taken to court, notwithstanding the outcome of the Zondo Commission’s 
investigation and recommendations. It is still debatable whether the Zondo Commission has the 
necessary teeth to resolve the accountability issue of underperforming SOCs.1217 
The Zondo Commission has a mandate to make recommendations on the findings of its 
investigation and is not empowered to take any other action against SOCs, their directors or 
Ministers, save for referrals to the NPA.1218 It is arguable that the outcome of the investigation is 
redundant if the Zondo Commission lacks the enforceability to take action itself against alleged 
perpetrators of corruption. In the premise, the lengthy proceedings of the Zondo Commission, 
whilst informative, will be anti-climactic if no further action is taken. The report of the Zondo 
Commission may not even be made public as it is submitted to the President to take further 
action.1219 A report on state corruption should be made public and not be solely submitted to the 
very executive on which the report is based.  
 
1213 Ibid. 
1214 Corruption Watch and Another v Arms Procurement Commission and Others 2020 (2) SA 165 (GP) para 72.  
1215 Ibid para 70.  
1216 Ibid; Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr op cit note 1284.  
1217 Kelly Kropman & Amanda Shivamba ‘Do Commissions of Inquiry have Teeth?’ News24 19 November 2017 
available at http://www.news24.com/Columnists/GuestColumn/do-commissions-of-inquiry-have-teeth-20171117, 
accessed on 3 September 2020.  
1218 Terms of Reference op cit note 14 term 1 at 1 & term 7 at 8.  





The judiciary has been the most effective sphere of government which has acted as an external 
accountability check on SOCs over the last decade. Whilst the executive and legislature have 
provided some element of supervision, their ability to enforce the accountability of SOCs is 
unimpressive. In the unlikely event that even the judiciary fails as an external accountability 
mechanism for SOCs, the public will have to become involved as an avenue of last resort.  
4.8 The Public  
The public may only intervene to hold the board of an SOC and the Minister to account through 
limited methods. The methods available to the public include: a vote of no confidence in the 
President and his Cabinet, public protests and rallies, joining private institutions which fight 
against corruption and, possibly, through a section 218 (2) application of the Companies Act.1220  
In order to pass a vote of no confidence in the President or his Cabinet, a two-third majority vote 
from the members of the National Assembly is required.1221 In a constitutional democracy, a two-
third majority should be difficult to achieve by one political party alone. However, this has been 
the case in South Africa for over two decades as the members of the ruling political party have 
held approximately a two-third majority vote in the National Assembly. 1222 Therefore, there is 
little chance of a vote of no confidence being passed, unless the ruling party is pressurized to 
remove its own appointed President or Cabinet. The drafters of the Constitution may have seen no 
reason to include another mechanism for removing the President or his Cabinet, other than by a 
two-third majority vote.  
Public protests have been held by private citizens, strongly voicing the public’s discontent with 
the current government and its questionable activities which are in discord with the principles of 
the Constitution to respect and uphold the Republic and its people.1223 Through citizen-funded 
organizations such as OUTA, Save South Africa and Corruption Watch, notable public protests 
against corruption and failing SOCs have gained local and international media recognition.1224  
 
1220 Constitution op cit note 11 at section 102; Companies Act op cit note 11 at section 218 (2).  
1221 Ibid at section 102.  
1222 Parliament of the Republic of South Africa ‘African National Congress party details’ available at 
http://www.parliament.gov.za/party-details/ANC, accessed on 3 September 2020.  
1223 Masuku op cit note 184 at 123. Al Jazeera News ‘Thousands March Against Corruption in South Africa’ 27 
September 2017 available at http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/09/thousands-march-corruption-south-africa-
170927092332199.html, accessed on 3 September 2020.  
1224 Save South Africa ‘About us’ available at http://www.savesouthafrica.org//wp-content/uploads/2017/11/savesa-





These institutions combat corruption through various methods including: peaceful protests and 
demonstrations, referendums to Parliament, applications to courts and investigations and reports 
conducted into government and made available to the public.1225 Whilst not a realistic method for 
continually ensuring accountability, public activism has gained momentum over the last decade 
and is proving to be a powerful accountability mechanism.1226 SAA’s board is the focus for OUTA 
which launched a successful court application for a delinquency order granted against former non-
executive chairperson Myeni.1227 Similarly, Corruption Watch have launched a court application 
seeking a delinquency order against the board of Eskom.1228 
The Zondo Commission’s current investigation seems to have placated the public to a certain 
degree. The investigation attempts to illustrate government’s willingness to fight against 
corruption.1229 However, without a measure of enforceability the recommendations made by the 
Zondo Commission in its unveiling of a corrupt executive which includes many SOCs may become 
redundant.   
Another possible mechanism available to the public to hold the directors of an SOC liable for a 
breach of their duties may lie in the application of section 218 (2) of the Companies Act.1230 This 
catch-all provision for liability may allow for a class action to be brought by the public against 
directors of SOCs. The public would have to prove that their loss was caused by the directors 
breaching their duties and that the loss suffered is not reflective of the loss suffered by the SOC.1231 
The loss suffered by the public would arguably be a loss of earnings as the downgrade of the 
economy, due in large part to failing SOCs, increased their costs of living as a result of inflation 
and tax increases. The public’s claim would be difficult to prove given the precedent set by recent 
case law.  
 
Protests’ 19 April 2018 available at http://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/19/world/africa/south-africa-ramaphosa-
protests.html, accessed on 19 October 2018.  
1225 Ryan, Ciaran ‘Corruption Watch goes to war against previous Eskom board’ Moneyweb 1 April 2019 available at 
http://www.moneyweb.co.za/news/south-africa/corruption-watch-goes-to-war-against-previous-eskom-board/, 
accessed on 3 September 2020.  
1226 Ibid.  
1227 OUTA v Myeni case supra note 346.  
1228 Corruption Watch op cit note 1267. 
1229 Kropman op cit note 1217.  
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The shareholders of ABI and Steinhoff approached the court with a 218 (2) claim against the 
directors of the companies stating that the diminution of the value in their shares caused them to 
suffer a loss which was as a result of the directors breaching their duties.1232 On both occasions, 
the court held that the loss suffered by the shareholders, in a diminution of the value of their shares, 
was reflective of the loss suffered by the companies.1233 Therefore, the shareholders had not proved 
that the loss was suffered by them and their claims under section 218 (2) were dismissed. In these 
circumstances, as in accordance with the common law, only the company suffering the loss has an 
action against the party causing the loss.1234 
The remedy under section 218 (2) has yet to be implemented by the public and the link between 
their loss and the breach of duties by the directors of SOCs may be too tenuous to sustain a cause 
of action. However, the action of the public in bringing such an application against the directors 
of SOCs may have the desired effect of illustrating the public’s discontent with government and 
act as a warning to all future SOC directors. The public need to be given a realistic avenue for 
holding the executive and its failing SOCs to account.  
4.9 Conclusion  
Despite the numerous internal and external accountability measures which are available to SOCs, 
their practical implementation appears to be absent and accountability remains an issue. As is 
illustrated through an analysis and interpretation of the SAA Reports, it is submitted that the lack 
of accountability exhibited by SAA has contributed to its poor financial performance, since 2012. 
Once the Zondo Commission concludes its investigation into SAA, and various other SOCs, 
punishment may be levied against directors who are alleged to have breached their statutory or 
common law duties. However, the current retribution -based approach utilised in an attempt to 
enforce the accountability of SOCs, such as SAA, may not be effective and an alternative approach 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF SOCS 
5 Introduction  
The financial performance failures of many SOCs in South Africa over the last decade has been 
attributed to a lack of accountability.1235 The principle of accountability has mainly been achieved 
through the implementation of effective corporate governance structures for SOCs although 
accountability may be achieved through other mechanisms.1236 However, it is proposed that in 
order for accountability to be meaningfully achieved, a method of enforcement needs to be 
implemented. It is proposed that enforceable accountability for SOCs may be achieved in a cost-
effective and efficient manner through the implementation of a reformed combination of 
retribution and reward-based mechanisms.   
5.1 The Concept of Corporate Governance  
The concept of corporate governance was borne out of a need for resolving the age-old agency 
issue which arises on the incorporation of a company as a separate juristic entity.1237 The directors 
of a company are the managers who control the company on behalf of the shareholders who own 
the company.1238 The agency issue arises due to a divergence between those who manage the 
company, the directors and those who own the company, the shareholders.1239 The issue pertains 
to the potential conflicts of interest which may arise as a result of the divergence of interests 
between the directors and shareholders.1240  
Directors are required to exercise their fiduciary duties, and the duty of care and skill, in serving 
the best interests of the company at all times.1241 Shareholders, on the other hand, owe no fiduciary 
duties to the company and are primarily concerned in serving their own interests in terms of a 
growth in their investment in the company.1242 Potential conflicts of interest are inevitable when 
the competing interests of directors and shareholders collide. Whilst shareholders are free to act as 
 
1235 Makwethu (AGSA) op cit note 18 at 10; Thabane op cit note 9 at 25; Thomas op cit note 9; Kanyane op cit note 
10 at 32; Futuregrowth.op cit note 10 at 12; McGregor op cit note 831 at 5; Masuku op cit note 184 at 118; Makoni 
op cit note 13 at 23; Moloi op cit note 905 at 1 – 2.  
1236 King IV op cit note 19 at 1.  
1237 Wiese op cit note 63  at 2; Makoni op cit note 13 at 21; Makuta op cit note 205 at 56.  
1238 Ibid.  
1239 Thabane op cit note 9 at 6.  
1240 Wiese op cit note 63  at 2.  
1241 Futuregrowth op cit note 10 at 4; Kanyane op cit note 10 at 30.  





selfishly as they wish, the directors are duty bound to act only in the best interests of the 
company.1243  
On occasion, circumstances arise which result in a misalignment of company’s interests with that 
of its shareholders. In such an untenable situation, the directors are tasked with the duty of serving 
the best interests of the company.1244 Ultimately, the directors owe their duties to the company as 
a separate juristic entity which comprises the interests of its various stakeholders and not just its 
shareholders.1245 Directors are required to account to the shareholders for their decisions taken and 
should always be mindful of acting in the best interests of the company which should be the 
primary justification for any decision taken. Corporate governance is the popular method utilised 
to achieve the accountability of the board of an SOC.1246  
The more traditional and historic description of corporate governance stems from the United 
Kingdom’s Cadbury Report which was published in 1992 and defines corporate governance as 
‘the practice by which companies are managed and controlled’.1247  This definition has been 
expanded upon and the concept of corporate governance has been further described as: ‘the system 
and process by which organisations are directed and controlled in order to ensure the protection 
of the interests of the owners.’1248 As a result of evolving global corporate trends, the definition of 
corporate governance has been expanded even further to include the interests of other stakeholders 
and not just the shareholders as owners of the company. 1249  This is due to the increasing 
recognition of the role which society, the community and the environment play in the company’s 
achievement of its aims and objectives.1250  
In South Africa, the King Codes provide recommended practices for good corporate governance 
which should be applied by all entities, irrespective of their form of incorporation.1251 The most 
recent report in the King Codes, King IV depicts a wider definition of corporate governance as: 
 
1243 Cassim at op cit note 78 at 394. 
1244 Ibid at 524. 
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http://ecgi.global/sites/default/files//codes/documents/cadbury.pdf, accessed on 13 August 2020.  
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1249 Wiese op cit note 63  at 2; Jean J Du Plessis et al Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance 2ed (2011) 
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‘the exercise of ethical and effective leadership by the governing body towards the achievement of 
the following governance outcomes: ethical culture, good performance, effective control and 
legitimacy.’1252 King IV advocates a stakeholder-inclusive approach which reinforces the concept 
that the directors of an entity must take into account the interests of all stakeholders and not just 
the owners. 1253  The stakeholder-inclusive approach and King IV’s definition of corporate 
governance aligns the South African corporate landscape with current international trends.  
The expanded definition of corporate governance gives rise to a debate surrounding the definition 
of the ‘owners’ of the company. The owners of the company were traditionally solely defined as 
the shareholders. 1254 The directors were required to manage and control the company in the best 
interests of the shareholders which amounted to a goal of short-term profit maximization.1255  
Fundamental global shifts saw an extension of this traditional approach to include the interests of 
other stakeholders, in the decision taking of the directors, but only to the extent that it would be in 
the interests of the shareholders to do so. 1256  This evolved framework was deemed the 
‘shareholder-centric’ or ‘enlightened shareholder’ approach.1257  
The ‘shareholder-centric’ or ‘enlightened shareholder’ approach again expanded and evolved to 
the ‘stakeholder inclusive’ approach.1258 This approach ranks the interests of all stakeholders as 
equal and removes the shareholder from its predetermined place of priority as the primary 
stakeholder. 1259  Other such stakeholder interests, in addition to the shareholders, include: 
employees, customers, creditors, the community, environment and government.1260 
King IV supports the stakeholder-inclusive approach by recommending that ‘the legitimate and 
reasonable needs, interests and expectations of all material stakeholders’ should be taken into 
account when taking decisions in the best interests of the company.1261 The theory behind this 
approach is that all stakeholders have a vested interest in the sustainability of the company and 
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that companies do not operate in an archaic vacuum where the interests of all stakeholders are 
subordinated in favour of the shareholders.1262 
The advent of the Companies Act did not bring about any closure to the debate around the 
consideration of shareholder’s and stakeholders’ interests for directors in South Africa.1263 Under 
the statutory duties, the directors are required to take decisions in the best interests of the 
company.1264 The Companies Act provide for a basic definition of a company as a juristic person 
which is registered in accordance with its provisions.1265 Directors are therefore left to interpret 
and apply their statutory duties in accordance with case law in order to ascertain the parameters of 
what would constitute a decision which is taken in the best interests of the company.   
Whilst there may be a growing need to recognize the effect which all stakeholders have on the 
company, the aim and purpose for which the company was established should always be the 
primary consideration. Most companies are established in order to achieve commercial goals and 
whereas the directors may consider the interests of the community or environment, in their decision 
taking, the interests of the company are paramount.  
5.1.1 The Importance of Corporate Governance  
The central purpose and importance of corporate governance is an ever-debated topic. Opponents 
of corporate governance argue the relevance and impact which a voluntary set of recommended 
practices can have on the accountability of entities and their ultimate performance.1266 The costs 
of compliance with corporate governance structures are also a deterrent for their implementation, 
especially, when entities are unconvinced of the relative importance of corporate governance.1267 
Proponents of corporate governance will argue that effective corporate governance structures can 
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serve as preventative measures for massive corporate failures and attract local and foreign 
investors thereby improving financial performance.1268  
The King Codes stipulate that the implementation of effective corporate governance structures 
results in the achievement of the overarching principles of fairness, accountability, transparency 
and responsibility. 1269   Other objectives of corporate governance include: good leadership, 
oversight of management (by the board and the shareholder), ethical compliance with rules and 
regulations, risk management, sustainability and long-term growth, transparency, disclosure, 
accountability and responsibility to all stakeholders.1270 King IV provides the following outcomes 
which can be realized by entities practicing good corporate governance: ethical culture, good 
performance, effective control and legitimacy.1271 
Over the last decade, the attainment of these principles by the boards of entities, as the ultimate 
decision-making body, has become a prominent priority.1272 Since the economic and financial 
crises of 2008, the importance of establishing effective corporate governance structures has been 
emphasized. 1273  It is argued that a lack of corporate governance mechanisms has been a 
contributing factor to many of the recent, local and global corporate and operational failures of 
various entities.1274  
In the United States, the large-scale corporate failures of the Enron Corporation and the Lehman 
Brothers Holdings Inc, emphasized the need for efficient corporate governance structures.1275 Both 
scandals rocked the financial and operational stability of the American economy, which would 
suffer the drastic after-effects for many years to come.1276 In the United Kingdom, weak corporate 
governance structures of the local banks was found to be one of the predominant causes of the 
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2008 financial banking crises.1277 As a result of these massive international corporate failures, 
which superseded many other corporate failures around the world, a renewed interest in the value 
of corporate governance was sparked.1278  
South African entities alike had their own corporate failures, the notable examples of which 
include: the Fidentia Group and Leisurenet scandals and most recently the Steinhoff and ABI 
sagas.1279 SOCs have also been highlighted as the most culpable entities which have exhibited 
signs of massive governance failures which have been attributed to their downfall. 1280  The 
unequivocal financial, operational and corporate failures of SOCs such as Eskom, SABC, SAA 
and Telkom SA SOC Limited have greatly depleted investor and public confidence in the state’s 
ability to successfully improve the national growth of the economy.1281   
The South African economy has been weakened, and almost depleted, as a result of the significant 
failures of these SOCs, especially over the last decade.1282 It is argued that at the heart of these 
failures is a lack of accountability which may be attributed to an inability to implement effective 
corporate governance structures.1283 This was the finding of the former Public Protector in her 
State Capture Report which depicted the detrimental impact which these SOC failures have, not 
only on the SOC itself, but the economy and community at large.1284  
Many of the local and global corporate failures may have also resulted from the effects of short-
termism in the form of profit maximization as the sole objective for many entities.1285 Directors 
are pressured into ensuring and protecting the shareholder, as the primary stakeholder, often in lieu 
of the best interests of the entity.1286 Whilst profit maximization is an important goal, directors 
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should also focus on long-term growth and sustainability in order to ensure the future protection 
of the interests of all stakeholders’ and not only the shareholder.1287  
Following the 2008 financial crises, international corporate trends have shown a fundamental shift 
from short-term profit maximization to long-term growth, development and sustainability in an 
effort to protect the interests of all stakeholders.1288 It is submitted that sound corporate governance 
practices promote the sustainability and protection of all stakeholder interests which in turn boosts 
investor confidence in the entity.1289 Entities with effective corporate governance structures have 
been associated with greater market value, an increase in financial and operational performance 
and provide a valuable contribution to the economy.1290  
The sound corporate governance of SOCs attracts local and international investors, serves to boost 
public confidence and accelerates growth and development for our developing economy. 1291 
SOCs are especially important as their performance is often mirrored in the performance of the 
state as the primary shareholder.1292 Ineffective corporate governance structures may result in a 
lack of accountability for SOCs which may negatively impact their performance.  
On a worldwide stage and as result of globalization, privatization and massive corporate failures, 
the accountability of the board of directors has become essential. Accountability may be achieved 
through the implementation of effective corporate governance structures or as a standalone 
principle which may be achieved through other methods. 1293  South Africa, as a developing 
economy, and with numerous allegations of corruption can ill afford to subsidize financially 
underperforming SOCs who should be self-sustaining. 1294  Increased accountability for SOC 
performance may result in their improved future performance, thereby adding value to the 
economy instead of draining scarce state resources.1295 
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5.1.2 The Evolution of Corporate Governance in South Africa 
The corporate governance framework in South Africa depicts a hybrid structure, comprising a 
combination of a regulatory, rule-based and a voluntary, principle-based, system.1296 Legislation 
stipulates a number of governance rules for entities as well as duties for directors which are 
mandatory and for which a failure to comply will result in retribution.1297 With the exception of 
companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, for which certain provisions of the King 
Codes are mandatory, the application of the recommended practices in the King Codes are 
voluntary.1298  
The King Codes were first implemented with the publication of the King Report on Corporate 
Governance for South Africa, 1994 (‘King I’) followed by the King Report of Corporate 
Governance for South Africa, 2002 (‘King II’), King III in 2009 and the most recent King IV 
which became effective on 1 April 2017.1299 King IV replaced King III in its entirety.1300 This 
hybrid structure of corporate governance calls for mandatory compliance with rules whilst 
simultaneously applying voluntary recommended practices in order to achieve good governance 
principles such as accountability.1301 
The King Codes contain recommended practices which should be applied by entities to achieve 
the paramount principles of good governance: accountability, responsibility, transparency and 
fairness.1302 Application of the recommended practices has evolved from a compliance-based 
approach towards an outcomes-based approach focusing on the understanding and comprehension 
of the principles to be achieved.1303 This shift resulted from a mindless ‘tick-box’ mentality which 
many boards adopted in their efforts to comply with the King II report.1304  
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In order to foster a board culture of comprehension and understanding, King IV adopted an ‘apply 
and explain’ approach in comparison to King III’s ‘apply or explain’ approach.1305 Under the King 
IV approach, the board is required to apply a recommended practice and explain how such practice 
resulted in the achievement of the desired principle.1306  
King IV states that the recommended practices of corporate governance are applicable to all 
organisations, regardless of their nature or incorporation. 1307  This indicates the expansive 
application of the King Codes and enhances the ability of every entity, including SOCs, to actively 
engage in the practice of becoming a good corporate citizen. 1308  Proponents of corporate 
governance submit that good governance attracts investment to an entity, thereby promoting its 
long term sustainability, future growth and development.1309 Therefore, the motivation in applying 
good corporate governance structures, despite the voluntary nature of the King Codes, lies in the 
future rewards to be gained by entities.1310 
King IV does not largely depart from the objectives enshrined in King III which include: ethical 
leadership, integrated thinking, sustainable development and stakeholder inclusivity.1311 However, 
the number of principles to apply and explain in King IV reduced to 17 from the previous 75 
contained in King III.1312 One of the key distinguishing features of King IV is its resolute focus on 
the principles of transparency and accountability which are to be achieved through the mindful 
application of the recommended practices.1313  
King IV’s approach to corporate governance conforms to international corporate trends where 
mindless compliance has been relegated to the past and comprehension and understanding have 
come to the forefront.1314 King IV also dedicates specific chapters to various organisations in 
sector specific supplements which attempt to prevent a ‘one size fits all’ approach to corporate 
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governance.1315 Under these sector supplements, there are corporate governance recommendations 
which are applicable to SOCs.1316  
5.2 The Corporate Governance of South African SOCs 
The evolution of corporate governance for SOCs in South Africa has been a slow progression. The 
director’s duties for SOCs are legislated and mandatory but corporate governance has remained a 
voluntary application of principles.1317 King IV remains the predominant source for corporate 
governance in South Africa and many SOC boards allege a religious application of the 
recommended practices.1318  Boards of SOCs utilise King IV as the successor to the outdated 
Protocol.1319  The effectiveness of corporate governance structures in achieving the accountability 
of the board of an SOC and its directors remains debatable.1320 Given the current abhorrent state 
of many of our SOCs, it is arguable that the corporate governance mechanisms implemented by 
various SOCs have not improved their accountability.1321  
5.3 The Evolution of SOC Corporate Governance  
For SOCs, the application and explanation of the recommended practices for corporate governance 
are set out in chapter six of King IV.1322 King IV, echoing the sentiments of the Presidential 
Review Committee on State-Owned Enterprises, emphasizes the importance of good corporate 
citizenship of all SOEs as accelerators of national growth and development of the economy.1323 
The chapter six supplement under King IV applies to all SOEs including SOCs such as SAA.1324  
King I and King II contained various recommendations for which could be applied by the directors 
of private and public companies in South Africa, but they made no reference specifically to 
SOEs.1325 The Protocol which was launched in 2002 by government is based on the contents of 
King I and attempted to promote the principles contained in King II but with specific application 
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to SOEs.1326 The Protocol, which is largely outdated and seldom utilized, provides a roadmap for 
suggesting the mechanisms to be used by SOEs in terms of the management, strategic direction 
and accountability of the board.1327 Subsequent to the Protocol, the PFMA was enacted in 1999 
which legislated certain duties the compliance with which became mandatory for the board of an 
SOC.1328 
King III took effect in 2009 and in contrast to King I and King II, it contained recommended 
practices which were applicable to all entities regardless of their form of incorporation.1329 King 
III incorporated specific principles and practices which had been incorporated in the Protocol and 
were applicable to all SOEs.1330 However, King III made no reference to SOEs in the application 
of its recommended practices.1331 King IV which took effect in 2017 was the first report in the 
series of King Codes to make specific reference to the application of recommended practices to 
SOEs which includes SOCs.1332 King IV contains a chapter dedicated to the governance of SOEs, 
including SOCS, which is meant to take into account the unique challenges and issues facing SOCs 
in large part due to the state sole shareholder.  
All  the principles contained in King IV apply to SOCs with the exception of principle 17 which 
pertains to the responsible investment of institutional investors.1333 SOCs are partially or wholly 
owned by the state and do not have institutional investors which renders principle 17 redundant.1334 
Any organization referred to in King IV includes a reference to any SOE and SOC.1335 Governing 
body members of SOCs are referred as its ‘accounting authority’ which is in line with the 
definition of the board of directors stipulated in the PFMA.1336 The external auditor refers to the 
Auditor-General of South Africa.1337 The shareholder is referred to as the ‘executive authority’ of 
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the SOC which aligns to the definition provided in the PFMA and indicates the Minister under 
whose portfolio SOCs fall.1338 
The principles and practices espoused in King IV, which are voluntary in nature, must be read in 
conjunction with the specific statutory requirements pertaining to SOCs set out in the PFMA, 
Companies Act and its own founding legislation.1339 In the event of a conflict arising between the 
principles of King IV and the mandatory rules of legislation, legislation will prevail.1340 An holistic 
approach to the implementation of corporate governance structures by the board of an SOC is 
required with reference to all of the mandatory rules and voluntary principles.1341  
5.4 SOC Corporate Governance and Accountability 
Over the last decade failing SOCs have been highlighted as their poor corporate governance 
coupled with a failure to account have been identified as central inhibitors to their performance.1342 
Repeat offenders including Eskom, SAA and SABC are continuously reported on in media forums 
for their continuing poor performance, with allegations of fraud, corruption and a failure to be held 
accountable by the state.1343 These SOCs are inevitably under the spotlight due to the significant 
impact which their financial underperformance has had on the economy.1344 
Despite a plethora of statutory requirements and corporate governance recommendations, these 
SOCs have yet to exhibit any significant measures of actual accountability for their continued 
dismal performance.1345 As discussed in the preceding chapter, an examination of the SAA Reports 
illustrated a lack of accountability displayed by the board and the directors of SAA, despite 
apparent application of the King Codes.1346 However, the last published annual integrated report 
of SAA, for their financial year-end on 31 March 2017, applied the recommendations set out in 
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King III as King IV only came into effect on 1 April 2017.1347 Therefore, the board of SAA was 
unable to apply the sector specific supplement created for SOCs by King IV which may have 
improved their accountability and performance.  
There are many critics of King IV who argue that application of the recommended practices for 
good corporate governance does not necessarily result in improved accountability or performance 
of an entity.1348  Furthermore, it may be argued that the sector supplement for SOCs in King IV 
does not really identify and cater for the unique challenges faced by SOCs which are largely as a 
result of the state being the sole shareholder. King IV focuses on the corporate governance 
recommendations to be applied by the board of an SOC which is the predominant body for ensuring 
accountability.1349 However, SOCs are hamstrung in this respect as the fact of the state being the 
sole shareholder may have a direct impact on board’s ability to actually achieve accountability 
under King IV.1350 
There are some adaptations made to the recommended practices for SOCs under King IV which 
act as a roadmap for good corporate governance.1351 King IV makes reference to the role of the 
state as the sole shareholder of an SOC and its reciprocal duty to hold the board to account in 
accordance with its constitutional obligations. 1352  The state should also be transparent and 
effectively communicate to the board through the use of shareholder compacts.1353 King IV also 
makes reference to the elevated accountability of SOCs given their status as service delivery 
providers on behalf of the state and, therefore, the need for accurate and transparent annual 
integrated reports which are available to all of their numerous stakeholders.1354 
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There are also key nuances relating to the disclosure, transparency and accountability of the board 
of an SOC which are different to those of a board of private or public company.1355 Some of these 
nuances have been highlighted to a certain extent under King IV’s sector supplement for SOCs.1356  
First, the state is the partial or sole shareholder for SOCs and the executive branch of government 
comprises a hierarchical accountability structure. This structure which commences with board of 
the SOC being accountable to the Minister, the Minister being accountable to Cabinet and Cabinet 
being accountable to Parliament.1357 However, King IV does not provide guidance on the issues 
facing the accountability of the board of an SOC when the state becomes complacent or corrupt 
and fails to discharge its supervisory role and reciprocal duty to hold the board accountable.  
Secondly, the state holds various stakeholder capacities in relation to an SOC and not just as the 
sole shareholder which is concerned with profit-maximization.1358 As a policymaker, the state 
should oversee the implementation of certain service delivery functions by the SOC. 1359  As 
shareholder, the state should be concerned with the financial and operational performance of the 
SOC which may also affect its ability to perform its service delivery functions.1360 As a regulator, 
the state should also monitor the industry practices of SOCs, their pricing structures and the 
interests of consumers.1361  
These different capacities may overlap and conflict and the engagement between the board and the 
state is key to ensuring the fulfilment of all of the objectives of the SOC in terms of its commercial 
and non-commercial mandates.1362 King IV promotes the conclusion of an annual shareholder 
compact between the state and the board of an SOC to communicate accurate performance 
indicators.1363   However, King IV fails to provide recommendations for the board of an SOC 
where the state fails to actively engage with it and conclude annual compacts which may hinder 
the ability of the board to ensure the effective fulfilment of all of the objectives of their dual 
mandates. It is arguable that where the state fails to actively communicate and engage with the 
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board of the SOC on a regular basis, the enforcement of the accountability of the board is 
diluted.1364  
Thirdly, the board of the SOC is accountable to the public as its ultimate stakeholder due to the 
utilisation of taxpayer monies and as a result of the public interest mandates which are discharged 
on behalf of the state.1365  Many SOCs are reliant on state funding to continue their operations and 
the state’s purse is funded, in large part, through taxpayers’ monies.1366 This causal link results in 
the taxpayer becoming an ‘investor’ in the SOC and a stakeholder to which the board of the SOC 
remains accountable. Therefore, the public is a direct stakeholder of SOCs by virtue of their use 
of taxpayer monies and may be directly concerned with the failing status of SOCs which begets 
more state funding through taxpayer monies.1367  
King IV mentions this unique challenge for SOCs in that they are accountable to the public but 
does not provide any recommendations on how the board is to meaningfully engage with the 
public, other than by way of publishing their annual integrated reports.1368 Such reports, as evident 
by the examination on the SAA Reports do not actually provide an accurate and up to date 
reflection of the status of an SOC and the public should find alternative avenues to ensure that it 
holds an SOC accountable for its performance.1369    
Unfortunately, King IV is limited in its ability to address the serious issues facing the board of an 
SOC where the state, as its sole shareholder and in various other stakeholder capacities, fails in its 
supervisory role and reciprocal duty to hold the SOC accountable. This accountability issue has 
been raised as one of the predominant contributing factors to the dismal financial and operational 
performance of SOCs over the last decade, despite their boards’ application of the King Codes.1370 
This issue is unique to SOCs as the shareholders of private and public companies are, arguably, 
more concerned with losing their personal investments and are, therefore, more actively engaged 
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in holding the board to account for the company’s performance.1371 The state is not similarly 
incentivized, although it should be, to hold the board of an SOC accountable.1372  
As a result of the unique challenges facing SOCs, which are not adequately addressed by King IV, 
an appropriate enforcement mechanism needs to be devised which seeks to ensure the 
accountability of the board of an SOC.    
5.5 Enforcement Mechanisms for Accountability 
There are two predominant enforcement mechanisms which are generally utilised to ensure the 
accountability of an SOC: reward-based and retribution-based systems. 1373  Reward-based 
mechanisms entail incentivizing enforcement through the provision of rewards.1374 A director who 
effectively applies the principle of accountability in his or her decision taking is rewarded.1375 
Retribution-based mechanisms ensure enforcement through the fear of retribution for non-
compliance.1376 A director who does not comply with the respective rules and regulations in his or 
her decision taking is punished.1377 A combination of reward and retribution-based systems is often 
utilized in order to enforce the accountability of directors for their decision taking. The 
effectiveness of any enforcement mechanism, arguably, lies in its implementation.  
For SOCs, their unique nature which is brought about by the state being the sole shareholder may 
complicate the effectiveness of any enforcement mechanism which is utilised to ensure the 
accountability of the board and its directors.1378 A possible reform of the current enforcement 
mechanism, which comprises both reward and retribution-based systems, for holding directors of 
SOCs accountable, may be required.  
5.5.1 Retribution-Based Mechanism 
The effectiveness of a retribution-based enforcement mechanism lies in the fear of the imposition 
of punishment for non-compliance with a mandatory rule or regulation.1379 It is proposed that the 
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imposition of a retribution-based system as an enforcement mechanism for accountability should 
include the codification of a duty to account. Directors would be required to comply with the 
statutory duty to account in order to avoid punishment for non-compliance. In this respect, the duty 
to account becomes a rule, the compliance with which is mandatory for all directors regardless of 
their categorization as an executive or non-executive director.  
There are many benefits associated with the use of retribution as an enforcement mechanism for 
ensuring compliance with rules and regulations. Rules and regulations create certainty and 
uniformity for directors who are able easily access their statutory duties. 1380  The rules are 
contained in statutes which are readily available and directors are able to inform themselves of 
their requisite duties and obligations.1381 From a compliance perspective, adhering to a standard 
set of rules and regulations is less time consuming and, therefore, more cost-effective.1382  
However, there are negative aspects associated with a rule-based compliance system of 
enforcement for directors’ duties. Rules and regulations, because of their rigidity and uniformity, 
are easier to circumvent than a set of principles which require comprehension in order to ensure 
their effective application.1383 The systemic compliance with rules and regulations also tends to 
stifle innovation and flexibility and is not conducive to fostering an environment of comprehension 
and understanding.1384  
A regulated set of requirements also espouses a ‘one-size-fits-all approach’ as rules are not applied 
based on individual circumstances but are requirements for all entities, regardless of their nature 
and size.1385 Rules and regulations must be complied with regardless of the requirements of each 
individual entity and set rules may not cater for the unique board and business model of an 
entity.1386 There have been numerous corporate governance failures where the regulatory approach 
was adopted such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the United States.1387 As a result, there has been a 
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global and fundamental shift towards understanding and comprehension as opposed to regulatory 
compliance.1388 
A plethora of statutory requirements also leads to directors resorting to a ‘tick-box’ mentality of 
mindless compliance with the rules and regulations without understanding their underlying nature 
or purpose.1389 It has been suggested that this mindless compliance has led to many corporate 
failures where entities have alleged compliance with mandatory requirements yet failed in any 
event.1390 Instead of ensuring that the directors actually implement good corporate governance 
measures, boards simply ‘tick the box’ for each requirement in order to avoid punishment without 
contemplating the reason behind the rule and the purpose for which it was enacted.1391  
The main aspect for enforcement in a retributive system lies in the fear of punishment due to the 
possible implementation of harsh and severe retributive measures.1392 For SOC boards, a breach 
of the statutory duties may result in the imposition of personal or criminal liability in accordance 
with the provisions of the PFMA and Companies Act.1393  The threat of imprisonment and a 
substantial loss of cashflow should act as deterrents for any future breaches of duties by directors. 
However, the actual implementation of retributive measures, regardless of their severity, is 
required in order to ensure their effectiveness as an enforcement mechanism.1394 Directors may 
only be deterred from considering a breach of their duties if the imposition of personal and criminal 
liability is a realistic possibility as opposed to simply being perceived as an idle threat.1395  
Regardless of the breadth of available theoretical retributive measures, they must be consistently 
and continuously implemented against directors who have breached their duties to ensure their 
effectiveness. Without actual implementation of the statutory retributive measures against 
recalcitrant directors, the enforcement of their accountability is diluted. However, a careful balance 
needs to be achieved and courts should be wary of imposing punishment on directors as continuous 
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litigation initiated against directors may completely deter persons from serving on the boards of 
SOCs.1396  
5.5.2 Reward-Based Mechanism  
It is arguable that, due to its nature as a principle, accountability is predominantly implemented 
through voluntary application by directors and enforced through the provision of rewards in an 
incentive-based system. An incentive-based system works through the receipt of a possible reward 
as a result of the achievement of a certain goal or outcome by a director.1397 The provision of 
bonuses and increased remuneration are the most utilized rewards for an incentive-based 
enforcement mechanism for the performance of executive directors.1398  Whilst non-executive 
directors may also be rewarded with increased fees for their services, the provision of increased 
remuneration and bonuses is more ideally suited and proposed for the incentivisation of executive 
directors. 
The predominant issue with a reward-based system is that it tends to lack a measure of actual 
implementation due to its optional or voluntary nature.1399 A director may choose not to apply the 
principle of accountability, in his or her decision taking, thereby choosing to forgo the provision 
of a reward. Unlike the fear of punishment, there is no consequence for failing to apply a principle 
but rather the forgoing of a reward which may be easier for directors to contemplate.1400 In order 
for reward-based systems to be effective as an enforcement mechanism for the accountability of 
directors, the incentives utilized need to be too enticing to forgo.1401  
Another issue pertaining to the implementation of a reward-based enforcement mechanism is the 
uniform provision of rewards to all directors, regardless of their performance, targets or individual 
merits.1402 A disconnect between the performance of the director or the SOC and the provision of 
rewards may dilute the effectiveness of an incentive-based enforcement mechanism. 1403  In 
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essence, without a causal link between the performance and the reward, directors won’t be 
incentivized to perform.  
The effectiveness of a reward-based system lies in its incentivization. If the reward is high enough 
there will be an incentive for the director to ensure achievement of all of his or her duties and 
obligations.1404 However, as shown from the SAA Reports, if the reward is not enticing or is 
provided to all directors, and not merit based, there is little incentive to perform duties and fulfil 
obligations which often come at great personal expense.1405 The effectiveness of a reward-based 
enforcement mechanism largely depends on the discretion to reward only those directors who have 
performed and ascertained their targeted indicators. Directors are incentivized to outperform one 
another and be rewarded accordingly.1406  
The common incentives utilised to enforce the performance of executive directors are the provision 
of increased remuneration and bonus payments.1407 The measurement for performance must be 
based on a uniform, clear and achievable scorecard to ensure fairness for all directors. There should 
always be a link between the remuneration and bonuses given to directors and their performance 
as well as the performance of the entity.1408 In the absence of such a link, the remuneration and 
bonuses given to executive directors may become a contentious issue between shareholders and 
directors.1409  
Shareholders are concerned with the growth of their investments and require transparent and fair 
remuneration for directors which is linked to their performance and the performance of the 
entity.1410 The performance of the entity is increasingly thought to include not only financial 
performance but operational performance and maximizing shareholder wealth in a socially 
responsible manner.1411 In the event that the entity performs poorly over a number of years, activist 
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shareholders may vote against increased remuneration or the provision of bonuses for directors.1412 
The board of an entity should always ensure that it is accountable for any remuneration or bonus 
policy involving the directors and should establish a remuneration committee for this purpose.1413  
It is further submitted that another issue for the reward-based mechanism is the time consuming 
and, therefore, costly application of principles. 1414  The application of a principle requires 
understanding and comprehension by the director which may be a more burdensome task than 
simply complying with uniform rules and regulations.1415  Many entities do not have adequate 
resources for directors to spend time comprehending and applying principles. The capacity of 
directors and their ability to understand and comprehend the purpose of a principle may also be a 
barrier to their application.1416 Hence, the necessity for a minimum set of qualifications for director 
appointments which are set by a nominations committee.1417 
It is submitted that the possible solution to these issues is to compile a set of principles which are 
simple and easy to apply and which do not comprise an overly exhaustive list of recommended 
practices.1418 Directors should undergo training to ensure that they understand the principle which 
the entity is attempting to achieve without resorting to the application of numerous recommended 
practices in a ‘tick-box’ fashion.1419 A mindless application of principles simply replaces mindless 
compliance with the rules. The result remains the same in both instances, a failure by directors to 
comprehend and understand the rule or principle that they are trying to comply with or to apply 
will dilute their accountability.  
5.6 SOC Enforcement Mechanisms  
The enforcement mechanism for ensuring the accountability of the board of an SOC and its 
directors comprises components of reward and retribution-based systems.1420 Directors of SOCs 
are held accountable through statutory duties which are contained in the PFMA, the Companies 
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Act and their own founding legislation.1421 Any failure to comply with any statutory duty may 
result in retribution being levied against the director in the form of personal or criminal liability.1422  
Directors of SOCs are also encouraged to practice sound corporate governance and achieve the 
principle of accountability through applying the recommended practices in the King IV.1423 It is 
conceivable that application of the principles should result in the improved performance of the 
SOC for which the executive directors may be rewarded, through the provision of increased 
remuneration and bonus payments. However, the performance of the SOC should always be 
reflected in the remuneration of the directors and there should always be a positive correlation 
between the renumeration of the directors and the performance of the SOC.1424   
The disclosure of remuneration for directors in the annual financial statements of the SOC is a 
statutory requirement.1425 The remuneration for SOC directors must also be approved by a special 
resolution of the shareholder, which will be the state, every two years.1426 These mechanisms are 
mandatory in order to prevent the board of an SOC from excessively remunerating the directors 
without having regard to their performance or the profitability, sustainability, growth and 
performance of the SOC.1427 King IV also recommends the implementation by the board of a fair, 
responsible and transparent remuneration policy which promotes the strategic growth and 
performance of the SOC.1428  
The enforcement of accountability through the fulfilment of statutory duties, lies in the fear of 
possible retribution for non-compliant SOC boards.1429 The enforcement for an application of the 
principle of accountability by the board of an SOC is incentivization through the provision of 
rewards.1430 Despite the presence of both retribution and reward-based enforcement mechanisms, 
SOCs still exhibit a chronic lack of accountability.1431  It is submitted that the enforcement of the 
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retribution and reward-based systems in the actual levying of punishment and the provision of 
merit-based rewards is one of the greatest hurdles for the accountability of SOCs.  
5.6.1 Retribution-Based Mechanism Failures 
Currently, the predominant enforcement mechanism against SOC boards, its individual directors 
and the Minister seems to retribution-based in the levying of punishment. The former chairperson 
of SAA has been declared a delinquent by the court and the board of Eskom have been taken to 
court on delinquency applications brought by Corruption Watch.1432 The court has also held two 
of the directors of SABC personally liable for the costs of an application brought against them for 
failing to discharge their statutory duties.1433  The Eskom board has also been taken to court on 
allegations of a breach of the fiduciary duties owed to the SOC.1434 The conduct of the Minister 
and the Minister of Communications has also been scrutinized by the courts for failing to discharge 
their constitutional accountability obligation and failing to perform their supervisory role over the 
boards of Eskom and SABC, respectively.1435 
In the abovementioned cases, the board of the SOC was not the applicant which sought an order 
against itself, its directors or the Minister. Similarly, the Minister, as the executive authority 
responsible for ensuring the compliance by the board of an SOC with the provisions of the PFMA, 
was not the applicant which brought a claim against the board or its directors. Private institutions, 
OUTA and Corruption Watch and the opposition party, the Democratic Alliance were the 
interested parties which sought to bring claims against SOC boards and directors for a breach of 
their duties and the imposition of retribution.1436 These cases are also very few in number given 
the underperformance of SOCs over the last couple of years which may be attributed to a lack of 
resources for private institutions and the opposition party in for instituting court proceedings 
against SOC boards and their directors.  
Precedent has been set by the courts in the ABI and Steinhoff cases that it should be the company 
itself which institutes proceedings against directors to hold them liable for a breach of their duties 
which causes the company to suffer a loss.1437 Following this precedent, the board of an SOC 
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should hold its directors liable for a breach of their duties which causes a loss to be suffered by the 
SOC. In the case against Myeni, the board of SAA should have been the interested party which 
sought to declare her a delinquent or hold her personally or criminally liable for a breach of her 
duties to SAA. Failing institution by the board, the Minister should be authorised as the executive 
authority to pursue a claim against recalcitrant SOC boards and directors.  
However, it seems that the boards of SOCs are reluctant to investigate, impose sanctions, institute 
dismissal proceedings or institute court applications against directors who are alleged to have 
committed a grossly negligent breach of their duties under the PFMA.1438 The PFMA also does 
not authorize the imposition of criminal liability against the board of an SOC by the Minister and 
only requires that the Minister table findings or sanctions against boards for financial misconduct 
with the National Assembly.1439 The Auditor-General should also utilise the extended powers 
afforded to him under the PAAA to issue certificates of debt so that the Minister is able to recover 
certain debt amounts from the board of an SOC due to its failure to implement remedial action 
stipulated by the Auditor-General.1440  
It would appear that the statutory retribution mechanisms are not being sufficiently utilised against 
SOC boards and directors whether by board itself, the Minister, the Auditor-General or through 
court applications by interested third parties. Given the dismal performance of SOCs and their 
numerous disclaimed audit findings from the Auditor-General, an argument can be made that 
retribution should be sought against many more SOC boards and directors on the basis of a breach 
of their statutory duties.1441 As was illustrated by an examination of the SAA Reports, the board 
has never dismissed any of its directors despite failing to submit annual financial statements for 
the last two of its year-ends which may constitute a grossly negligent breach of the statutory 
duties.1442  
Furthermore, none of the SAA directors have been taken to court by the board to hold them liable 
for breaching their duties which should be evident due to the qualified audit opinion given by the 
Auditor-General for SAA’s 2017 financial year-end.1443 Unfortunately, the board of SAA could 
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not be held liable by the Minister, as directed by the Auditor-General, to recover debt in terms of 
the PAAA which only came into force on 1 April 2019 with the last published audited financial 
statements of SAA being for the 2017 year-end and SAA going into business rescue in December 
2019.1444  
It is possible that as a result of complacency and corruption, the state has failed to ensure the 
effective implementation of the statutory retribution measures by the board of an SOC against its 
directors who are alleged to have breached their duties and failed to comply with their statutory 
obligations.1445 The board of an SOC may also be politically influenced by a corrupt state, as its 
sole shareholder, to withhold the institution of any sanctions against its directors. Without the 
actual implementation of these retributive measures, the enforcement of accountability for the 
fulfilment of statutory duties and obligations for the board of an SOC and its directors is completely 
negated.1446    
5.6.2 Reward-Based Mechanism Failures  
Remuneration and bonus payments for executive directors are the predominant forms of rewards 
and are readily utilised as incentives to enforce the accountability of directors.1447 The issue with 
the provision of rewards as an incentive-based mechanism is that it may become redundant if the 
provision of the reward is not based on the performance of the director and the SOC.1448 This issue 
was evident in the SAA Reports where the executive directors received increased remuneration 
and bonus payments every year despite the record annual losses sustained by the SOC.1449  
Claw-backs of executive director bonus payments have been suggested as a resolution to this issue, 
however the claw-back system may prove difficult to implement.1450 If the director has already 
spent the bonus monies then court proceedings will have to be instituted by the company in order 
to claim repayment which is an expensive and timely process. 
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Shareholder activism is possibly the cheaper and less time-consuming method to ensure the 
presence of a link between the performance the company and the director and the provision of 
reward.1451 Shareholder activists assist in attempting to prevent this possible enforcement issue for 
private and public companies.1452 Especially for JSE listed companies, activist shareholders who 
are determined to protect their investments may influence the provision of remuneration and bonus 
payments for executive directors and the fees for non-executive directors.1453 Through various 
methods including: writing letters, engaging with management, voting against resolutions, 
divesting of shares or enforcing their statutory rights, shareholders are able to voice concerns 
surrounding rewards which may be provided to directors regardless of their, or the company’s, 
performance.1454  
Institutional investors, who have more of an effect than individual investors, are guided in 
becoming activist shareholders in South Africa through the implementation CRISA.1455 Although 
not as vocal as they could be, institutional investors in South Africa have a platform for influencing 
board decision taking in companies in which they are major shareholders.1456 The reputational 
effects which a divestment of shares by a major institutional shareholder can have on a JSE listed 
company can be catastrophic. 1457  In the premise, the directors of JSE listed companies are 
encouraged to remain conscious of ensuring their continued performance and to take the concerns 
of institutional investors seriously, especially when it comes to executive remuneration and bonus 
payments.1458 
However, shareholder apathy is still a huge issue for attempting to utilize shareholder activism to 
ensure that renumeration, fees and bonus payments act as an effective incentive and reward-based 
enforcement mechanism for the accountability of directors. 1459  Despite the various available 
methods, shareholders cannot be forced to become active and voice their concerns with the 
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renumeration of directors and the performance of the company. Complacent shareholders are not 
motivated to hold the board of company accountable for its remuneration policy.  
For SOCs, the shareholder apathy issue stems from the fact that the state is the sole shareholder.1460 
There is no code for responsible investing for the state and most of the shareholder activist’s 
methods available to private and public shareholders are not available for the state as the sole 
shareholder of the SOC.1461 The state can only divest shares to a willing purchaser once the SOC 
has become privatized. With the baggage of a non-commercial mandate, many SOCs will not find 
a willing purchaser.  
The state can vote against a resolution by the directors but as the sole shareholder there are no 
other shareholders to provide a check against excessive remuneration and bonus packages which 
are authorized by the state, as sole shareholder.1462 If the state has made political appointments to 
the board of an SOC it is unlikely that it will vote against board resolutions to increase director 
remuneration and bonus packages. 1463  As is evident from the SAA Reports where former 
chairperson Myeni was paid excessively high director fees, given her status as a non-executive 
director and the dire performance of SAA during her tenure on the board.1464  It is arguable that 
the excessively high fees for the former chairperson may have resulted from her close links to the 
former president, Jacob Zuma. 
The Department of Public Enterprises also published a remuneration guideline for executive and 
non-executive directors of SOCS in 2007 which was recently revised in 2018 by the National 
Treasury.1465 The guideline was meant to assist boards of SOCs with their remuneration policies 
and link the performance of the SOC to the remuneration and fees of the directors.1466 However, 
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many SOCs such as SAA do not adopt these guidelines and have been the subject of intense public 
and media scrutiny for allowing the excessive remuneration of their directors which is not linked 
to the performance of the SOC.1467  
King IV states that the recommended practices provided for the remuneration of directors of public 
and private companies are to be applied for SOCs, without variation.1468 One of the primary 
recommended practices for fair and reasonable executive director remuneration is the approval of 
the remuneration policy by the shareholders of the company at an annual general meeting.1469 In 
the event of 25 per cent or more dissenting votes by those shareholders entitled to exercise voting 
rights for approving the remuneration policy, the board is required to engage with the dissenting 
voters.1470 The board is required to ascertain reasons for the dissenting votes and to address the 
legitimate and reasonable concerns which are raised in connection with the remuneration 
policy.1471  
This recommended practice of shareholder approval and engaging with dissenting shareholders is 
superfluous for SOCs where the state is the sole shareholder. Application of this recommended 
practice without variation by the board of an SOC whose sole shareholder is the state will not assist 
in curbing unreasonably high executive director remuneration and fees for non-executive directors. 
King IV contains no resolutions to this issue where the state is the sole shareholder and fails to 
effectively supervise the board’s remuneration policy which is meant to be linked to the 
performance of the SOC. Furthermore, King IV does not provide any additional recommended 
practices to ensure fair, responsible and transparent remuneration policies which are specific to 
SOCs and which may account for the eventuality of a corrupt and complacent shareholder.  
It is submitted that the board of an SOC should adopt the remuneration guidelines provided by the 
Department of Public Enterprises, however, the guideline requires amendment prior to its 
implementation. The current guideline uses the size of the SOC to determine the appropriate 
remuneration and incentive packages for the executive directors. 1472  The size of the SOC is 
determined with reference to the annual revenue generated and the asset base.1473 The guideline 
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also requires that the remuneration policy illustrate a clear link between the remuneration of the 
directors and the performance of the director and the SOC.1474 Any deviation from the set packages 
by the board of an SOC must be met with prior approval from the Minister, as the executive 
authority.1475  
It is submitted that the generation of revenue and the size of its asset base are not clear indicators 
of the SOC’s affordability in light of its remuneration policy for directors. The thresholds for 
director remuneration should be linked to the performance of the SOC, the performance of the 
director and the cashflow of the SOC.1476 The performance of the SOC should be determined not 
only from a financial perspective but also with reference to the sustainability, social responsibility, 
economic, environmental and operational attributes of the SOC. 1477  The performance of the 
director may include: evaluations on the contributions made by the director to the SOC, the 
accountability, transparency and responsibility exhibited by the director in his or her decision 
taking, the discharging of his or her duties and his or her overall attendance and input at board 
meetings.  
The remuneration committee of an SOC will devise a performance and remuneration and fee 
scorecard for directors, based on the aforesaid criteria, which will form part of the remuneration 
policy. The remuneration and bonus package amounts for the executive directors in the 
remuneration policy will accord to the maximum thresholds set by the remuneration guideline 
issued by the Department of Public Enterprises, with the suggested amendments. The remuneration 
policy of the SOC should adopt the revised guideline issued by the National Treasury in 2018 for 
the payment of the fees for the non-executive directors. Any deviation from its own remuneration 
policy by the board of an SOC will require prior approval from the state and the state will be 
required to justify its approval to Parliament and if necessary, the Auditor-General.  
As an avenue of last resort, the taxpayers may become the activist stakeholders of the SOC where 
the state fails to ensure the implementation of fair and responsible renumeration for executive 
directors. 1478  Evident from various media reports, the public has activated its role in the 
supervision of executive remuneration and bonus payments for underperforming boards of 
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SOCs.1479 Public outrage followed announcements of continued bonus payments being provided 
to the boards of SAA and Eskom. 1480  These SOCs are financially underperforming and the 
provision of rewards for their board of directors is counterintuitive.1481  
The primary factor for the remuneration policy of an SOC is to align the remuneration, fees and 
bonus packages for directors with the performance of the director and the SOC.1482 This alignment 
will attempt to ensure that the remuneration policy contains incentives for directors in achieving 
strategic objectives and performance indicators which promotes the long-term sustainability of the 
SOC. 1483  As a criterion for the assessment of the directors performance, a director will be 
incentivized to achieve accountability in his or her decision taking in order to receive the highest 
possible remuneration or fee package. Without the presence of a link between a director’s 
remuneration or fee and the performance of the SOC, this reward-based enforcement mechanism 
for ensuring the accountability of the board and its directors will prove ineffective.1484  
5.7 Paving the way to Enforceable Accountability  
The theoretical retributive measures which are meant to enforce the accountability of directors of 
SOCs are underutilized, thereby drastically impeding their effectiveness. 1485  In addition, the 
absence of a link between the performance of the director and the SOC and the renumeration, fees 
and bonus payments dilutes the effectiveness of this reward- based enforcement mechanism for 
accountability.1486 Therefore, despite the combination of retribution and reward-based measures 
the enforcement of accountability for the board of an SOC and its directors is still considered a 
governance mirage.1487  
The effectiveness of the recommended practices provided by King IV are debatable in their ability 
to achieve the actual accountability of the board of an SOC and its directors.1488 Given the dismal 
 
1479 Ibid.  
1480 Mzilikazi Wa Afrika ‘SAA executive salaries slammed as airline struggles with financial woes’ IOL 17 November 
2019 available at http://www.iol.co.za/sundayindependent/news/saa-executive-salaries-slammed-as-airline-
struggles-with-financial-woes-37360595, accessed on 7 September 2020. 
1481 Makoni op cit note 13 at 18.  
1482 Bezuidenhout op cit note 31 at 12; Marimuthu op cit note 1466 at 9; King IV op cit note 19 at principle 14 at 66.  
1483 Ibid.  
1484 Ibid; Makoni op cit note 13 at 18.  
1485 Dullah op cit note 190 at 38.  
1486 Bezuidenhout op cit note 31 at 12. 
1487 Fourie op cit note 167 at 39; Futuregrowth op cit note 10 at 39; Kanyane op cit note 10 at 8; Thabane op cit note 
9 at 24; Thomas op cit note 9 at 454; Makoni op cit note 13 at 23; Moloi op cit note 905 at 3.  





performance of many SOCs over the last decade it is arguable that an application of the 
recommended practices may not necessarily result in the achievement of meaningful 
accountability.  
In its last published annual report for its 2017 financial year-end, the board of SAA confirmed its 
consistent and continued application of the King III recommended practices.1489 Notwithstanding 
the application of these practices, SAA announced its voluntary entry into business rescue 
proceedings in 2019.1490 It is argued that the link between the accountability of directors of SOCs 
and the application of the King Codes has deteriorated, as illustrated by the examination of the 
SAA Reports. However, it has yet to be uncovered whether the King Codes were actually ever 
applied by the board of SAA despite its statements to the contrary.   
In the premise, a new enforcement framework, which is still based on elements of the retribution 
and reward-based mechanisms with slight variations, is proposed to ensure the accountability of 
the directors of SOCs. Under this framework, the reward-based mechanism will be altered to 
ensure the adoption of a remuneration policy by the board of an SOC which links the provision of 
remuneration, fee and bonus packages to the performance of the director and the SOC. The current, 
theoretical retributive measures for punishing recalcitrant SOC directors may also need to undergo 
reform in order to improve their effectiveness under this novel enforcement framework. 
Concurrently with the revised retribution measures, the outcome of the Zondo Commission should 
result in criminal and personal liability being levied against many more SOC directors who are 
found guilty of committing criminal acts or breaching their duties.1491 
The details of this framework are set out in the next chapter which include the variations proposed 
to the current retribution and reward-based mechanisms for holding SOCs accountable. In 
addition, the framework will suggest innovative proposals with regards to the enactment of certain 
legislation and corporate governance reform to ensure not just the accountability but the 
enforceable accountability of SOCs.  
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5.8 Conclusion  
Currently, the principle of accountability is predominantly achieved through the implementation 
of corporate governance structures by the board of an SOC. In order to enforce accountability of 
the board, various retribution and reward-based mechanisms are available for implementation. 
However, these current mechanisms have proven ineffective in actually enforcing the 
accountability of the board of an SOC, as was illustrated through an examination of the SAA 
Reports in the preceding chapter.  
It is submitted that this lack of enforceable accountability may have contributed to the poor 
performance of an SOC, such as SAA, over the last decade. It is proposed that accountability may 
be achieved through the implementation of corporate governance structures or as a standalone 
principle, depending on the nature, structure and business model of the specific SOC. It is further 
proposed that the enforcement of accountability should be implemented with a framework 
comprising elements of the current retribution and reward-based mechanisms, however, with some 





CHAPTER SIX: ENFORCEABLE ACCOUNTABILITY FOR SOCS 
6 Introduction  
The proposed framework for the implementation of enforceable accountability for SOCs is 
twofold. First, the statutory reform for SOCs which entails the enactment of an overarching SOE 
Legislation, as previously proposed by the Presidential Review Committee on State-Owned 
Entities and a proposed Rating Agency Act. The overarching SOE Legislation will govern all 
aspects relating to SOEs, including SOCs. The Rating Agency Act will establish an independent 
state institution to annually rate the accountability of SOEs, including SOCs. The Rating Agency 
Act will stipulate that the rating of the SOC must be carried out annually based on a scorecard with 
uniform categories and the outcome of the rating will be linked to the provision of state funding to 
the SOC.  
Secondly, the board of an SOC will have the discretion to implement any method or mechanism, 
of which corporate governance is just one, to achieve the principle of accountability. Therefore, 
accountability will remain a voluntary application for the board of an SOC. The failure of an SOC, 
such as SAA, to achieve accountability, despite alleged compliance by the board with its statutory 
duties coupled with the ineffectiveness of the implementation of retribution, in the event of non-
compliance, was a primary factor for the proposal that accountability remain a voluntary principle 
which the board of an SOC is incentivised to achieve through the implementation of a mainly 
reward-based mechanism. The board will be incentivized to achieve accountability as the provision 
of state funding to the SOC will be determined based on the outcome of the rating. 
6.1 The Solution: Enforceable Accountability  
The degree to which the board of an SOC is held accountable is dependent on the enforcement 
mechanism utilised to ensure the achievement of accountability. The lack of an effective 
enforcement mechanism will dilute the need for the board of an SOC to account for its performance 
to the Minister. Enforcement mechanisms are generally found in the form of a retributive or 
reward-based approach.1492 Despite a plethora of regulatory compliance obligations for the boards 
of SOCs, accountability is a principle which is mainly constructed on an approach based on 
voluntary application.1493  
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The current accountability measures in place for the board of an SOC depict a hybrid approach 
straddling elements of both a regulatory and voluntary nature. The board and the directors of an 
SOC are currently required to comply with their statutory duties and voluntarily apply the 
recommended practices of corporate governance under King IV.1494 Compliance by the board and 
the directors with the statutory duties combined with the voluntary application of corporate 
governance practices are meant to ensure the accountability of an SOC.1495  
As illustrated through an examination of the SAA Reports, the actual accountability of SAA is 
virtually non-existent despite the alleged implementation of King IV and compliance with the 
statutory duties and obligations by the board and its directors.1496 Attributable to a multitude of 
failures, SOCs continue to underperform on a financial and operational level which puts the 
economy at risk, given the important role played by SOCs as custodians of national assets and 
potential facilitators of national growth and development.1497  
The issue of theoretical accountability, without substantial and real accountability, may be 
resolved through the implementation of an appropriate enforcement mechanism. Distinguishing 
between accountability and enforceable accountability may result in the improved performance of 
SOCs by virtue of the implementation of an effective governance mechanism, practice or structure. 
6.2 Rating Agencies for Corporate Governance  
Corporate Governance rating agencies have become a popular method for enforcing the 
accountability of directors, in response to numerous, worldwide corporate governance failures.1498 
In the private sector, companies which are listed on stock exchanges make use of rating agencies 
in order to calculate the effectiveness of their corporate governance structures. 1499  The link 
between a company’s good corporate governance and its performance is a hotly debated topic.1500  
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The ongoing debate revolves around the fact that a company’s practicing of effective corporate 
governance does not always necessarily result in its improved performance or that it is difficult to 
establish a clear causal link between the two.1501 However, it is submitted that a correlation should 
exist between good corporate governance, including accountability and the performance of a 
company based on the agency theory.1502 Each company must balance the costs associated with 
effective corporate governance structures with its perceived benefits in order to decide on its 
implementation.  
Notwithstanding the ongoing debate on the link between good corporate governance and company 
performance, the accountability of directors is always of paramount consideration.1503 The more 
accountable the directors, the more confidence that existing and future investors will have in the 
performance of the company. 1504  Companies therefore utilize the outcome of the corporate 
governance rating, if favourable for accountability, as a way of attracting potential future investors 
and providing security and comfort to existing investors.1505 The publicity of the ratings outcome 
remains at the discretion of the company and in most jurisdictions an annual governance rating is 
not a regulatory requirement for companies.1506 
There are various methodologies and rankings which are used by the different rating agencies, the 
majority of which are largely based on the overarching principles of corporate governance. These 
principles are akin to those set out in King Codes: transparency, accountability, responsibility and 
fairness.1507 The four most globally recognized firms which conduct governance ratings are: The 
Institutional Shareholder, Standard & Poor’s, Governance Metric International and the Corporate 
Library.1508  
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It is submitted that the best rating methodology which should be utilised by all of these rating 
agencies is twofold. First, a rating should be done on a particular country’s approach to corporate 
governance.1509 Secondly, the specific company’s corporate governance must then be rated with 
reference to country in which it operates.1510 Investors gain a much more accurate assessment of a 
company by analysing its corporate governance rating in the context of the country in which the 
company operates its business.1511  
The most common categories of assessment by the ratings agencies include: board composition, 
accountability of the directors, director remuneration, audit processes, internal controls, ownership 
structures, anti-takeover devices, financial disclosures and shareholder rights. 1512  The most 
common procedure amongst rating agencies is to conduct their rating of a company using publicly 
available documents, media articles and company websites.1513 The rating scorecard may then be 
made available to the rated company, institutional investors or interested parties for a certain 
fee.1514 The cost of the scorecard is determined by the specific rating agency and may be based on 
an annual subscription fee or a once-off review cost.1515 The rating agencies are often chosen based 
on their costs and the criteria which they use in their ranking assessments.1516 
In conjunction with the corporate governance rating agencies are the global credit rating agencies 
which are an essential component of capital markets.1517 These agencies are fast becoming an 
indispensable source of credible information for investors who are assessing in which company 
and country to make their investment.1518  The three global credit rating giants are: Moody’s 
Investor Services (‘Moody’s’), Fitch Ratings (‘Fitch’) and Standard & Poor.1519 These agencies 
ascribe domestic and external ratings, at the request of the borrower, using different methodologies 
and assessment criteria which are continually revised to keep up with international corporate 
trends.1520 Increasingly, these agencies are incorporating an assessment of effective corporate 
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governance structures into their various rating methodologies.1521 All of the information regarding 
the rating and decisions taken by the agency are made publicly available for easy and cost-effective 
analysis by all investors on a global spectrum.1522 
The reputation of the credit and governance rating agencies is of the utmost importance to instil 
confidence for investors who consider their ratings to be credible and accurate.1523 Millions of 
investors worldwide take investment decisions based on the outcomes given by credit and 
governance rating agencies of various companies and the countries in which they operate.1524 In 
order for a rating outcome to be an effective enforcement mechanism for the accountability of 
directors, an incentive has to be created.  
Investors who invest in companies with good ratings on their corporate governance, which 
includes an assessment on accountability, are rewarded with better equity performance which in 
turn creates an incentive in two respects. First, other companies are incentivized to implement 
good corporate governance structures and achieve higher ratings in order to attract more 
investors. 1525  Secondly, more investors may regard good governance ratings as one of their 
predominant informants when taking their investment decisions.1526 
6.2.1 Disadvantages of Rating Agencies 
Opponents of the use of corporate governance rating agencies, as an incentive for companies and 
investors, emphasize several disadvantages of these systems. First, there is no definitively proven 
link between good corporate governance and company performance.1527 There is, therefore, little 
incentive for a company to implement effective corporate governance structures and then to have 
them rated by any agency.1528  Investors are also cautioned when analysing a company’s corporate 
governance rating as it does not necessarily imply good performance.1529 Secondly, rating agencies 
use different methodologies and assessment criteria for their governance rankings which dilutes 
uniformity thereby making comparisons between rated companies very difficult. 1530  Thirdly, 
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rating agencies which assess governance criteria separately may produce misleading results as 
many criteria are inter-related and interdependent and should be examined on a holistic basis.1531 
Fourthly, many rating agencies rely primarily on published annual integrated reports of a company, 
media reports and company websites as the sources of information on which to conduct their 
ratings.1532 These sources are secondary and may not depict an accurate reflection of the company 
which may lead to unreliable ratings.1533 Fifthly, the country in which the rated company operates 
may have legislation which affects its governance methods and which are not taken into account 
in the assessment, thereby compromising comparability between various companies.1534  
Sixthly, the independence of the rating agencies becomes questionable when the rated company 
pays for assessment to be conducted.1535 This may lead investors to assume that the company may 
have influenced the agency in order to receive a preferable outcome which dilutes the integrity of 
the rating.  Finally, the resources expended by companies, from a time and cost perspective, on 
ascertaining a rating may prove an insurmountable hurdle for smaller enterprises which are 
attempting to enter into competitive markets.1536  
6.2.2 Advantages of Rating Agencies 
Proponents for the use of corporate governance rating agencies also make very convincing 
arguments. First, governance ratings agencies are utilized as an accountability enforcement 
mechanism for directors as achieving accountability will likely result in good ratings. 1537 
Secondly, a rated company may track its own accountability and corporate governance if the 
ratings are done annually and directors are able to gauge and understand the effectiveness of their 
own governance structures.1538  Thirdly, rated companies with high ratings are able to use them as 
marketing tools to attract future investors.1539 Fourthly, a company with a good governance rating 
is able to provide comfort and security to its existing investors which may lower the risk of 
dissenting shareholders and their claims against the company.1540 
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Fifthly, where corporate governance measures are legislated, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 
the United States and for JSE Listed Companies in South Africa, rating agencies may promote 
compliance with the law.1541 Companies which comply with the law will receive good ratings and 
this, in turn, may incentivize other companies to follow suit.1542 Sixthly, it may be insinuated that 
companies exhibiting a good rating are illustrative of accountable directors which lowers the risk 
profile for the company as directors are accountable to their stakeholders for their decisions which 
may reduce the possibility of a perpetration of fraud.1543 The low risk profile of the company may 
lead to lower costs of capital and improve the company’s value which may attract future 
investors.1544 
Lastly, as a result of recent corporate failures and global recessions investors are seeking credible 
sources of information on which to base, in whole or in part, their investment decisions.1545 Rating 
agencies with good reputations are fast becoming indispensable investment tools for institutional 
investors.1546 Possibly as an unintended consequence and due to the recent failure of many huge 
corporations, rating agencies have become increasingly popular as a source of credible information 
for institutional and individual investors.1547  
In an ever-evolving environment with challenging economic circumstances, peace of mind for 
investors has become an irreplaceable commodity.1548 For the majority of investors, companies 
with good corporate governance ratings are considered less risky and, therefore, good 
investments. 1549  The presence of rating agencies which assess the governance of multiple 
companies and the countries in which they operate provide an essential source of comfort and 
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6.3 Corporate Governance Ratings for SOCs 
SOCs play an integral part in providing public service mandates on behalf of the government and 
have the ability to accelerate national growth and development. 1551  SOCs which are 
underperforming, from a financial and operational perspective, due to poor governance and a lack 
of accountability may be hugely detrimental to the economy of the country in which they 
operate.1552  
The rating of the corporate governance structures and the accountability of an SOC may not be 
beneficial, from a protentional investor perspective as is the case in the private sector, as the state 
is the sole shareholder of an SOC.  However, the outcome of a rated SOC may prove a useful 
indicator of the governance and possible future performance of the economy in which the SOC 
operates.1553 This indicator would be beneficial to potential investors in ascertaining whether to 
invest in certain companies in the economy in which the rated SOC operates.1554 The performance 
of SOCs is meant to be monitored and supervised by the state as the sole shareholder. The rating 
of SOCs may, therefore, be an indicative representation of the effectiveness of the governance and 
accountability measures which are enforced by the state in its supervision of SOCs.1555  
In addition, the results from an SOC’s rating may provide a credible and accurate source of 
information pertaining to the actual governance and accountability of the SOC instead of relying 
solely on an interpretation of its annual integrated reports.1556 This information would be beneficial 
for the board of an SOC in its attempts to improve governance and accountability measures.1557 
The state and the public should also be interested parties in examining the results of the rating of 
an SOC, as the primary stakeholders.1558  
Currently, in many jurisdictions the corporate governance of SOCs is rated as one of the 
assessment criteria of the major credit rating agencies: Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch.1559 
Moody’s is the only credit rating agency which incorporates corporate governance as one of its 
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pivotal assessment criteria.1560 Instead of utilising corporate governance rating agencies, as would 
be the case within the private sector, some jurisdictions have set up institutions which are solely 
responsible for monitoring and supervising their SOCs.1561 Arguably, due to the costs associated 
with setting up such institutions, South Africa still solely relies on the assessments provided by the 
credit rating agencies in order to get information surrounding the governance and accountability 
of its SOCs.1562  
Other countries including: China, Singapore, France and New Zealand have established a 
government branch, agency or state-owned institution which is solely responsible for monitoring 
and supervising their SOCs. 1563  This supervision ordinarily includes an assessment of the 
governance and accountability structures practiced by such SOCs.1564 New Zealand is the only 
country which has established an institution, that is partially independent from government, to 
monitor the performance of its various SOCs.1565 For these countries, the corporate governance 
and accountability of their SOEs remains a top priority as their governments are willing to allocate 
time and resources to ensure that they are efficiently monitored and supervised.1566 
The numerous corruption allegations levied against the South African government indicate that 
only an institution which is completely independent would be able to effectively monitor the 
corporate governance and accountability of its SOCs.1567 Political interference, motivations and 
conflicts of interest would detract from a government institution’s ability to effectively monitor 
the performance of its own SOCs, in an independent, objective and impartial manner. 1568 
Therefore, independence is the paramount criterion in the establishment of any government 
institution which has a duty to rate the accountability of South African SOCs without fear, favour 
or prejudice.   
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6.4 Accountability Rating Agency for South African SOCs 
There is an ongoing debate as to the evidence of a positive correlation between the good corporate 
governance rating of a company and its performance.1569 However, the abovementioned numerous 
advantages make a case for the use of a rating agency as an enforcement mechanism to incentivize 
directors to achieve accountability which may be a solution for underperforming South African 
SOCs.  
Slight variations are proposed to the existing approach of corporate governance rating agencies 
and government monitoring institutions which are used in other jurisdictions around the world.1570 
These variations address the disadvantages associated with the use of ratings agencies and focus 
on the achievement of accountability as a core principle, either under corporate governance 
structures or one a standalone basis, given the specific requirements of the SOC. This novel 
accountability framework will include the rating of SOCs as a reward-based enforcement 
mechanism coupled with a reform of current retributive measures.  
The inevitable downgrade of South Africa’s credit rating occurred in early 2020 when Moody’s 
announced its rating of the economy, following the suit of Standard & Poor and Fitch who 
downgraded South Africa to junk status in 2017.1571 A large contributor to this downgrade resulted 
from the chronic lack of accountability displayed by the continuously underperforming SOCs, 
such as Eskom and SAA.1572 As major public entities, a lack of accountability from these SOCs is 
hugely detrimental to the economy and is indicative of a complacent state in its supervisory role 
as sole shareholder. 1573 An integral component for the reform of these distressed SOCs is the 
establishment of an independent institution which is tasked with conducting annual ratings of the 
accountability, governance and performance of SOCs. 
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6.4.1 The Rating Scorecard 
There are various scorecards which are utilized by corporate governance and credit rating agencies, 
of which accountability is one of the criteria.1574 SOCs should be rated with accountability as one 
of the primary criteria due to the chronic lack of accountability which has been highlighted one of 
the predominant contributing factors to the dismal performance of South African SOCs, over the 
last decade.1575 The scorecard may also be applied by a private rating agency to private and public 
companies, with slight variations to certain criteria which are specific to SOCs. The concept of 
this proposed rating scorecard for SOCs may also be extended to cover primary corporate 
governance principles including: fairness, responsibility and transparency. However, the focus on 
achieving the principle of accountability is paramount for SOCs in South Africa and the proposed 
scorecard will be constructed with this principle at the forefront.  
Unlike the approach to corporate governance provided by the King Codes, an accountability rating 
scorecard for SOCs will focus on achievement of the principle by the board of directors as opposed 
to application of numerous recommended practices. 1576  The objective of the accountability 
scorecard is for directors of SOCs to comprehensively apply their minds to meaningful 
achievement of the principle as opposed to mindless application of recommended practices.1577 
The rating scorecard should be simple and clear whilst simultaneously being broad and flexible in 
order to foster comprehension and understanding of accountability for the SOC directors. The 
board of an SOC should be allowed the flexibility to effectively apply the principle of 
accountability in the context of the unique nature of the SOC given its size and the industry in 
which it operates.1578 The ability of the board of an SOC to effectively account for its decisions, 
giving reasons and justifications is compromised by a one-size fits all methodology.1579 
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The accountability scorecard will be measured in terms of select categories which will contain 
some of the assessment criteria utilized by existing governance and credit rating agencies.1580 Prior 
to the first rating, the agency should equip itself with the knowledge, information and 
understanding of the unique nature of the SOC, its business, the common state ownership structure 
(with differing ministers as the state’s representative), board composition and the specific industry 
in which it operates. Whilst the rating agency may analyse the business of each unique SOC to 
understand the way in which it operates, which may differ from case to case, the rating agency will 
apply a uniform scorecard for accountability. The five uniform categories and their assessment 
criteria for the rating scorecard are proposed under the next heading of this chapter.  
The uniform categories and sub-categories of the scorecard must be applied to each SOC, having 
due regard to the circumstances and the industry in which it operates. This uniform scorecard will 
eliminate inconsistencies which may occur due to the utilization of differing methodologies which 
is currently the case with the existing corporate governance rating agencies.1581 The scorecard, and 
its various categories, will also be legislated in the proposed Rating Agency Act which will ensure 
its uniformity and clarity.  The assessment criteria within each category will be published from 
time to time under the regulations to the proposed Rating Agency Act and will be capable of 
change to avoid stagnation and to ensure their alignment with the current socio-economic climate 
in South Africa.  
The rating agency, in addition to utilizing media sources, integrated reports and SOC websites will 
engage in active interviews and circulate questionaries’ or surveys to the directors. This will 
provide a source of accurate information in order to effectively rate the SOC. Any interactive 
engagement with the directors by the rating agency should be limited and time sensitive to avoid 
any unnecessary burden on the SOC directors and a possible waste of resources.  Any interviews, 
surveys or questionnaires that are to be conducted with various directors will entail questions 
which are open-ended in an attempt to ensure comprehension and understanding and avoid 
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mindless application or compliance which may be brought about by leading or closed-ended 
questioning methods.1582   
The categories of the rating scorecard are also based on the existing internal and external 
accountability mechanisms of SOCs but with slight variations in an attempt to address the issues 
associated with the current mechanisms. The internal accountability mechanisms include: the 
directors, the board and its committees, the state as shareholder, the internal audit and the role of 
the company secretary. The external accountability mechanisms include: the external audit, the 
office of the Auditor-General and Public Protector, the judiciary and legislature and the public. 
Founded on these accountability mechanisms, the proposed scorecard depicts five distinct 
categories which contain select assessment criteria. Although the categories of the scorecard are 
distinct, the assessment criteria may be inter-linked and inter-related to one another and the rating 
agency should take care to avoid unnecessary duplications of the criteria whilst assessing the SOC 
under the various categories.  
Under this scorecard, the directors and the board will owe their duties to the SOC and not just the 
board as stipulated under the PFMA. The scorecard will conceptualize the concurrent application 
of the Companies Act and the PFMA by requiring that the board, as a collective body and the 
directors, as individuals, owe their duties and obligations to the SOC. The board and the directors 
will be utilised interchangeably throughout the scorecard categories and any reference to the board 
or the directors will imply that the duty or obligation pertains to both.  
The total accountability score for the SOC will be provided by the rating agency in respect of the 
five major categories and their assessment criteria. A simple numerical scorecard of accountability 
will suffice on an ascending scale from the numbers zero to ten. The lowest level of accountability 
being rated with a score of zero and the highest level with a score of ten. The rating agency will 
provide reasons and justifications for its accountability rating of the SOC. The reasons will not be 
so convoluted and detailed so as to be utilised in a mindless ‘tick-box’ fashion by the board of the 
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(a) Category One: The Board and Ownership Structures  
The first category will comprise the board and ownership structures of the SOC.  In this category 
directors will be questioned as to their understanding of the structure of the board of the SOC, the 
business of the SOC and its shareholder which is the state as sole shareholder. Although the state’s 
sole ownership of SOCs is a common feature, understanding the tiers of government is essential 
for directors who need to understand what it an SOCs is and what it means to owe their duties to 
the SOC (i.e the ownership structure of the SOC being the state and how the executive branch of 
government works).  
It is proposed that initial assessment criteria for this category may include an examination on: the 
directors understanding of the state’s ownership and accountability structure, the SOC’s board 
composition, any minimum qualification criteria for directors for their appointment, the process of 
appointment and removal of directors, the staggered rotation of directors, the succession planning, 
the various committees, the remuneration policy, any codes of conduct, the training programmes 
for directors, the role and duties of directors, the categories of directors, the number of board 
meetings, the attendance at those meetings, the topics and agendas of the meetings and the 
transparency of the minutes of the meetings and the records kept.1584 
Within this initial category, certain accountability issues for SOCs may become evident which 
should be addressed by the rating agency in its ratings outcome. The SOC should have training 
programmes to ensure that directors understand their positions as independent or executive 
directors and the duties that they owe to the SOC. The differing roles of the independent chairman 
and CEO should be expressly detailed and publicly disclosed. 1585  The independence of 
independent, non-executive directors should be continually analysed by the SOC and results of 
this analysis made publicly available.1586 The appointment of directors should entail a list of 
minimum qualifications and experience to prevent capacity issues.1587 Any removal of directors 
should be accompanied by an explanation and a disclosure of any exit packages which were offered 
to a director.  
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The state should employ accountability mechanisms to engage with the board of directors of the 
SOC on a continual basis. Monthly or quarterly reports should be ascertained from the SOC by the 
state as opposed to once-off annual shareholder compacts. The scorecard is different, in this 
respect, to that of the recommendations provided by King IV which pertain to the board who owes 
its duties to the SOC. Due the issues associated with the state being the sole shareholder of SOCs, 
additional accountability measures need to be enforced to ensure that the state fulfils its reciprocal 
constitutional duty to hold the board accountable.1588  
These additional measures will be interspersed under the assessment criteria of the scorecard as 
the accountability obligation of the state is an underlying principle which permeates various 
categories of the scorecard to ensure the achievement of actual accountability by the board of an 
SOC.  
(b) Category Two: The Accountability of the Board 
The second category will comprise the accountability of the board and its directors for the 
performance of the SOC. In this category the directors will be made to account for the performance 
of the SOC with primary reference to the fulfilment of its commercial and non-commercial 
mandates. The economic, social responsibility, sustainability, operational and environmental 
performance of the SOC will also be considered under this category. 1589  Any overlaps or 
duplications of the assessment criteria under this category and category one of the scorecard should 
be identified and minimized to avoid possible repetitions. The accountability mechanisms utilised 
should be ones of continual application and not only an annual summary provided in the integrated 
reports of the SOC.  
Suggested methods of continual accountability mechanisms include: self, board and stakeholder 
evaluations, key-performance scorecards and measurements, peer reviews, the imposition of a 
balanced scorecard and the implementation of accountability measures to improve historical 
ratings.1590 The reward of remuneration, fees and bonus payments for directors to incentivize good 
performance also needs to be closely monitored.1591 There should always be link between the 
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performance of the SOC and the directors and the provision of reward to the directors and such 
link needs to be disclosed and published.1592  
The reciprocal duty on the state, as sole shareholder, to hold the board of the SOC accountable 
will also be analysed in this category. The methods available to the state to ensure the 
accountability of the board may include: evaluations of the board, the achievement of key-
performance targets, the imposition of rewards or retributions on directors based on performance 
and compliance and the frequency and effectiveness of the communication mediums between the 
board and the state.1593 
An analysis of the historical ratings of the SOC will be undertaken by the board in an attempt to 
resolve any accountability issues and obtain an improved future score. Subsequent ratings of the 
accountability of the SOC will comprise an analysis of the measures implemented by the SOC in 
order to improve its rating score from the previous year. The rating agency should be able to 
ascertain from its engagements with the board whether a mindless ‘tick-box’ method of application 
of accountability has been implemented which is devoid of any actual comprehension and 
understanding of the concept of accountability.1594 It will be evident, whether the board of an SOC 
has failed to mindfully apply the principle of accountability to their decision taking as if the board 
attempts to mindlessly apply the recommendations given by the rating agency in its previous 
assessment, then the rating for this category will again produce a very low score. 
(c) Category Three: Compliance  
The third category is compliance by the board and the Minister with internal and external 
regulatory requirements, from a legal and industry specific perspective. The specific focus of this 
category will entail an examination of the financial accountability mechanisms, including: the 
audit committee, the internal audit control, the frequency of the audits as a form of continual 
assessment and the improvements in any measures to be implemented, compliance with 
legislation, the risk management policy, financial reporting and disclosure mechanisms, the 
external audit and the external auditors.1595  
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The agency will specifically ascertain whether the board of the SOC has been held accountable by 
the state, and to what extent, for any failure to perform any of the mandated financial controls. An 
inability of the state to effectively hold the board accountable for any non-compliance will 
negatively affect the rating of the SOC under this category. This is again different to the approach 
under King IV where the focus is on the board of the SOC as the primary body to ensure the sound 
corporate governance and accountability of the SOC.1596  Under this category the accountability 
of the board and the reciprocal duty on the state to hold the board accountable will be of combined 
importance.  
Annual integrated reports should be simplified and only contain information which is specific to 
that financial year-end and should not comprise a repetition of the previous year’s report. The 
external auditors will be carefully analysed to ensure their independence from the SOC and their 
report on the audit of the SOC’s annual, financial statements will also be examined.1597 Methods 
for ensuring the absolute independence of the external auditors should be implemented by the 
board of the SOC, including: mandatory rotation, continual independence assessments and the 
submission of any potential conflicts of interests.1598  
The directors should be held accountable for compliance with relevant regulations and legislation 
by the SOC and in respect of the fulfilment of their own duties and obligations as directors.1599 
The directors should be held personally accountable and an explanation required for any possible 
litigation instituted against them for a breach of their duties and the imposition of personal or 
criminal liability.1600 Under this category it is the directors and the board who will be examined 
for the fulfilment of their duties, as a collective body and as individuals who owe their duties to 
the SOC.1601 Any breach by the board or the directors may result in the imposition of liability 
either jointly and severally against the entire board or against individual directors.1602 Liability 
should be imposed by the board of the SOC against individual directors, alternatively and secondly 
by the state against the board or the individual directors of the SOC.  
 
1596 Ibid at principle 6 at 114.  
1597 Ibid at principle 8 at 115.  
1598 Companies Act op cit note 11 at section 90 – 2.  
1599 King IV op cit note 19 at principle 7.  
1600 Companies Act op cit note 11 at section 76.  
1601 PFMA op cit note 11 at section 50 & 51 concurrently applied with the Companies Act op cit note 11 at section 76.  





Any adverse findings or investigations made against the SOC by independent institutions such as 
the Auditor-General or Public Protector need to be explained and justified by the board.1603 The 
board needs to prove its compliance with any remedy which is stipulated by such institutions.1604 
The ability of the state to ensure the compliance by the board with its statutory obligations and the 
taking of any stipulated remedial action will be of specific focus under this category. The state 
may withhold the increased remuneration, fees or bonus packages to the directors of the SOC as a 
result of non-compliance or failing to fulfil their duties.1605 This method of withholding rewards 
may be preferable as an enforcement mechanism for the state as opposed to the imposition of 
punishment.  
(d) Category Four: Stakeholder Relations 
The fourth category pertains to the relationship that the board of the SOC maintains with its 
numerous stakeholders. The board of the SOC should be held accountable for maintaining constant 
and effective communication with its stakeholders, including: employees, creditors, regulators, the 
state and the public.1606 The board should disclose such communication methods publicly and 
investigate any stakeholder complaints. A code of conduct for director engagement with 
stakeholders should also be published on the SOC’s website. Under this category, the supervisory 
role of the state, as sole shareholder, will again be brought into consideration.1607  
(e) Category Five: Support Mechanisms 
The last category comprises an analysis of the support mechanisms which the board employs in 
order to meet its accountability requirements. The board should be assisted by various committees 
as well as the company secretary.1608 The mandatory committees should include, depending on the 
size and nature of the SOC: an audit and finance committee, a governance and accountability 
committee, a nominations and removal committee and a compliance committee.  
The position of the company secretary should be continually analysed. A minimum set of 
qualifications should be stipulated in the foundling legislation of the SOC for the appointment of 
 
1603 PAAA op cit note 647; PPA op cit note 682. 
1604 Makwethu (AGSA) op cit note 18 at 10.  
1605 Bezuidenhout op cit note 31 at 13.  
1606 McGregor op cit note 831 at 13.  
1607 Ibid at 17.  





the company secretary.1609 A mandatory rotation of the company secretary after a set period should 
also be stipulated. The role of the company secretary will also be examined, including: 
independence, capacity, availability, number of director interactions, training programmes 
provided to directors, compliance with legislation, communication methods and access for 
directors. 
6.5 The Rating Agency  
The state institutions which were established for the purpose of strengthening democracy, under 
chapter nine of the Constitution, have been utilized effectively as a powerful accountability tool 
for flailing SOCs.1610 The track record of the Public Protector and the Auditor-General are nearly 
impeccable, notwithstanding their operation in the context of a torrential socio-economic 
climate.1611 These institutions have had to overcome continuous threats to their impartiality largely 
due to political interference from the executive. However, the integrity and independence of these 
institutions has remained intact and they have effectively fulfilled their duties and performed their 
functions, without fear, favour or prejudice.1612   
Despite the effectiveness of these state institutions, SOCs still exhibit a lack of accountability 
which contributes to their continuing poor performance. 1613  Therefore, a need arises for the 
establishment of an independent rating agency for SOCs as a state institution under chapter nine 
of the Constitution. This independent state institution will be mandated to annually rate the 
accountability of SOCs. The rating agency is required to be an independent institution due to the 
numerous allegations of corruption against the state which is the sole shareholder of many SOCs. 
These allegations have brought into question the ability of the state to effectively fulfil its 
constitutional obligation to hold the board of SOCs accountable.1614  As an independent state 
institution, the rating agency should be able to perform its functions without fear, favour or 
prejudice, akin to the offices of the Public Protector and Auditor-General.  
 
1609 King IV op cit note 19 at principle 10 at 116.  
1610 Constitution op cit note 11 at ch 9 & section 181.  
1611 SABC case supra note 167 para 24 – 9; Mail & Guardian case supra note 701 para 19 and 22; New National Party 
case supra note 701 para 98 and 99.  
1612 Constitution op cit note 11 at section 181 (2); SABC case supra note 167 para 29 & 53; EFF case supra note 677 
para 54.  
1613 Thabane op cit note 9 at 24; Thomas op cit note 9 at 451; Kanyane op cit note 10 at 30.  
1614 Constitution op cit note 11 at section 92 (2); Kanayane op cit note 10 at 30; Thabane op cit note 9 at 24; Thomas 





The additional powers and functions of the rating agency will be set out in national legislation 
which is to be enacted and is proposed as the Rating Agency Act.1615 The primary function of the 
rating agency will be to carry out annual ratings of SOCs, on an individual basis, according to the 
proposed accountability scorecard and to publish those ratings and deliver them to the National 
Assembly.1616 It is submitted that the proposed Rating Agency Act may incorporate provisions 
relating to: the appointment and removal of its members, the rating process of SOCs, the 
accountability scorecard and the proposed categories, the link between the provision of state 
funding and the rated SOCs; maximum thresholds for state funding to SOCs based on their ratings, 
the reporting and publishing process, its code of conduct, its annual report, its funding 
requirements, the use of its funds and its own disclosure and accountability requirements.1617  
The rating agency remains accountable to the National Assembly at all times as is the case with 
the chapter nine state institutions.1618 It is proposed that Parliament should establish a standing 
committee to deal with and actively engage with the ratings agency whilst at the same time 
respecting and maintaining its independence. As is the case with the SCOPA which deals with the 
Public Protector.1619 The proposed standing committee may advise the state on matters including: 
the appointment and remuneration of members of the rating agency, the additional powers of the 
agency and any complaints referred to the committee, in respect of the agency.1620 The supervisory 
role over SOCs provided by the current committees, SCOPA and the Standing Committee on 
Finance, may be subsumed under the role of the proposed standing committee dealing with the 
rating agency. 
The President, on recommendation of the National Assembly and the proposed rating agency 
standing committee, must appoint the head and the members of the ratings agency.1621 However, 
the proposed Rating Agency Act must stipulate a list of minimum qualifications and experience, 
which members of the agency are required to fulfil in order to be appointed by the President. The 
Constitution must specify that the head of the office of the rating agency may only be held by a fit 
 
1615 This national legislation will be similar to the PPA and the PAA which were enacted in support of the Public 
Protector and Auditor-General when they were established as a chapter nine state institutions under the Constitution 
op cit note 11 at section 181 (2), 182 (1) & 188 (2).  
1616 Ibid at section 181 (5).  
1617 These provisions are largely drawn from the provisions contained in the PPA and the PAA.  
1618 Constitution op cit note 11 at section 181 (5).  
1619 PPA op cit note 682 at section 2 (1).  
1620 Ibid.   





and proper South African who has specialized knowledge and experience in the area of corporate 
governance and accountability.1622  
The tenure of the head of the office of the rating agency should be for a period of seven years in 
order to avoid the issues associated with constant turnover of the position. The head of the office 
may only be removed, prior to the expiry of his or her tenure, in limited circumstances by the 
President or the National Assembly.1623 
6.6 Enforcement of the Rating Agency 
There are potential enforceability issues in respect of the remedial action prescribed by the state 
institutions to SOCs as previously discussed in terms of the remedial action stipulated by the Public 
Protector.1624 In order to combat this issue, an enforcement mechanism needs to be established 
which compels the board of an SOC to resolve any issues raised by the rating agency. A rated SOC 
which achieves a low score will be required to address its accountability issues in order to improve 
its future scoring. A mechanism needs to be implemented to ensure that the SOC takes steps to 
improve its accountability and achieve a better future score. This enforcement mechanism can be 
in the form of a reward which incentivizes action or in the form of punishment which deters non-
compliance.1625  
Currently, the state’s provision of funding to failing SOCs is prolific and there is a lack of 
accountability when it comes to the continued poor performance of the SOC despite numerous 
bailouts provided by the state. 1626 It is argued that there may be room for an enforcement 
mechanism which links the state funding to SOCs with the outcome of their scoring from the rating 
agency.  It is submitted that SOCs with lower ratings are provided with less funding or funding on 
less favourable terms and SOCs with higher ratings are provided with more funding or funding on 
preferential terms. This link between state funding and the rating of the SOC provides an 
enforcement mechanism for accountability which is incentive-based as SOCs with higher ratings 
 
1622 Similar to the requirements for the appointment of the Auditor-General and Public Protector under the Constitution 
at section 193 (1) & (3).  
1623 Ibid at section 194.  
1624 SABC case supra note 167 para 60; De Vos op cit note 714.  
1625 Davies op cit note 709 at 22.  
1626 Futuregrowth op cit note 10 at 42; Kanyane op cit note 10 at 30; Thabane op cit note 9 at 24; National Treasury 





are rewarded with more or preferential state funding. Therefore, the board of an SOC is 
incentivized to achieve actual accountability and receive a high rating from the rating agency. 
The annual rating of an SOC by the rating agency and the link between the rating and the state 
funding to SOCs should be mandated and included in legislation. These rules may be contained in 
the overarching SOE Legislation or the Rating Agency Act or in both statutes. Any state funding 
provided to SOCs must be regulated and maximum thresholds should be set which are linked to 
the annual ratings provided by the agency.  Any state funding must be declared by an SOC and the 
use of those funds must be tracked in its annual financial statements. An inability of the board to 
effectively account, every year, for the utilization of state funds will impact negatively on the 
SOC’s scoring in terms of the third category of the scorecard in an assessment on its internal 
financial controls. 
The link created between the provision of state funds or preferential funding and the outcome of 
the rating will incentivize the board of the SOC to improve its accountability measures and obtain 
a higher rating. An increase in the provision of state funding, or preferential funding, should assist 
in improving the financial and operational performance of the SOC. An SOC which out performs 
its competitors will be able to increase remuneration and director fees and make bonus payments. 
Directors are, therefore, incentivized to ensure that they remain accountable in order to obtain a 
high rating and the benefit of more, or preferential, state funding.  
Incentivized directors should, in turn, reduce the necessity for the continual monitoring and 
supervision by the state, through the Minister, as sole shareholder. The directors will want to be 
accountable and achieve high scores to receive the needed state funding and should not require 
much prompting from the Minister. The reciprocal duty on the state to hold the board of the SOC 
accountable remains an assessment criterion under the scorecard which may also incentivize the 
board to constantly and effectively engage and communicate with the state.  
One of the main components of this enforcement mechanism is the strict implementation of 
transparency and disclosure methods by the SOC. These methods should be legislated and be 
encompassed under the proposed provisions of the overarching SOE Legislation. These proposed 





voluntary recommended practices for the accountability, transparency and disclosure of SOCs 
which are contained in the PFMA, the Companies Acts and King IV.1627  
The mandatory annual rating of an SOC by the rating agency together with the statutory creation 
of a link between the rating score of the SOC and the provision of state funding to that SOC 
establishes a proposed incentive-based enforcement mechanism to ensure the actual accountability 
of the board of an SOC.  
6.7 Implementation of SOC Reform  
The proposed framework for the accountability reform of South African SOCs comprises two 
primary components. In the first instance, two pieces of national legislation would have to be 
enacted. A proposed Rating Agency Act would be implemented which depicts the rules and 
regulations for the establishment of a rating agency which will rate the accountability of SOCs. In 
order to include this rating agency as a state institution, chapter nine of the Constitution would 
have to be amended.1628 An overarching SOE Legislation would also have to actually be enacted 
to govern all aspects relating to SOEs, including SOCs.1629  
In the second instance, the corporate governance approach currently undertaken by SOCs may 
have to be reformed to include the effects brought about by the rating agency and its accountability 
scorecard. The application of accountability would remain voluntary as a principle to be achieved 
by the board of an SOC by whatever structures or measures it chooses to implement whether under 
the auspices of corporate governance or as a standalone principle. However, it is proposed that two 
components of the accountability of SOCs be regulated under the reformed approach. First, a duty 
to account for the directors of SOCs must be made mandatory as a statutory duty embodied under 
the proposed overarching SOE Legislation. Secondly, the annual rating of an SOC by the rating 
agency and the link between the SOC’s rating and the provision of state funding to that SOC must 
be mandated.  
6.8 Statutory Reform 
The statutory reform for the implementation of a rating agency as a chapter nine state institution 
under the Constitution requires two primary actions. First, the Constitution would have to be 
 
1627 PFMA op cit note 11; Companies Act op cit note 11; King IV op cit note 19.  
1628 Constitution op cit note 11 at ch 9.  





amended in order to include the rating agency as a chapter nine state institution.1630 Secondly, 
national legislation would have to be enacted in terms of the overarching SOE Legislation and the 
Rating Agency Act.  
6.8.1 Amendment of the Constitution 
The Constitution would need to be amended to include the rating agency as a chapter nine state 
institution. Chapter nine of the Constitution would need to be amended by a Bill supported by two 
thirds of the members of the National Assembly.1631 Approval of the Bill by the NCOP would not 
be required as the amendment to the Constitution pertains to the establishment of a chapter nine 
institution for the rating of SOCs which is not considered a provincial matter.1632 The process 
detailing an amendment of the Constitution is lengthy and depicted under section 74 of the 
Constitution.1633 This process would have to be initiated efficiently if the rating agency is to be 
utilized to enforce the accountability of SOCs in the near future. 
6.8.2 Enactment of National Legislation  
There are two legislative enactments which are proposed in order to implement the enforceable 
accountability framework for SOCs. The proposed Rating Agency Act would have to be 
implemented as national legislation to govern all of the powers and processes of the rating agency 
as a chapter nine state institution under the Constitution. The overarching SOE Legislation would 
also have to be enacted as national legislation to govern all aspects relating to SOEs, including 
SOCs.  
The national legislative authority vests in Parliament which confers on the National Assembly the 
power to pass legislation.1634 The National Assembly would, by a majority vote of its members, 
pass a Bill governing all aspects relating to the Rating Agency Act.1635 The Bill would then be 
referred to the NCOP where the Bill will be passed, with or without amendment, or rejected.1636 A 
 
1630 Constitution op cit note 11 at ch 9.  
1631 Ibid at section 74 (3)(a).  
1632 Ibid at section 74 (3)(b).  
1633 Ibid at section 74.  
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1635 Ibid at section 53 (1)(a).  





Bill passed by the NCOP without any proposed amendments will be submitted for assent by the 
President.1637 
 A rejected Bill, or one passed with amendments, will be referred back to the National Assembly 
for consideration.1638 The National Assembly may then pass the Bill as national legislation, with 
or without the proposed amendments or decide not to proceed with the Bill.1639 A Bill passed by 
the National Assembly must be submitted to the President for assent.1640 Once the Bill has been 
assented to and signed by the President, it becomes national legislation and must be published in 
the government gazette.1641 The effective date of the statute is the date upon which it comes into 
operation which is the date that the government gazette is published or a date set out in the statute 
itself.1642  
(a) The Rating Agency Act 
The Constitution requires that the office of the Public Protector and the Auditor-General, which 
are established as chapter nine institutions, refer to national legislation to govern their additional 
powers and processes.1643 Akin to these institutions, a rating agency which is established as a 
chapter nine institution would require national legislation to govern all aspects related to its 
implementation, powers and processes.  
This proposed Rating Agency Act will contain two predominant aspects. First, to enact the 
mandated link between the outcome of the SOC rating and the provision of state funding to that 
SOC. Secondly, to regulate the accountability scorecard containing the five categories for the 
rating of SOCs which is to be utilised by the rating agency. The assessment criteria, which fall 
under each category, will be published from time to time under the regulations of the proposed 
Rating Agency Act. The regulated scorecard categories and the published assessment criteria, 
which may be subject to change from time to time, are meant to achieve a sense of uniformity and 
clarity for SOC directors whilst at the same time promoting flexibility to ensure proper application, 
comprehension and understanding of the principle of accountability.  
 
1637 Ibid at section 75 (1)(b).  
1638 Ibid at section 75 (1)(c).  
1639 Ibid at section 75 (1)(c)(i) & (ii) & 55 (1)(a).  
1640 Ibid at section 75 (1)(d).  
1641 Ibid at section 79 & 81.  
1642 Ibid at section 81.  





The Rating Agency Act must mandate the link between the provision of state funding and the 
rating of the SOC with set maximum thresholds of funding or preferential funding based on the 
rating scores, on an ascending scale from zero to ten. As an example, an SOC achieving a level 
one rating will receive state funding or funding on the designated terms which is within the 
parameters set for a level one score and for which there will be maximum thresholds. The state 
will be bound by the provisions of the Rating Agency Act and will not be able to deviate from the 
maximum funding thresholds or designated funding terms.  
In the premise, the directors of SOCs will be incentivized to achieve actual accountability and a 
high rating score as the state will not be able to provide funding to the SOC unless in accordance 
with the provisions of the proposed Rating Agency Act.  
(b) SOE Legislation 
The second aspect of the statutory reform for SOCs is the implementation of the overarching SOE 
Legislation. 1644  The SOE Legislation will include provisions specifically relating to the 
identification and governance of all SOCs which are proposed under next heading of this chapter. 
The SOE Legislation may repeal the PFMA, in its entirety, as well as the provisions of the 
Companies Act and the JSE listing requirements which pertain to SOCs.1645 All of the current rules 
and regulations in under these statutes which pertain to SOCs will be subsumed, with or without 
amendment, under the SOE Legislation. SOCs will be given a transition period, similar to that 
which was given to companies under the Companies Act, to amend their founding legislation to 
ensure alignment with the SOE Legislation. In a conflict between the founding legislation of an 
SOC and the SOE Legislation, the SOE Legislation will prevail.  
The SOE Legislation may resolve the initial hurdle caused by the complicated definitions ascribed 
to SOEs and SOCs under the PFMA and the Companies Act.1646 The SOE Legislation may address 
this issue by amalgamating the differing definitions provided by the PFMA and the Companies 
Act and providing clear definitions thereby eliminating unnecessary duplications and 
contradictions. It is proposed that simplifying and amending the various qualifying criteria for 
SOCs and providing for continual assessment and possible reclassification methods, if 
circumstances dictate, would assist in clearly identifying and categorizing SOEs and SOCs. This 
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improved and accurate classification of all SOEs will assist in identifying and clarifying their 
unique mandates and may avoid conflicts of interest which arise in their fulfilment.  
The enactment of one overarching SOE Legislation may also assist in overcoming some of the 
compliance issues currently facing SOCs. SOCs are required to comply with multiple rules and 
regulations contained in numerous statutes which are often contradictory, convoluted and 
complex.1647 This creates an overly burdensome task for directors of SOCs who have to refer to 
multiple statutes to ensure compliance.  The costs of compliance may be reduced with adherence 
to only statute as opposed to multiple.1648  
There may already be processes in place to enact an overarching piece of national legislation which 
will cover all governance aspects relating to the state’s management of SOEs, as the partial or sole 
shareholder. The Shareholder Management Bill is expected to be presented by the executive to 
Parliament for consideration in 20211649. Arguably, the Bill should resolve many of the issues 
pertaining to the lack of accountability for SOCs with various amendments proposed to the existing 
legislation. The Bill will also aim to establish a framework to ensure that all the boards of all SOEs 
and SOCs are held accountable to the executive.1650 However, this Bill has been in the process of 
being implemented since at least 2014 and it is possible that it may never actually be enacted as 
national legislation.1651 
6.8.3 Proposed Provisions for the SOE Legislation  
The overarching SOE legislation may amend some of the current rules and regulations pertaining 
to SOCs with the objective of addressing their numerous accountability issues. It is submitted that 
there are seven predominant solutions to be proposed in the provisions of the overarching SOE 
Legislation.   
 
 
1647 Kanyane op cit note 10 at 32.  
1648 Ibid.   
1649 Parliamentary Monitoring Group ‘Report of the Portfolio Committee on Public Enterprises on Budget Vote 9: 
Public Enterprises and the Annual Performance Plan for the 2019/2020 of the Department of Public Enterprises’ 
(2019) available at http://pmg.org.za/tabled-committee-report/3867, accessed on 10 September 2020. 
1650  Ana Reporter ‘Public enterprises wants to fast-track oversight bill on SOEs’ IOL 3 July 2019 available at 
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(a) Directors  
The accountability issues facing directors of SOCs will be addressed by the overarching SOE 
Legislation through an amendment of the current rules and regulations. There are, arguably, three 
major challenges which currently impede the accountability of SOC directors and which may be 
resolved through the SOE Legislation.  
In the first instance the SOE Legislation may address the capacity issue facing the directors of 
many SOCs by implementing three requirements. First, a minimum set of qualification criteria for 
the appointment of SOC directors should be legislated.1652 Directors of SOCs may not be appointed 
by the state if they do not satisfy the minimum statutory requirements set out in the SOE 
Legislation. These criteria will be specific to the category of director, whether executive or non-
executive and the criteria for independent, non-executive directors will centre around their 
independence from the SOC in order to avoid any potential conflicts of interest. The founding 
legislation of the SOC may also set out additional qualification criteria for the appointment of its 
directors. 
Secondly, a nominations committee should also become compulsory for SOCs and the state must 
only be allowed to appoint directors by a majority agreement of the nominations committee. This 
nominations committee will also have to be consulted by the state prior to the removal of any 
directors from the board of an SOC. In the premise, the Minister will no longer be allowed to 
appoint or remove directors to, or from, the board of SOCs at his or her sole discretion.1653 
Thirdly, mandatory training for directors of SOCs will also be regulated and directors will be 
required to comply, failing which, they will be removed from their office. The mandatory training 
afforded to directors will assist in educating them on their respective positions, and differing roles, 
as independent, non-executive or executive directors and the duties which they are required to 
fulfil. The training will also centre around compliance with relevant legislation which will beget 
education surrounding the implementation of governance mechanisms to improve the SOC’s 
accountability ratings. This training may dilute an argument for future directors claiming ignorance 
 
1652 Viviers op cit note 1401 at 6.  
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in the event of tyrant chairpersons taking decisions which are not in the best interests of the SOC, 
as was the case with Myeni and the board of SAA.1654 
The continuous evaluation of directors of SOCs by the nominations committee, the minimum 
qualification criteria and the implementation of mandatory training should reduce capacity 
constraints experienced by SOC boards and assist in reducing the turnover of predominant 
executive directors.1655 The frequent turnovers cause disruption in the board’s operations and are 
largely as a result of incapacity from the initial appointment or due to a lack of training after the 
appointment has been made.1656 This risk may be mitigated with the proper screening of directors 
prior to their appointment by the nominations committee and mandatory training on their positions 
and the duties with which they have to comply in order to retain their positions on the board.  
In the second instance, the numerous statutory duties for SOC directors, which make compliance 
a burdensome and time-consuming task, may be resolved by the SOE Legislation. 1657 
Amalgamation of all of the statutory duties stemming from the PFMA and Companies Act would 
assist SOC directors from a compliance perspective.1658 Any duplications of the statutory duties 
may also be amended to avoid unnecessary contradictions and interpretation issues. Directors need 
only source one piece of legislation instead of numerous in order to ascertain which duties they 
owe to the SOC. A duty to account may also be included in the statutory fiduciary duties with 
which the directors of SOCs are required to comply.  
In the third instance, the provisions regarding the liability to be imposed on recalcitrant directors 
may be reformed through the SOE Legislation. Although there are currently statutory measures 
for holding directors personally and criminally liable, they are outdated and ineffectively 
implemented as retributive-based enforcement mechanisms. With the exception of the court orders 
for declaring delinquent directors, the liability provisions set out under the PFMA and Companies 
Act are underutilized.1659 This underutilization may occur, in part, due to the application of the 
numerous safeguards afforded to directors who are alleged to have breached their duties. The SOE 
Legislation should allow for liability to be imposed by the state on the board, jointly and severally, 
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as well as on the individual directors, by the state or the board, for a breach of their duties to the 
SOC.  
An abuse of the safeguards dilutes the enforceability which the liability provisions are meant to 
provide. In addition, the criminal liability imposed under the PFMA in the event of a breach of 
duties for SOC directors is archaic and should be amended if not removed entirely.  The provisions 
pertaining to the liability and safeguards for SOC directors should be complementary and reinforce 
one another in order to be effective as retributive-based enforcement mechanisms for 
accountability.  
SOE Legislation which comprehensively deals with the liabilities, safeguards and duties for SOC 
directors may negate any contradictions and duplications, thereby improving their clarity and 
effectiveness as enforcement mechanisms for accountability.  
(b) The Board and Committees 
The composition of the board for SOCs is currently not mandated and should remain as such with 
a few exceptions and additions. The composition of the board of directors is specific and unique 
for each SOC, depending on the nature of its business, its size and the industry within which it 
operates.1660 Regulating board composition would place uniform requirements on all SOCs which 
would stifle flexibility and the ability to determine the best composition for each specific SOC. A 
one-size fits all, regulatory approach may not be beneficial in ascertaining the best board 
composition for SOCs in terms of the diversity, skills, knowledge and experience of its directors.  
The addition of a compulsory nominations committee, minimum qualification criteria and 
mandatory training for directors, in lieu of uniform rules and regulation for board composition, 
will assist in removing deficiencies in the board composition of SOCs.1661 Based on statutory 
minimum qualification criteria, only select individuals are screened and appointed as directors of 
SOCs based on their individual merits and in the context of the SOC given its nature, mandates 
and specific requirements. The mandatory establishment of the nominations committee, coupled 
with the requirement of its prior approval for appointments, will mean that the board’s opinion 
will be considered in the appointment of directors and the composition of the board.  
 
1660 King IV op cit note 19 at principle 7 at 115.  





The composition of the board of an SOC will form part of the accountability scorecard utilized by 
the rating agency. Category one of the scorecard pertains to the board structure of the SOC and 
includes the board’s composition and the appointment and removal of its directors. The board’s 
governance systems, the attendance of directors at, and the number of, annual board meetings will 
also form part of category one of the scorecard and remain voluntary for the SOC. A uniform and 
regulated approach to the frequency and attendance of board meetings is not conducive to the 
governance of an SOC. The board of an SOC should be allowed the flexibility to determine the 
frequency and attendance of board meetings taking into account its own unique governance 
requirements which may vary based on the nature and size of every SOC.   
The governance processes for directors’ meetings such as: notices, resolutions, proxies, quorums 
and recorded minutes under the Companies Act are clear and comprehensive and should be 
incorporated into the SOE Legislation.1662 The attendance and contribution of directors at board 
meetings should be linked to their renumeration or fees and bonus payments.1663 These rewards 
should act as an incentive mechanism to enforce attendance and meaningful contributions as 
opposed to punishing directors for non-attendance.  
Whilst the composition of the board remains voluntary for the SOC, certain restrictions should be 
legislated. There should be statutory disqualification criteria for the appointment of independent, 
non-executive directors to the board. It is submitted that there should be rules stating that no person 
who has a personal or financial interest, whether director or indirect, in the state should be 
appointed to serve as an independent, non-executive director for an SOC. Similarly, a person 
cannot be appointed as an independent, non-executive director if that person has previously served 
as an executive director for that SOC. The regulation of both of these requirements would have 
prevented the appointment of former chairperson Myeni to the board of SAA which had drastic 
consequences.1664  
The continual analysis of the independence of independent non-executive directors will be a 
function for the nominations committee.1665 Every year the nominations committee must confirm 
that the independent non-executive directors are truly independent and that the minimum 
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qualification criteria, and none of the disqualification criteria, have been satisfied. The supervisory 
role of the independent non-executive directors on the board of an SOC is imperative to its 
composition.1666 The committee should also ensure that mandatory training is imposed, as and 
when required, for all directors to continuously educate them on their respective roles and duties.  
There should be a regulated limitation on the number of years for which an independent non-
executive director can serve on the board of an SOC.1667 After a certain period, for example seven 
years, a director is no longer considered to be independent from the SOC, having been a witness 
to its operations through the board meetings for a number of years. These directors may continue, 
after seven years, to serve on the board as non-executive directors however, they will not be 
classified as independent non-executive directors for the rating purposes of board composition. A 
director may be reappointed to the board of an SOC as independent non-executive director after a 
period of five consecutive years of not serving as any director on the board of that SOC.  
There should also be a mandated limit on the number of boards on which a person may serve as 
an independent non-executive director in any given year.1668 In the appointment of the director, 
the nominations committee will screen the individual and if that individual is already a director, 
regardless of categorization, of four other entities he or she cannot be appointed as a director of 
that SOC. This measure is regulated to avoid capacity constraints for independent non-executive 
directors due to their serving on the boards of too many entities at any one time.  
The compulsory committees which SOCs are required to establish must be legislated as is currently 
the case but with some amendments. The compulsory committees should be: the nominations and 
removal committee, the audit and finance committee, the governance and accountability 
committee and the compliance committee. The board of the SOC will have the discretion to 
compile the contents of the written mandate for each committee.1669 However, the mandates must 
be written and reviewed every quarter by the board to ensure that the committee fulfils its delegated 
responsibilities. The screening of directors by the nominations committee, and their prior approval 
for appointment, should assist in decreasing the frequent turnover of the committee members 
which causes instability and may detract from their ability to complete their responsibilities.  
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Whilst the four committees and their written mandates are compulsory, the composition of the 
committees and their governance will form part of category five of the accountability scorecard 
and remain voluntary for the SOC. The composition of the committees must be determined in line 
with the composition of the board and the nature, size and mandates of the SOC. A regulated 
approach to the composition of the committees may stifle innovation and not cater to the specific 
needs of each SOC. As is evident from the SAA Reports, the regulation of the composition of the 
audit committee did not necessarily result in the efficient performance of its mandate especially 
with regards to the internal audit function.1670 
The SOC may also establish committees in addition to the compulsory ones however, the number 
of committees should be established with due regard to the nature, size and business of the 
particular SOC. Too many or too few a number of committees may be counterproductive for the 
execution of their delegated responsibilities on behalf of the board of the SOC.  
The SOC board may set requirements for the frequency and attendance of committee meetings. 
However, as was illustrated from the SAA Reports, there is no proven link between fulfilment of 
the minimum number of compulsory meetings and the effective fulfilment of the committee’s 
responsibilities.1671 The number of meetings held per year is not as important as the attendance at 
those meetings and the effective fulfilment of the committee’s mandates. Therefore, the number 
of meetings may be left to the discretion of the board of the SOC and form part of the rating 
scorecard instead of being legislated. 
(c) The Shareholder 
The SOE Legislation will primarily deal with the governance aspects pertaining to the SOC, and 
particularly, the accountability of the board. The reciprocal duty of the state, as sole shareholder, 
to hold the board of an SOC to account for its performance will remain a constitutional 
obligation.1672 The implementation of the Shareholder Management Bill may also deal primarily 
with the supervisory role which the state is required to discharge over SOCs and, therefore, 
inclusion of the state’s obligations in the SOE Legislation may be unnecessary.1673 However, the 
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addition of the proposed provisions in the SOE Legislation, set out in this chapter, may assist in 
curbing possible abuses of power which are wielded by the state over the SOC as its sole 
shareholder.  
The abovementioned statutory reform to the appointment, removal and assessment of directors of 
the board of an SOC may assist in preventing the state from abusing its power as the sole 
shareholder. The state is alleged to have made appointments to the boards of SOC due to political 
motivations or as a result of conflicts of interest which meant that the appointments were not made 
with the best interests of the SOC in mind and to better the composition of the board.1674  The 
proposed statutory minimum qualification and disqualification criteria for directors coupled with 
the prior approval of the compulsory nominations committee are improved safeguards in 
preventing political appointments to the boards of SOCs by the state.  
The statutory reward-based enforcement mechanism, in the form of the link between the rating of 
an SOC and the provision of state funding, is another measure which serves to dilute the power of 
the state. The state will be unable to continuously bail out poorly rated SOCs without being subject 
to the provisions of the proposed Rating Agency Act and the maximum funding thresholds. The 
implementation of this reward-based mechanism will also improve the enforceability of the 
retribution-based mechanism which entails holing directors of SOCs liable in the event of breach 
of their duties. The state may be more pro-active in instituting proceedings against recalcitrant 
directors of SOCs in order to improve their accountability ratings and allow for the provision of 
more state funding.   
The state’s duty to hold the board of an SOC to account, whether by reward or retribution is 
measured under various categories of the scorecard and therefore remains paramount. The addition 
of a compulsory compliance committee for an SOC will also assist in ensuring compliance by the 
board with its statutory duties and obligations which shifts the supervisory role to the board and 
averts the detrimental effects of a complacent state.  
Furthermore, the implementation of the rating agency as an independent state institution may also 
assist in overcoming failures by the state to hold the board of an SOC to account. The establishment 
of the rating agency will act as an additional accountability check on the SOC, notwithstanding 
the degree to which the state, as sole shareholder, holds the board of an SOC to account. Therefore, 
 





in the event of a disengaged state shareholder, the rating agency may act as a primary 
accountability check on the board of the SOC.  
The state’s ability to abuse its power as the sole shareholder of an SOC may be restricted due to 
the imposition of the proposed provisions for the SOE Legislation. The state should be incentivized 
to hold the board of an SOC to account in order to improve its ratings and allow for the provision 
of more or preferential state funding. The provision of meagre state funding to an SOC as a result 
of its poor rating may hinder its ability to perform public policy and service delivery mandates on 
behalf of the state. This should incentivise the state to hold the board accountable to improve the 
SOC’s ratings. If the state is not so incentivized, the rating agency may subsume the role of the 
state as the primary mechanism for holding the board of an SOC to account through the 
implementation of the rating system.  
(d) Internal Audit and Company Secretary 
The current statutory provisions pertaining to the internal accountability mechanisms provided by 
the internal audit and the company secretary for SOCs will largely remain unamended. The SOE 
Legislation will contain the amalgamated provisions from the Companies Act and the PFMA with 
regards to the compulsory, internal audit and the appointment of a company secretary for SOCs.1675 
These amalgamated regulations in the SOE Legislation will assist with the board’s compliance 
therewith, as any conflicting regulations will be removed and only one piece of legislation will 
have to be referenced as opposed to multiple.  
The current statutory provisions pertaining to the conducting of an internal audit by the audit 
committee of an SOC are substantial. 1676  Arguably, the issue with the internal audit as an 
accountability mechanism for SOCs lies in its enforceability. Despite being mandated, the Auditor-
General alleges in his consolidated report that many SOCs fail to conduct internal audits 
throughout the year.1677 Retributive measures are seldom levied against the members of the audit 
committee for failing to conduct the statutory internal audits of the SOC.1678 The implementation 
of a reward-based mechanism, linking the rating of the SOC to its funding, may incentivize the 
audit committee members to ensure that the internal audits are conducted in a timeous fashion. 
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The incentivization of the audit members may be a better enforcement mechanism than the current 
retributive measures for the implementation of the internal audit as an accountability measure.  
The addition of a mandatory time period, for which the company secretary may serve the SOC, 
must be included in the SOE legislation. This will attempt to ensure that the independence of the 
company secretary is maintained and avoid any potential conflicts of interest which may comprise 
the ability of the company secretary in the performance of his or her duties. A minimum set of 
qualification criteria for appointment and mandatory training of the company secretary must be 
included in the SOE Legislation in order to avoid capacity constraints.1679 Additional qualification 
criteria may be provided in the founding legislation of an SOC, if required.  
The company secretary must also be a mandatory member of the nominations committee to 
provide guidance on the screening and appointment of directors to the board of an SOC. The 
company secretary must also attend all nomination committee meetings. The prior approval of the 
nominations committee must be a statutory requirement in the board’s appointment and removal 
of the company secretary for the SOC.  
The board of the SOC will be able to voluntarily implement its own governance structures to 
further bolster the accountability mechanisms provided by the internal audit and the company 
secretary. The role of the internal audit of the SOC will be examined by the rating agency under 
category three of the scorecard. The role of the company secretary will be examined by the rating 
agency under category five of the scorecard.  
(e) The External Audit 
The mandatory rules regarding the annual external audit of SOCs are comprehensively governed 
by the PAA, as amended by the PAAA, the APA and the Companies Act.1680 These statutory 
provisions relating to the appointment of auditors for SOCs will be amalgamated and subsumed 
under the SOE Legislation, with minor amendments to include the involvement of the nominations 
committee in the appointment and assessment of the external auditors.  
The nominations committee must provide a recommended list to the board of the SOC, comprising 
its preferred external auditors prior to their appointment every financial year.1681 The independence 
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and capacity of the external auditor will be the primary considerations for the nominations 
committee in its recommendations to the board.1682 The board must select an external auditor from 
the list provided by the nominations committee which is subject to approval by the Auditor-
General.1683 There must be minimum qualification and disqualification criteria for the appointment 
of the external auditors under the SOE Legislation. The reasons for the appointment of the auditor 
by the board, on recommendation by the nominations committee, must be set out in the SOCs 
annual integrated report. 
The maximum period for which an external auditor can be appointed to audit an SOC must be set 
under the SOE Legislation at a consecutive period of five years which is currently the period 
stipulated under the Companies Act.1684 Auditors may only apply for the role of external auditor 
of an SOC after the term of the preceding auditors has expired or upon request by the board of the 
SOC, in the event of the existing auditors being removed prior to the conclusion of their term. The 
mandatory rotation of the external auditors of an SOC, every five years, will assist in maintaining 
their independence. The independence of the external auditors, over their five-year term, will be 
continuously assessed by the nominations committee in order to avoid any conflicts of interest.  
The external auditors may only be removed by the board of the SOC on the expiration of their term 
or with the consent of the Minister and the Auditor-General, as already prescribed.1685 The reason 
for the removal of the external auditor must be set out in the SOCs annual integrated report. 
A predominant issue, in terms of the external audit function, stemmed from a lack of accountability 
by the boards of SOCs in failing to: submit annual financial statements, remedy issues identified 
in disclaimed auditors’ opinions or comply with legislation.1686 The available retributive measures 
were never imposed against directors of SOCs who had failed to comply with their statutory 
obligations which undoubtedly amounted to a breach of their duties.1687  It is submitted that the 
fear of punishment is not an effective enforcement mechanism for the accountability of the board 
of an SOC. The implementation of the proposed reward-based mechanism may improve 
compliance by directors of SOCs with the financial requirements, including the external audit 
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function. The quality of the of the external audit, as well as the external auditors and their 
independence, will form part of the assessment criteria under category three of the accountability 
scorecard. 
(f) External Role Players 
There are currently three predominant external institutions which provide effective accountability 
checks on SOCs. The Auditor-General, the Public Protector and the judiciary currently play an 
indispensable role in improving the accountability of SOCs. The effectiveness of these institutions 
largely stems from their ability to retain their independence from the state, despite numerous 
allegations of state corruption.1688 These institutions have maintained their independence and their 
ability to function without fear, favour or prejudice, and to take action against SOCs and the state 
has remained relatively unscathed. However, the mechanisms available to these institutions to 
enforce the accountability of SOCs and the state needs to be bolstered.  
The office of the Auditor-General was recently given extensive statutory powers to curb and 
prevent fruitless and wasteful expenditure by SOCs. 1689  The effect of these newly enforced 
retributive measures has yet to be fully tested; however, they are expected to assist in the 
accountability of SOCs and prevent the squandering of state funds.  
The office of the Public Protector has proven extremely efficient and capable of investigating the 
actions and conduct of SOCs and ferreting out those suspected of engaging in corrupt practices.1690 
However, the current enforcement mechanism available to the Public Protector in her ability to 
take appropriate remedial action requires revitalization. The remedies of the Public Protector 
appear to be ineffectual enforcement accountability mechanisms for SOCs which are seemingly 
able to circumvent their binding nature.1691 Although the Public Protector is able to refer persons 
suspected of committing a crime during the course of her investigation to the NPA, this is rarely 
done.1692  
Unless the Pubic Protector avails her office of the retributive enforcement mechanism at her 
disposal, compliance with her binding remedies will appear to be voluntary. It is submitted that 
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the Public Protector should also be granted extensive statutory powers to hold directors of SOCs 
personally liable for failing to implement her binding remedies. These powers would be legislated 
in an amendment of the PPA, in a similar fashion to those given to the Auditor-General in the 
PAAA.1693  
The three spheres of government: the executive, legislature and judiciary act as accountability 
checks over one another.1694 The executive has proven itself to be an ineffective accountability 
check over the performance of its own SOCs.1695 The legislature has, to some extent, executed its 
role satisfactorily through passing legislation and establishing committees to control and supervise 
the functioning of SOCs.1696  The functions of the Portfolio Committee, the SCOPA and the 
Standing Committee on Finance, in supervising the performance and conduct of SOCs, may be 
amalgamated and subsumed under the role of the committee to be established for the rating agency.  
The legislature will be required to pass the legislation in terms of the proposed Rating Agency Act 
and the SOE Legislation, in fulfilment of its accountability role over the executive in respect of 
the conduct of its SOCs.  
The judiciary remains an effective accountability enforcement mechanism, as its independence has 
withheld political interference and influence.1697 The judiciary has, over the last decade, been 
called upon to adjudicate allegations of corruption against the state as well as its numerous 
SOCs.1698  Unwavering in its integrity, the court system is still the most effective branch of 
government in the country in terms of maintaining its independence from the other branches of 
government. Without fear, favour or prejudice, the judiciary has impartially adjudicated upon and 
granted orders against the state, or the directors of SOCs, when found guilty of corrupt 
practices.1699  
The only proposed improvement to the adjudication function of the judiciary would be the levying 
of harsher, and more frequent, punishment against recalcitrant SOC directors as an effective 
deterrent for similar future behaviour. The reward-based mechanism, in the link between the rating 
of the SOC and the provision of state funding, may also serve as a better enforcement mechanism 
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for accountability than the current retributive mechanisms. In addition, the reward-based 
mechanism may prove more effective for holding SOC directors to account than the outcome of 
the investigation provided by the Zondo Commission. The investigation and outcome of the Zondo 
Commission is lengthy, costly and a once-off exercise whereas the SOC ratings will be conducted 
annually and will form part of the annual national budget.  
It is further submitted that as a result of the implementation of the reward-based enforcement 
mechanism, the public’s role as an accountability check on SOCs will dwindle. This will be a 
welcome reprieve for the state which is currently inundated with various claims emanating from 
civil rights institutions.1700 Furthermore, civil unrest should decrease as fewer public protests and 
demonstrations will have to be staged against failing SOCs whose performance is likely to improve 
as a result of the implementation of the reward-based enforcement mechanism. The role of the 
public, as an external accountability measure for SOCs, will be restored to an avenue of last resort. 
(g) The SOE Ombuds 
As a result of their limited ability to establish a cause of action and obtain court orders against 
SOCs and recalcitrant directors, the public should be given a direct avenue to lodge complaints 
against SOEs, including SOCs. It is proposed that an SOE Ombuds be established for this purpose, 
as a non-profit company, in terms of the regulations of the SOE Legislation. The primary role of 
the SOE ombudsman will be the resolution of disputes borne out of complaints lodged against 
various SOEs by private citizens.  
The establishment of the SOE Ombuds will open up an alternative avenue for the public, as 
opposed to protests and demonstrations against the state. The SOE Ombuds will be established in 
similar fashion, and with a similar purpose, to the Consumer Goods and Services Ombuds which 
was established due to enactment of the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008.1701  
6.9 Reform of SOC Corporate Governance  
The current corporate governance regime implemented by most SOCs in South Africa entails the 
application of the recommended practices contained in King IV.1702 King IV contains a sector 
specific supplement for the application of sound corporate governance practices for SOCs.1703 
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Given the many recent domestic and global corporate failures, many SOCs have taken to adopting 
the recommended practices from King IV in, arguably, a ‘tick box’ fashion in an effort to assure 
investors and instil confidence in the public.1704  However, the argument over the causal link 
between sound corporate governance practices and the performance of the entity is still a hotly 
debated topic.1705 
Notwithstanding this debate, the accountability of the board of an SOC should always be 
considered of primary importance.1706 Regardless of good or bad performance, the board of an 
SOC must always account for its decisions which are to be taken in the best interests of the SOC 
at all times. It is evident from an examination of the SAA Reports that a lack of accountability 
from the board of an SOC may negatively impact its financial performance .1707 The board and 
directors of an SOC should focus on the achievement of accountability, regardless of the 
mechanism utilized of which corporate governance is just one.1708  
Accountability is the predominant principle which is lacking in almost all South African SOCs.1709 
The accountability scorecard, utilized by the rating agency, contains five categories with various 
assessment criteria which also comprise elements of fairness, disclosure and responsibility. 
Therefore, with accountability as the primary principle all of the other principles are inter-related 
and are also accounted for under the scorecard although they are of a secondary nature. The 
achievement of accountability may result in the achievement of the other important principles of 
good corporate governance due to their inter-relatedness.1710  
King IV has been criticized for failing ensure the actual achievement of the principle of 
accountability through the implementation of its numerous recommended practices.1711 It is also 
submitted that King IV failed to provide adequate recommendations for the specific nature of 
SOCs and the unique consequences facing them as a result of the state being their sole shareholder. 
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As illustrated by the SAA Reports, it is evident that an application of the King Codes does not 
necessarily result in the achievement of accountability of the board of an SOC.1712  
Therefore, it is submitted that instead of mindlessly applying the numerous recommended practices 
contained in King IV, the board of an SOC should comprehensively debate the best mechanism 
for achieving accountability. The adoption of King IV may not be the best approach for SOCs in 
the achievement of accountability and it may not even be the adoption of corporate governance 
practices at all. 
The proposed accountability scorecard to be utilized by the rating agency will be legislated while 
the assessment criteria in each category of the scorecard will be published in the regulations of the 
proposed Rating Agency Act and may be subject to amendment from time to time. The assessment 
criteria must always align to corporate trends and the prevailing economic circumstances of South 
Africa. This will avoid stagnation of the statute as is currently the case with the identification and 
categorization of various SOEs and SOCs under the PFMA.  
It is only the assessment criteria which will be published and not any recommended practices for 
the achievement of the criteria for SOC directors. This method will attempt to prevent a ‘tick-box’ 
mentality in mindlessly applying the recommended practices for good corporate governance.1713 
The board of an SOC will have the discretion to implement any mechanism it deems sufficient in 
order to effectively achieve the principle of accountability. The rating agency will then rate the 
accountability by the SOC, through the scorecard which comprises the five statutory categories 
and their various assessment criteria.  
The outcome of the rating will be presented to the SOC so that the board can improve on the rating 
score for the following year. The SOC will then also receive state funding, if required, in 
accordance with its specific rating and the maximum thresholds which are set in accordance with 
the provisions of the proposed Rating Agency Act.  
The establishment of a mandatory governance and accountability committee for the SOC in terms 
of the SOE Legislation will also assist with the achievement of accountability. This committee will 
be mandated to ensure that the principle of accountability is achieved by the board of the SOC 
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through the implementation of any mechanisms, practices or structures. The strategic planning of 
this committee will entail an examination of the various categories and assessment criteria under 
the proposed Rating Agency Act and its regulations. The committee will be required to ensure that 
the principle of accountability is actually achieved by the board of the SOC, given its unique 
nature, size and business operations. The committee will also act as the medium between the rating 
agency and the SOC by providing information and setting up requisite interviews, thereby 
prompting an efficient and accurate rating process.  
Currently, one of the predominant issues pertaining to the voluntary application of King IV by the 
board of an SOC, is the lack of an appropriate enforcement mechanism. 1714  This voluntary 
application is subjective and discretionary and, as depicted by the SAA Reports, the board of an 
SOC may claim to have implemented all of the recommended practices in King IV without any 
evidence of their actual implementation.1715 The establishment of an independent, third party 
rating agency will attempt to resolve this issue of the perceived accountability of an SOC. The 
rating provided by the rating agency may be a better indication of the mechanisms actually 
implemented by the board of an SOC in its attempts to achieve accountability, in comparison to 
the blanket statements which are made in the annual integrated reports.   
Furthermore, the link between the rating of the SOC and the provision of state funding will act as 
a reward-based enforcement mechanism for the achievement of accountability. The more effective 
the mechanisms which are implemented by the SOC and the greater the level of accountability, 
the higher the rating from the rating agency. A high rating will attract more funding or funding on 
preferential terms from the state. Therefore, the directors of an SOC, through its governance and 
accountability committee, are incentivized to implement effective structures to achieve actual 
accountability as the provision of state funds to the SOC will have a direct impact on their 
remuneration or fees and bonus payments.  
In the premise, the board of an SOC still has the discretion to employ any method at its disposal, 
including corporate governance, in order to achieve accountability. The proposed framework for 
the enforceable accountability of SOCs comprises elements of both retribution-based and reward-
based systems. Directors of SOCs who fail to fulfil their duties and obligations may be held 
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personally liable or declared delinquents, in accordance with the statutory retributive measures 
contained in the SOE Legislation. Directors of SOCs are incentivized, with the possibility of 
greater remuneration or fees and bonus payments, to obtain high accountability ratings which will 
result in more, or preferential, state funding in accordance with the proposed Rating Agency Act.   
6.10 Conclusion  
The proposed framework to resolve the accountability issues facing SOCs involves statutory and 
corporate governance reform. Accountability will be enforced for SOCs by establishing an 
independent rating agency act, as a chapter nine state institution, which will annually rate an SOC 
in terms of an accountability scorecard. The accountability scorecard will contain five uniform 
categories with numerous assessment criteria. The rating of the SOC will be linked to the 
provisions of its state funding, on an ascending scale with set maximum funding thresholds. This 
reward-based enforcement mechanism serves to incentivise the board of an SOC in actually 
achieving the principle of accountability.  
The rating agency will be subject to the provisions of a proposed Rating Agency Act and 
established through an amendment to chapter nine of the Constitution. An overarching SOE 
Legislation will govern all aspects relating to SOEs, including SOCs and the proposed statutory 
provisions will attempt to overcome some of the accountability issues currently facing SOCs. The 
corporate governance of SOCs will be reformed in that the board of an SOC may achieve 
accountability under the umbrella of its corporate governance structures or as a standalone 
principle. The proposed framework for the enforceable accountability of SOCs serves to improve 













CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.  Introduction  
The accountability and performance of South African SOCs has deteriorated over the last decade. 
From an examination of the SAA Reports, it is evident that SAA has suffered largescale 
accountability issues which may have negatively impacted its financial performance. One of the 
main issues contributing to this lack of accountability for SAA stemmed from the absence of an 
appropriate enforcement mechanism. Without being enforced, the accountability of the board of 
SAA has been virtually non-existent. The proposed framework for the concept of enforceable 
accountability entails a statutory and corporate governance reform for SOCs which may serve to 
improve their accountability and future performance.  
7.1  Recommendations  
The current accountability framework for SOCs in South Africa comprises compliance with 
statutory requirements and the voluntary application of the recommended practices for good 
corporate governance encompassed under King IV. Despite a plethora of internal and external 
accountability mechanisms, SOCs still display a chronic lack of accountability. The state’s failure 
to hold the boards of SOCs accountable has significantly contributed to their poor historical track 
record of performance.  
A complacent state has failed to ensure the accountability of the boards of SOCs due to an 
underutilization of the statutory retributive measures at its disposal. In addition to underutilised 
retributive measures, the absence of a correlation between the performance of the directors and the 
SOC and the provision of rewards, in the form of remuneration or fees and bonus packages, has 
further diluted the enforcement of holding SOC boards accountable. Without the implementation 
of an appropriate enforcement mechanism, whether in the form of retribution or reward, the board 
of an SOC is not held accountable for its decision taking which is meant to be in the best interests 
of the SOC at all times. This failure to account means that decisions may be taken which are not 
in the best interests of the SOC and, if left unchecked, this may negatively impact the performance 
of the SOC.  
The proposed framework for enforceable accountability attempts to resolve the lack of 
accountability exhibited by SOCs with the objective of improving their future performance. Well 





resources will be alleviated, to a certain extent. The framework recommends the enforcement of 
the accountability of the board of an SOC and directors in three main respects. The first two aspects 
of the recommendations set out the statutory reform and the last one the corporate governance 
reform for SOCs.  
7.1.1  SOE Legislation Proposed Provisions  
Firstly, the enactment of an overarching SOE Legislation which will govern all aspects relating to 
SOEs and SOCs is re-iterated. The proposal of an overarching legislation for SOEs was first made 
by the Presidential Review Committee on State-Owned Entities in 2012 but has yet to be actually 
enacted. Therefore, this thesis sets out the basis for a proposal to efficiently enact an overarching 
SOE Legislation to govern all aspects relating to SOCs which will serve to reduce compliance 
costs and remove existing contradictions and complexities in the current statutes which govern 
SOCs.   
The amalgamation of the current statutory provisions pertaining to the identification and 
categorisation of SOCs, with reference to the PFMA and Companies Act (as well as their own 
founding legislation) in the SOE Legislation will also assist in removing any inconsistencies and 
clarify the definition of SOEs and SOCs in South Africa.  
The proposed statutory provisions in the SOE Legislation may also overcome accountability issues 
currently facing SOCs such as SAA. The proposed provisions of the SOE Legislation are set out 
under the subsequent sub-headings.  
(a) Directors, Boards and their Committees  
For directors, the recommended statutory provisions include: the insertion of a mandatory 
nominations and removal committee, mandatory training for all directors, regulated minimum 
qualification criteria for the appointment of directors, the amalgamation of the current statutory 
director’s duties, the insertion of a duty to account and an updating of the current statutory liability 
provisions in the event of a breach of the duties.  
The recommended statutory provisions to assist the board, as a collective body, include: 
disqualification criteria for independent non-executive directors, constant board evaluations, a 
mandatory annual assessment and disclosure of the independence of independent non-executive 





committee, governance and accountability committee and compliance committee) and a limited 
number of boards on which an independent non-executive director may serve in any given year.  
It is recommended that board and committee composition as well as the governance of board and 
committee meetings, in terms of frequency and attendance (but excluding notices, quorums, 
adjournments, minutes and resolutions which should remain regulated) should be at the discretion 
of the SOC and not be regulated which may result in a restrictive one-size fits all approach. Board 
and committee composition and governance, limited to the attendance of meetings and the 
frequency of such meetings, should be set by the SOC with reference to its nature, size and 
business.  
(b) The State 
The state’s reciprocal duty, as sole shareholder, to hold the board of an SOC accountable will also 
be addressed through the proposed statutory provisions. The state will no longer be able to solely 
appoint and remove directors as it will require the prior approval of the mandatory nominations 
committee of the SOC. Furthermore, the addition of mandatory minimum qualification criteria for 
director appointment may serve to curtail the number of political appointments to the boards of 
SOCs.  The extension of the independence of independent non-executive directors to prevent the 
appointment of persons related (or interested parties) to the state may also reduce the number of 
political appointments.  
The addition of a compulsory compliance committee for an SOC may also assist the state in 
holding the board accountable for its compliance with relevant legislation. The imposition of set 
maximum funding thresholds which are linked to the rating outcome of the SOC will also dilute 
the power of the state by curtailing the state’s ability to provide funding to an SOC, without 
limitation.  
(c) Company Secretary and Audits 
The role of the company secretary in the accountability of SOCs will also be bolstered through the 
statutory provisions which include: minimum qualification criteria for the appointment of the 
company secretary, the imposition of a maximum tenure, mandatory inclusion as a member of the 
nominations committee and mandatory training for directors.  
The proposed statutory provisions will also cover some of the issues associated with the internal 





as currently contained in relevant statutes. However, the addition of the statutory reward-based 
mechanism, in linking the funding of the SOC to its rating, may serve as a better enforcement 
mechanism to incentivise the directors to actually conduct internal audits and to ensure that a 
proper independent, external audit is conducted every year. The external auditors will only be 
appointed on recommendation by the nominations committee, subject to the satisfaction of the 
minimum qualification criteria (with a strict focus on independence) and for a maximum period of 
five years.  
(d) SOE Ombuds 
It is lastly recommended that the statutory provisions propose the establishment of an SOE 
Ombuds to resolve disputes from complaints lodged with it by the public against SOEs, including 
SOCs.  
7.1.2  The Rating Agency Act 
Secondly, it is recommended that a Rating Agency Act be enacted which will establish a rating 
agency as an independent, state institution under chapter nine of the Constitution. The statutory 
reform of this proposal will include the enactment of national legislation as the Rating Agency Act 
to govern all aspects relating to the rating agency and rating process and an amendment to chapter 
nine of the Constitution to establish the rating agency as an independent, state institution.  
The proposed Rating Agency Act will implement a statutory scorecard with five uniform 
categories containing various assessment criteria against which the accountability of SOCs will be 
rated. The five uniform categories will be: understanding the ownership and board structures, the 
accountability of the board, compliance, stakeholder relations and support mechanisms. The 
assessment criteria are contained in the regulations to the proposed Rating Agency Act and are 
subject to amendment, from time to time, to ensure their alignment with the prevailing socio-
economic circumstances in South Africa and global corporate trends.  
The proposed Rating Agency Act will also set out a mandatory link between the rating of the SOC 
and the provision of state funding to the SOC, with maximum set thresholds based on the level of 
rating achieved, on an ascending scale. This mandated link will serve to incentivize the board of 
the SOC to achieve actual accountability and a high rating in order to receive more or preferential 





state funding is to act as a reward-based enforcement mechanism for the accountability of the 
board of an SOC.  
This enforcement mechanism will also serve to incentivise the state, as sole shareholder, to hold 
the board accountable as it will no longer be able to provide state funding at its sole discretion to 
SOCS (many of which discharge public policy functions on behalf of the state).  
7.1.3  Corporate Governance Reform 
Thirdly, it is proposed that the focus by the board of the SOC is the achievement of accountability 
as a standalone principle or under the umbrella of the corporate governance recommended 
practices under King IV. This approach deviates from the current approach in that SOCs 
predominantly utilise only corporate governance methods to attempt to achieve accountability. 
Whilst corporate governance structures may also be implemented by the board of an SOC, its 
priority should be the achievement of accountability through the implementation of any 
mechanisms, structures or practices. The achievement of accountability remains at the discretion 
of the board of the SOC and is not regulated through legislation.  
The addition of the reward-based enforcement mechanism also shifts the focus from punishing the 
directors in the event of a breach of their duties to rewarding them for fulfilling their duties. The 
enforceable accountability framework includes a combination of the current retributive measures, 
with slight variations to the statutory liability provisions and the proposed reward measures, 
largely in the form of linking the rating of the SOC to its state funding, on an ascending scale.  
The achievement of accountability by the board of an SOC will be one of the categories of the 
mandated, uniform scorecard of the rating agency and is an underlying principle throughout the 
other categories and assessment criteria of the scorecard. This proposed enforceable accountability 
framework is designed to ensure the actual achievement of accountability which may serve to 
improve the future performance of SOCs.  
7.2 Possible Issues 
The implementation of the proposed framework for the enforceable accountability for SOCs may 
encounter its own issues. The initial set up costs of the rating agency, through the implementation 
of the proposed Rating Agency Act, may deplete valuable state resources. The logistics in 
administering the rating agency may initially prove overwhelming for the strained capacity of the 





rating may involve lengthy processes and procedures over which period many SOCs may further 
deteriorate. Many more SOCs may go into business rescue or possibly liquidation proceedings.1716 
The costs associated in waiting for the implementation of the requisite legislation may be too high 
and result in irrevocable consequences for many SOCs.  
However, the long-term benefits of accountable and well performing SOCs should outweigh the 
initial set up and administration costs. The government should call upon available resources and 
the assistance of governance experts in order to effectively establish the rating agency, enact the 
SOE Legislation and the proposed Rating Agency Act and assist in the agency’s first rating. The 
assistance of governance experts, such as the Institute of Directors South Africa, may also serve 
to reduce the timeframe for the implementation of this reform which will prove invaluable for 
many rapidly deteriorating SOCs. The executive and legislature should make the implementation 
of this reformed framework a priority to foster the long-term sustainability of financially 
underperforming SOCs and reverse the drain which these SOCS have on the state’s limited 
resources.  
Another issue for the proposed framework may stem from the rigidity of the statutory provision of 
state funding to SOCs based on their accountability ratings. There are no proposed exceptions to 
the maximum thresholds, or preferential terms, for the provision of state funding to SOCs which 
is linked to their ratings. This omission of exceptions means that the state is afforded no discretion 
and is not able to deviate from the provisions of the proposed Rating Agency Act. The state is only 
able to provide funding to the SOC in accordance with the maximum thresholds contained in the 
proposed Rating Agency Act. 
The availability of exceptions for the state may ultimately result in an abuse of power in terms of 
the provision of funding to SOCs. The implementation of the rating agency and the link between 
the rating of the SOC and the provision of state funding is meant to prevent possible abuses of 
power by the state. However, the rigidity of these statutory provisions may result in many more 
SOCs facing possible business rescue or liquidation proceedings in the event of consistently poor 
ratings for which they receive limited state funding. It is therefore submitted that the only way to 
remedy this issue would be to implement the proposed framework for the enforceable 
 





accountability of SOCs and to adjudicate it on a trial and error basis before any possible 
amendments are initiated to the reform after conscientious deliberation.   
7.3  Concluding Remarks 
The accountability and performance of SOCs has been a hugely detrimental issue for the South 
African economy over the last decade. Arguably contributing to the inevitable downgrade to junk 
status, these financially underperforming SOCs have placed a huge strain on the state’s limited 
resources. Many SOCs have become fully reliant on state funding, despite their categorisation as 
‘Enterprises’ which means that they should be capable of financial independence due to the 
successful discharging of their commercial mandates.  
As a developing economy with many SOEs to support, who aren’t capable of being financially 
independent from the state, these SOCs are in need of a reform to improve their financial 
performance and alleviate their drain on the state’s resources.  
Not without its own possible issues, the proposed enforceable accountability framework provides 
a stepping stone to improving the accountability and performance of SOCs. With the 
implementation of the proposed statutory and corporate governance reform set out in this thesis, 
underperforming SOCs may once again become financially independent from the state. The 
enforceable accountability of SOCs serves to improve their accountability and future performance 
which will, in turn, alleviate their reliance on state funding thereby assisting in the growth and 
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